Microsoft Windows 2012 Server Domain Name System Security Technical Implementation Guide

Version

WDNS-AU-000001

Vuln IDs

V-58543

Rule IDs

SV-72973r3_rule

Without a means for identifying the individual that produced the information, the information cannot be relied upon. Identifying the validity of information may be delayed or deterred. This requirement ensures organizational personnel have a means to identify who produced or changed specific information in transfers, zone information, or DNS configuration changes.

Checks: C-59415r3_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select “Properties”. Click on the “Event Logging” tab. By default, all events are logged. Verify "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected. If any option other than "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63927r2_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. If not automatically started, initialize the “Server Manager” window by clicking its icon from the bottom left corner of the screen. On the opened “Server Manager” window, from the left pane, click to select “DNS”. From the right pane, under the “SERVERS” section, right-click the DNS server. From the displayed context menu, click the “DNS Manager” option. Click on the “Event Logging” tab. Select the "Errors and warnings" or "All events" option. Click on “Apply”. Click on “OK”.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must, in the event of an error validating another DNS servers identity, send notification to the DNS administrator.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58547 - SV-72977r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-AU-000003

Vuln IDs

V-58547

Rule IDs

SV-72977r3_rule

Failing to act on the validation errors may result in the use of invalid, corrupted, or compromised information. The validation of bindings can be achieved, for example, by the use of cryptographic checksums. Validations must be performed automatically. At a minimum, the application must log the validation error. However, more stringent actions can be taken based on the security posture and value of the information. The organization should consider the system's environment and impact of the errors when defining the actions. Additional examples of actions include automated notification to administrators, halting system process, or halting the specific operation. The DNS server should audit all failed attempts at server authentication through DNSSEC and TSIG/SIG(0). The actual auditing is performed by the OS/NDM, but the configuration to trigger the auditing is controlled by the DNS server.

Checks: C-59419r3_chk

Windows 2008 DNS servers, hosting Active Directory integrated zones, transfer zone information via AD replication. Windows 2008 DNS servers hosting non-AD-integrated zones as a secondary name server and/or are not hosting AD-integrated zones use zone transfer to sync zone data. If the Windows 2008 DNS server only hosts AD-integrated zones and all other name servers for the zones hosted are Active Directory Domain Controllers, this requirement is not applicable. If the Windows 2008 DNS server is not an Active Directory Domain Controller, or is a secondary name server for a zone with a non-AD-integrated name server as the master, this requirement is applicable. Administrator notification is only possible if a third-party event monitoring system is configured or, at a minimum, there are documented procedures requiring the administrator to review the DNS logs on a routine, daily basis. If a third-party event monitoring system is not configured, or a document procedure is not in place requiring the administrator to review the DNS logs on a routine, daily basis, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63931r2_fix

To detect and notify the administrator, configure a third-party event monitoring system or, at a minimum, document and implement a procedure to require the administrator to check the DNS logs on a routine, daily basis.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server log must be enabled.

AU-12 - Medium - CCI-000169 - V-58549 - SV-72979r3_rule

RMF Control

AU-12

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-000169

Version

WDNS-AU-000005

Vuln IDs

V-58549

Rule IDs

SV-72979r3_rule

Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident, or identify those responsible for one. The actual auditing is performed by the OS/NDM, but the configuration to trigger the auditing is controlled by the DNS server.

Checks: C-59421r2_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select “Properties”. Click on the “Event Logging” tab. By default, all events are logged. Verify "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected. If any option other than "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63933r2_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select “Properties”. Click on the “Event Logging” tab. By default, all events are logged. Select the "Errors and warnings" or "All events" option. Click on “Apply”. Click “OK”.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server logging must be enabled to record events from all DNS server functions.

AU-12 - Medium - CCI-000169 - V-58551 - SV-72981r3_rule

RMF Control

AU-12

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-000169

Version

WDNS-AU-000006

Vuln IDs

V-58551

Rule IDs

SV-72981r3_rule

DNS server performance can be affected when additional logging is enabled, however the enhanced DNS logging and diagnostics feature in Windows Server 2012 R2 is designed to have a very low impact on performance. Enhanced DNS logging and diagnostics in Windows Server 2012 R2 and later includes DNS Audit events and DNS Analytic events. DNS audit logs are enabled by default, and do not significantly affect DNS server performance. DNS analytical logs are not enabled by default and typically will only affect DNS server performance at very high DNS query rates. Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. The actual auditing is performed by the OS/NDM, but the configuration to trigger the auditing is controlled by the DNS server. In order to compile an accurate risk assessment, it is essential for security personnel to know what is being performed on the system, where an event occurred, when an event occurred, and by whom the event was triggered. Logging the actions of specific events provides a means to investigate an attack, recognize resource utilization or capacity thresholds, or to simply identify an improperly configured DNS system. If auditing is not comprehensive, it will not be useful for intrusion monitoring, security investigations, and forensic analysis. It is important, therefore, to log all possible data related to events so that they can be correlated and analyzed to determine the risk. Data required to be captured include: whether an event was successful or failed, the event type or category, timestamps for when the event occurred, where the event originated, who/what initiated the event, affect the event had on the DNS implementation and any processes associated with the event.

Checks: C-59423r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Open an elevated Windows PowerShell prompt on a DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Use the Get-DnsServerDiagnostics cmdlet to view the status of individual diagnostic events. All diagnostic events should be set to "True". If all diagnostic events are not set to "True", this is a finding.

Fix: F-63935r1_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Open an elevated Windows PowerShell prompt on the DNS server to which event logging needs to be enabled. Use the Set-DnsServerDiagnostics cmdlet to enable all diagnostic events at once. Set-DnsServerDiagnostics -All $true <enter> Also enable debug log rollover. Set-DnsServerDiagnostics - EnableLogFileRollover $true <enter>

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server logging criteria must only be configured by the ISSM or individuals appointed by the ISSM.

AU-12 - Medium - CCI-000171 - V-58553 - SV-72983r3_rule

RMF Control

AU-12

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-000171

Version

WDNS-AU-000007

Vuln IDs

V-58553

Rule IDs

SV-72983r3_rule

Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. The actual auditing is performed by the OS/NDM, but the configuration to trigger the auditing is controlled by the DNS server. Since the configuration of the audit logs on the DNS server dictates which events are logged for the purposes of correlating events, the permissions for configuring the audit logs must be restricted to only those with the role of ISSM or those appointed by the ISSM.

Checks: C-59425r3_chk

Verify the effective setting in Local Group Policy Editor. Run "gpedit.msc". Navigate to Local Computer Policy >> Computer Configuration >> Windows Settings >> Security Settings >> Local Policies >> User Rights Assignment. If any accounts or groups other than the following are granted the "Manage auditing and security log" user right, this is a finding: Administrators Auditors (if the site has an Auditors group that further limits this privilege.) Verify the permissions on the DNS logs. Standard user accounts or groups must not have greater than READ access. The default locations are: DNS Server %SystemRoot%\System32\Winevt\Logs\DNS Server.evtx Using the file explorer tool navigate to the DNS Server log file. Right click on the log file, select the “Security” tab. The default permissions listed below satisfy this requirement: Eventlog - Full Control SYSTEM - Full Control Administrators - Full Control If the permissions for these files are not as restrictive as the ACLs listed, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63937r2_fix

Configure the permissions on the DNS logs. Standard user accounts or groups must not have greater than READ access. The default permissions listed below satisfy this requirement: Eventlog - Full Control SYSTEM - Full Control Administrators - Full Control The default locations are: DNS Server %SystemRoot%\System32\Winevt\Logs\DNS Server.evtx

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must generate audit records for the success and failure of all name server events.

AU-12 - Medium - CCI-000172 - V-58555 - SV-72985r3_rule

RMF Control

AU-12

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-000172

Version

WDNS-AU-000008

Vuln IDs

V-58555

Rule IDs

SV-72985r3_rule

Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. The actual auditing is performed by the OS/NDM, but the configuration to trigger the auditing is controlled by the DNS server. In order to compile an accurate risk assessment, it is essential for security personnel to know what is being performed on the system, where an event occurred, when an event occurred, and by whom the event was triggered. Logging the actions of specific events provides a means to investigate an attack, recognize resource utilization or capacity thresholds, or to simply identify an improperly configured DNS system. If auditing is not comprehensive, it will not be useful for intrusion monitoring, security investigations, and forensic analysis. It is important, therefore, to log all possible data related to events so that they can be correlated and analyzed to determine the risk. Data required to be captured include: whether an event was successful or failed, the event type or category, timestamps for when the event occurred, where the event originated, who/what initiated the event, affect the event had on the DNS implementation and any processes associated with the event.

Checks: C-59427r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select Properties. Click on the Event Logging tab. By default, all events are logged. Verify "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected. If any option other than "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected, this is a finding. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Open an elevated Windows PowerShell prompt on a DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Use the Get-DnsServerDiagnostics cmdlet to view the status of individual diagnostic events. All diagnostic events should be set to "True". If all diagnostic events are not set to "True", this is a finding. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, the Enhanced DNS logging and diagnostics in Windows Server 2012 R2 must also be enabled. Run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Confirm the "Enable logging" check box is selected. If the check box to enable analytic and debug logs is not enabled on a Windows 2012 R2 DNS server, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63939r1_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. If not automatically started, initialize the Server Manager window by clicking its icon from the bottom left corner of the screen. On the opened Server Manager window, from the left pane, click to select DNS. From the right pane, under the SERVERS section, right-click the DNS server. From the displayed context menu, click the DNS Manager option. Click on the Event Logging tab. Select the "Errors and warnings" or "All events" option. Click on Apply. Click on OK. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Select the "Enable logging" check box. Click on OK. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Open an elevated Windows PowerShell prompt on the DNS server to which event logging is to be enabled. Use the Set-DnsServerDiagnostics cmdlet to enable all diagnostic events at once. Set-DnsServerDiagnostics -All $true <enter> Also enable debug log rollover. Set-DnsServerDiagnostics - EnableLogFileRollover $true <enter>

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must implement NIST FIPS-validated cryptography for provisioning digital signatures, generating cryptographic hashes, and protecting unclassified information requiring confidentiality.

SC-13 - Medium - CCI-002450 - V-58557 - SV-72987r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-13

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002450

Version

WDNS-SC-000031

Vuln IDs

V-58557

Rule IDs

SV-72987r3_rule

Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. The application must implement cryptographic modules adhering to the higher standards approved by the federal government since this provides assurance they have been tested and validated. The choice of digital signature algorithm will be based on recommended algorithms in well-known standards. NIST's Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [FIPS186] provides three algorithm choices: * Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) * RSA * Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA). Of these three algorithms, RSA and DSA are more widely available and considered candidates of choice for DNSSEC. In terms of performance, both RSA and DSA have comparable signature generation speeds, but DSA is much slower for signature verification. RSA is the recommended algorithm as far as this guideline is concerned. RSA with SHA-1 is currently the only cryptographic algorithm mandated to be implemented with DNSSEC, although other algorithm suites (i.e. RSA/SHA-256, ECDSA) are also specified. It can be expected that name servers and clients will be able to use the RSA algorithm at the minimum. It is suggested that at least one ZSK for a zone use the RSA algorithm. NIST's Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (FIPS 180-3) specifies SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as approved hash algorithms to be used as part of the algorithm suite for generating digital signatures using the digital signature algorithms in the NIST's DSS[FIPS186]. It is expected that there will be support for Elliptic Curve Cryptography in the DNSSEC. The migration path for USG DNSSEC operation will be to ECDSA (or similar) from RSA/SHA-1 and RSA/SHA-256 before September 30th, 2015.

Checks: C-59429r2_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Review the zone's RRs in the right window pane. For zones signed with DNSSEC, review the DNSKEY encryption in the Data column. Example: [DNSKEY][RsaSha1][31021] Confirm the encryption algorithm specified in the DNSKEY's Data is at RsaSha1, at a minimum. If the specified encryption algorithm is not RsaSha1 or stronger, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63941r2_fix

Sign or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click “Sign the Zone”, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server log must include event types within the log records.

AU-3 - Medium - CCI-000130 - V-58561 - SV-72991r3_rule

RMF Control

AU-3

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-000130

Version

WDNS-AU-000010

Vuln IDs

V-58561

Rule IDs

SV-72991r3_rule

Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. The actual auditing is performed by the OS/NDM, but the configuration to trigger the auditing is controlled by the DNS server. In order to compile an accurate risk assessment, it is essential for security personnel to know what is being performed on the system, where an event occurred, when an event occurred, and by whom the event was triggered. Logging the actions of specific events provides a means to investigate an attack, recognize resource utilization or capacity thresholds, or to simply identify an improperly configured DNS system. If auditing is not comprehensive, it will not be useful for intrusion monitoring, security investigations, and forensic analysis. It is important, therefore, to log all possible data related to events so that they can be correlated and analyzed to determine the risk. Data required to be captured include: whether an event was successful or failed, the event type or category, timestamps for when the event occurred, where the event originated, who/what initiated the event, affect the event had on the DNS implementation and any processes associated with the event.

Checks: C-59433r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. From the right pane, under the SERVERS section, right-click the DNS server. From the displayed context menu, click the DNS Manager option. Click on the Event Logging tab. By default, all events are logged. Verify "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected. If any option other than "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected, this is a finding. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, the Enhanced DNS logging and diagnostics in Windows Server 2012 R2 must also be enabled. Run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Confirm the "Enable logging" check box is selected. If the check box to enable analytic and debug logs is not enabled on a Windows 2012 R2 DNS server, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63945r1_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. From the right pane, under the SERVERS section, right-click the DNS server. From the displayed context menu, click the DNS Manager option. Click on the Event Logging tab. Select the "Errors and warnings" or "All events" option. Click on Apply. Click on OK. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Select the "Enable logging" check box. Click on OK.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server log must include time stamps within the log records.

AU-3 - Medium - CCI-000131 - V-58563 - SV-72993r3_rule

RMF Control

AU-3

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-000131

Version

WDNS-AU-000011

Vuln IDs

V-58563

Rule IDs

SV-72993r3_rule

Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. The actual auditing is performed by the OS/NDM, but the configuration to trigger the auditing is controlled by the DNS server. In order to compile an accurate risk assessment, it is essential for security personnel to know what is being performed on the system, where an event occurred, when an event occurred, and by whom the event was triggered. Logging the actions of specific events provides a means to investigate an attack, recognize resource utilization or capacity thresholds, or to simply identify an improperly configured DNS system. If auditing is not comprehensive, it will not be useful for intrusion monitoring, security investigations, and forensic analysis. It is important, therefore, to log all possible data related to events so that they can be correlated and analyzed to determine the risk. Data required to be captured include: whether an event was successful or failed, the event type or category, timestamps for when the event occurred, where the event originated, who/what initiated the event, affect the event had on the DNS implementation and any processes associated with the event.

Checks: C-59435r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select Properties. Click on the Event Logging tab. By default, all events are logged. Verify "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected. If any option other than "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected, this is a finding. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, the Enhanced DNS logging and diagnostics in Windows Server 2012 R2 must also be enabled. Run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Confirm the "Enable logging" check box is selected. If the check box to enable analytic and debug logs is not enabled on a Windows 2012 R2 DNS server, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63947r1_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select Properties. Click on the Event Logging tab. By default, all events are logged. Select the "Errors and warnings" or "All events" option. Click on Apply. Click on OK. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Select the "Enable logging" check box. Click on OK.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server log must include origin of events within the log records.

AU-3 - Medium - CCI-000132 - V-58565 - SV-72995r3_rule

RMF Control

AU-3

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-000132

Version

WDNS-AU-000012

Vuln IDs

V-58565

Rule IDs

SV-72995r3_rule

Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. The actual auditing is performed by the OS/NDM, but the configuration to trigger the auditing is controlled by the DNS server. In order to compile an accurate risk assessment, it is essential for security personnel to know what is being performed on the system, where an event occurred, when an event occurred, and by whom the event was triggered. Logging the actions of specific events provides a means to investigate an attack, recognize resource utilization or capacity thresholds, or to simply identify an improperly configured DNS system. If auditing is not comprehensive, it will not be useful for intrusion monitoring, security investigations, and forensic analysis. It is important, therefore, to log all possible data related to events so that they can be correlated and analyzed to determine the risk. Data required to be captured include: whether an event was successful or failed, the event type or category, timestamps for when the event occurred, where the event originated, who/what initiated the event, affect the event had on the DNS implementation and any processes associated with the event.

Checks: C-59437r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select Properties. Click on the Event Logging tab. By default, all events are logged. Verify "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected. If any option other than "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected, this is a finding. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, the Enhanced DNS logging and diagnostics in Windows Server 2012 R2 must also be enabled. Run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Confirm the "Enable logging" check box is selected. If the check box to enable analytic and debug logs is not enabled on a Windows 2012 R2 DNS server, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63949r2_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select Properties. Click on the Event Logging tab. By default, all events are logged. Select the "Errors and warnings" or "All events" option. Click on Apply. Click on OK. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Select the "Enable logging" check box. Click on OK.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server log must include the source of events within the log records.

AU-3 - Medium - CCI-000133 - V-58567 - SV-72997r3_rule

RMF Control

AU-3

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-000133

Version

WDNS-AU-000013

Vuln IDs

V-58567

Rule IDs

SV-72997r3_rule

Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. The actual auditing is performed by the OS/NDM, but the configuration to trigger the auditing is controlled by the DNS server. In order to compile an accurate risk assessment, it is essential for security personnel to know what is being performed on the system, where an event occurred, when an event occurred, and by whom the event was triggered. Logging the actions of specific events provides a means to investigate an attack, recognize resource utilization or capacity thresholds, or to simply identify an improperly configured DNS system. If auditing is not comprehensive, it will not be useful for intrusion monitoring, security investigations, and forensic analysis. It is important, therefore, to log all possible data related to events so that they can be correlated and analyzed to determine the risk. Data required to be captured include: whether an event was successful or failed, the event type or category, timestamps for when the event occurred, where the event originated, who/what initiated the event, affect the event had on the DNS implementation and any processes associated with the event.

Checks: C-59439r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select Properties. Click on the Event Logging tab. By default, all events are logged. Verify "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected. If any option other than "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected, this is a finding. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, the Enhanced DNS logging and diagnostics in Windows Server 2012 R2 must also be enabled. Run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Confirm the "Enable logging" check box is selected. If the check box to enable analytic and debug logs is not enabled on a Windows 2012 R2 DNS server, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63951r1_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select Properties. Click on the Event Logging tab. By default, all events are logged. Select the "Errors and warnings" or "All events" option. Click on Apply. Click on OK. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Select the "Enable logging" check box. Click on OK.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server log must include results of events within the log records.

AU-3 - Medium - CCI-000134 - V-58569 - SV-72999r3_rule

RMF Control

AU-3

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-000134

Version

WDNS-AU-000014

Vuln IDs

V-58569

Rule IDs

SV-72999r3_rule

Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. The actual auditing is performed by the OS/NDM, but the configuration to trigger the auditing is controlled by the DNS server. In order to compile an accurate risk assessment, it is essential for security personnel to know what is being performed on the system, where an event occurred, when an event occurred, and by whom the event was triggered. Logging the actions of specific events provides a means to investigate an attack, recognize resource utilization or capacity thresholds, or to simply identify an improperly configured DNS system. If auditing is not comprehensive, it will not be useful for intrusion monitoring, security investigations, and forensic analysis. It is important, therefore, to log all possible data related to events so that they can be correlated and analyzed to determine the risk. Data required to be captured include: whether an event was successful or failed, the event type or category, timestamps for when the event occurred, where the event originated, who/what initiated the event, affect the event had on the DNS implementation and any processes associated with the event.

Checks: C-59441r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select Properties. Click on the Event Logging tab. By default, all events are logged. Verify "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected. If any option other than "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected, this is a finding. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, the Enhanced DNS logging and diagnostics in Windows Server 2012 R2 must also be enabled. Run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Confirm the "Enable logging" check box is selected. If the check box to enable analytic and debug logs is not enabled on a Windows 2012 R2 DNS server, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63953r1_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select Properties. Click on the Event Logging tab. By default, all events are logged. Select the "Errors and warnings" or "All events" option. Click on Apply. Click on OK. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Select the "Enable logging" check box. Click on OK.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server log must include identity of individual or process associated with events within the log records.

AU-3 - Medium - CCI-001487 - V-58571 - SV-73001r3_rule

RMF Control

AU-3

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001487

Version

WDNS-AU-000015

Vuln IDs

V-58571

Rule IDs

SV-73001r3_rule

Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. The actual auditing is performed by the OS/NDM, but the configuration to trigger the auditing is controlled by the DNS server. In order to compile an accurate risk assessment, it is essential for security personnel to know what is being performed on the system, where an event occurred, when an event occurred, and by whom the event was triggered. Logging the actions of specific events provides a means to investigate an attack, recognize resource utilization or capacity thresholds, or to simply identify an improperly configured DNS system. If auditing is not comprehensive, it will not be useful for intrusion monitoring, security investigations, and forensic analysis. It is important, therefore, to log all possible data related to events so that they can be correlated and analyzed to determine the risk. Data required to be captured include: whether an event was successful or failed, the event type or category, timestamps for when the event occurred, where the event originated, who/what initiated the event, affect the event had on the DNS implementation and any processes associated with the event.

Checks: C-59443r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select Properties. Click on the Event Logging tab. By default, all events are logged. Verify "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected. If any option other than "Errors and warnings" or "All events" is selected, this is a finding. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, the Enhanced DNS logging and diagnostics in Windows Server 2012 R2 must also be enabled. Run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Confirm the "Enable logging" check box is selected. If the check box to enable analytic and debug logs is not enabled on a Windows 2012 R2 DNS server, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63955r1_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select Properties. Click on the Event Logging tab. By default, all events are logged. Select the "Errors and warnings" or "All events" option. Click on Apply. Click on OK. For Windows 2012 R2 DNS Server, run eventvwr.msc at an elevated command prompt. In the Event viewer, navigate to the applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\DNS Server. Right-click DNS Server, point to View, and then click "Show Analytic and Debug Logs". Right-click Analytical and then click on Properties. Select the "Enable logging" check box. Click on OK.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Servers audit records must be backed up at least every seven days onto a different system or system component than the system or component being audited.

AU-9 - Medium - CCI-001348 - V-58573 - SV-73003r3_rule

RMF Control

AU-9

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001348

Version

WDNS-AU-000016

Vuln IDs

V-58573

Rule IDs

SV-73003r3_rule

Protection of log data includes assuring log data is not accidentally lost or deleted. Backing up audit records to a different system or onto separate media than the system being audited on a defined frequency helps to assure, in the event of a catastrophic system failure, the audit records will be retained. This helps to ensure a compromise of the information system being audited does not also result in a compromise of the audit records. This requirement only applies to applications that have a native backup capability for audit records. Operating system backup requirements cover applications that do not provide native backup functions.

Checks: C-59445r2_chk

Consult with the System Administrator to determine the backup policy in place for Windows 2008 DNS Server. Review the backup methods used and determine if the backup's methods have been successful at backing up the audit records at least every seven days. If the organization does not have a backup policy in place for backing up the Windows 2008 DNS Server's audit records and/or the backup methods have not been successful at backing up the audit records at least every seven days, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63957r2_fix

Document and implement a backup policy to back up the DNS Server's audit records at least every seven days.

b

The validity period for the RRSIGs covering the DS RR for a zones delegated children must be no less than two days and no more than one week.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58575 - SV-73005r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000001

Vuln IDs

V-58575

Rule IDs

SV-73005r3_rule

The best way for a zone administrator to minimize the impact of a key compromise is by limiting the validity period of RRSIGs in the zone and in the parent zone. This strategy limits the time during which an attacker can take advantage of a compromised key to forge responses. An attacker that has compromised a ZSK can use that key only during the KSK's signature validity interval. An attacker that has compromised a KSK can use that key for only as long as the signature interval of the RRSIG covering the DS RR in the delegating parent. These validity periods should be short, which will require frequent re-signing. To prevent the impact of a compromised KSK, a delegating parent should set the signature validity period for RRSIGs covering DS RRs in the range of a few days to 1 week. This re-signing does not require frequent rollover of the parent's ZSK, but scheduled ZSK rollover should still be performed at regular intervals.

Checks: C-59447r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. View the validity period for the DS Resource Record. If the validity period for the DS Resource Record for the child domain is less than two days (48 hours) or more than one week (168 hours), this is a finding.

Fix: F-63959r3_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Right-click on the zone, choose DNSSEC->Properties. On the ZSK tab, for DS signature validity period (hours), choose more than 48 and less than 168.

b

The Windows DNS name servers for a zone must be geographically dispersed.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58577 - SV-73007r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000002

Vuln IDs

V-58577

Rule IDs

SV-73007r3_rule

In addition to network-based separation, authoritative name servers should be dispersed geographically as well. In other words, in addition to being located on different network segments, the authoritative name servers should not all be located within the same building. One approach that some organizations follow is to locate some authoritative name servers in their own premises and others in their ISPs' data centers or in partnering organizations. A network administrator may choose to use a "hidden" master authoritative server and only have secondary servers visible on the network. A hidden master authoritative server is an authoritative DNS server whose IP address does not appear in the name server set for a zone. If the master authoritative name server is "hidden", a secondary authoritative name server may reside in the same building as the hidden master.

Checks: C-59449r3_chk

Windows 2008 DNS Servers that are Active Directory integrated must be located where required to meet the Active Directory services. If all of the Windows 2008 DNS Servers are AD integrated, this check is Not Applicable. If any or all of the Windows 2008 DNS Servers are standalone and non-AD-integrated, verify with the System Administrator their geographic location. If any or all of the authoritative name servers are located in the same building as the master authoritative name server, and the master authoritative name server is not "hidden", this is a finding.

Fix: F-63961r7_fix

For non-AD-integrated Windows 2008 DNS servers, distribute secondary authoritative servers to be located in different buildings from the primary authoritative server.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must prohibit recursion on authoritative name servers for which forwarders have not been configured for external queries.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58579 - SV-73009r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000003

Vuln IDs

V-58579

Rule IDs

SV-73009r3_rule

A potential vulnerability of DNS is that an attacker can poison a name server's cache by sending queries that will cause the server to obtain host-to-IP address mappings from bogus name servers that respond with incorrect information. Once a name server has been poisoned, legitimate clients may be directed to non-existent hosts (which constitutes a denial of service), or, worse, hosts that masquerade as legitimate ones to obtain sensitive data or passwords. To guard against poisoning, name servers authoritative for .mil domains should be separated functionally from name servers that resolve queries on behalf of internal clients. Organizations may achieve this separation by dedicating machines to each function or, if possible, by running two instances of the name server software on the same machine: one for the authoritative function and the other for the resolving function. In this design, each name server process may be bound to a different IP address or network interface to implement the required segregation.

Checks: C-59451r3_chk

Note: In Windows 2008 DNS Server, if forwarders are configured, the recursion setting must also be enabled since disabling recursion will disable forwarders. If forwarders are not used, recursion must be disabled. In both cases, the use of root hints must be disabled. The root hints configuration requirement is addressed in WDNS-CM-000004. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, right-click on the server name for the DNS server and select “Properties”. Click on the “Forwarders” tab. If forwarders are enabled and configured, this check is not applicable. If forwarders are not enabled, click on the “Advanced” tab and ensure the "Disable recursion (also disables forwarders)" check box is selected. If forwarders are not enabled and configured, and the "Disable recursion (also disables forwarders)" check box in the “Advanced” tab is not selected, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63963r2_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, right-click on the server name for the DNS server and select “Properties”. Click on the “Forwarders” tab. If forwarders are not being used, click the “Advanced” tab. Select the "Disable recursion (also disables forwarders)" check box.

b

Forwarders on an authoritative Windows 2012 DNS Server, if enabled for external resolution, must only forward to either an internal, non-AD-integrated DNS server or to the DoD Enterprise Recursive Services (ERS).

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58581 - SV-73011r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000004

Vuln IDs

V-58581

Rule IDs

SV-73011r3_rule

A potential vulnerability of DNS is that an attacker can poison a name server's cache by sending queries that will cause the server to obtain host-to-IP address mappings from bogus name servers that respond with incorrect information. Once a name server has been poisoned, legitimate clients may be directed to non-existent hosts (which constitutes a denial of service), or, worse, hosts that masquerade as legitimate ones to obtain sensitive data or passwords. To guard against poisoning, name servers authoritative for .mil domains should be separated functionally from name servers that resolve queries on behalf of internal clients. Organizations may achieve this separation by dedicating machines to each function or, if possible, by running two instances of the name server software on the same machine: one for the authoritative function and the other for the resolving function. In this design, each name server process may be bound to a different IP address or network interface to implement the required segregation.

Checks: C-59453r2_chk

Note: In Windows 2008 DNS Server, if forwarders are configured, the recursion setting must also be enabled since disabling recursion will disable forwarders. If forwarders are not used, recursion must be disabled. In both cases, the use of root hints must be disabled. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, right-click on the server name for the DNS server and select “Properties”. Click on the “Forwarders” tab. If forwarders are not being used, this is not applicable. Review the IP address(es) for the forwarder(s) use. If the DNS Server does not forward to another DoD-managed DNS server or to the DoD Enterprise Recursive Services (ERS), this is a finding. If the "Use root hints if no forwarders are available" is selected, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63965r2_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, right-click on the server name for the DNS server and select “Properties”. Click on the “Forwarders” tab. Replace the forwarders being used with another DoD-managed DNS server or the DoD Enterprise Recursive Services (ERS). Deselect the "Use root hints if no forwarders are available".

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server with a caching name server role must restrict recursive query responses to only the IP addresses and IP address ranges of known supported clients.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58583 - SV-73013r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000005

Vuln IDs

V-58583

Rule IDs

SV-73013r3_rule

A potential vulnerability of DNS is that an attacker can poison a name server's cache by sending queries that will cause the server to obtain host-to-IP address mappings from bogus name servers that respond with incorrect information. Once a name server has been poisoned, legitimate clients may be directed to non-existent hosts (which constitutes a denial of service), or, worse, hosts that masquerade as legitimate ones to obtain sensitive data or passwords. To guard against poisoning, name servers specifically fulfilling the role of providing recursive query responses for external zones need to be segregated from name servers authoritative for internal zones.

Checks: C-59455r2_chk

Verify the Windows 2008 DNS Server will only accept TCP and UDP port 53 traffic from specific IP addresses/ranges. This can be configured via a local or network firewall. If the caching name server is not restricted to answering queries from only specific networks, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63967r2_fix

Configure a local or network firewall to only allow specific IP addresses/ranges to send inbound TCP and UDP port 53 traffic to a DNS caching server.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server with a caching name server role must be secured against pollution by ensuring the authenticity and integrity of queried records.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58585 - SV-73015r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000006

Vuln IDs

V-58585

Rule IDs

SV-73015r3_rule

A potential vulnerability of DNS is that an attacker can poison a name server's cache by sending queries that will cause the server to obtain host-to-IP address mappings from bogus name servers that respond with incorrect information. Once a name server has been poisoned, legitimate clients may be directed to non-existent hosts (which constitutes a denial of service), or, worse, hosts that masquerade as legitimate ones to obtain sensitive data or passwords. To guard against poisoning, name servers authoritative for .mil domains should be separated functionally from name servers that resolve queries on behalf of internal clients. Organizations may achieve this separation by dedicating machines to each function or, if possible, by running two instances of the name server software on the same machine: one for the authoritative function and the other for the resolving function. In this design, each name server process may be bound to a different IP address or network interface to implement the required segregation. Windows 2012 DNS Servers with a caching name server role must be secured against pollution by ensuring that the authenticity and integrity of queried records are verified before any data is cached.

Checks: C-59457r1_chk

The non-AD-integrated, standalone, caching Windows 2012 DNS Server must be configured to be DNSSEC-aware. When performing caching and lookups, the caching name server must be able to obtain a zone signing key DNSKEY record and corresponding RRSIG record for the queried record. It will use this information to compute the hash for the hostname being resolved. The caching name server decrypts the RRSIG record for the hostname being resolved with the zone's ZSK to get the RRSIG record hash. The caching name server compares the hashes and ensures they match. If the non-AD-integrated, standalone, caching Windows 2012 DNS Server is not configured to be DNSSEC-aware, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63969r1_fix

Implement DNSSEC on all non-AD-integrated, standalone, caching Windows 2012 DNS Servers.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must implement cryptographic mechanisms to detect changes to information during transmission unless otherwise protected by alternative physical safeguards, such as, at a minimum, a Protected Distribution System (PDS).

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58587 - SV-73017r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000007

Vuln IDs

V-58587

Rule IDs

SV-73017r3_rule

Encrypting information for transmission protects information from unauthorized disclosure and modification. Cryptographic mechanisms implemented to protect information integrity include, for example, cryptographic hash functions which have common application in digital signatures, checksums, and message authentication codes. Confidentiality is not an objective of DNS, but integrity is. DNSSEC and TSIG/SIG(0) both digitally sign DNS information to authenticate its source and ensure its integrity.

Checks: C-59459r1_chk

Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63971r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The validity period for the RRSIGs covering a zones DNSKEY RRSet must be no less than two days and no more than one week.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58589 - SV-73019r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000008

Vuln IDs

V-58589

Rule IDs

SV-73019r3_rule

The best way for a zone administrator to minimize the impact of a key compromise is by limiting the validity period of RRSIGs in the zone and in the parent zone. This strategy limits the time during which an attacker can take advantage of a compromised key to forge responses. An attacker that has compromised a ZSK can use that key only during the KSK's signature validity interval. An attacker that has compromised a KSK can use that key for only as long as the signature interval of the RRSIG covering the DS RR in the delegating parent. These validity periods should be short, which will require frequent re-signing. To minimize the impact of a compromised ZSK, a zone administrator should set a signature validity period of 1 week for RRSIGs covering the DNSKEY RRSet in the zone (the RRSet that contains the ZSK and KSK for the zone). The DNSKEY RRSet can be re-signed without performing a ZSK rollover, but scheduled ZSK rollovers should still be performed at regular intervals.

Checks: C-59461r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Right-click the zone and select DNSSEC, Properties. Select the KSK Tab. Verify the "DNSKEY RRSET signature validity period (hours):" is set to at least 48 hours and no more than 168 hours. Select the ZSK Tab. Verify the "DNSKEY signature validity period (hours):" is set to at least 48 hours and no more than 168 hours. If either the KSK or ZSK Tab "DNSKEY signature validity period (hours):" values are set to less than 48 hours or more than 168 hours, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63973r1_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Right-click the zone and select DNSSEC, Properties. Select the KSK Tab. For the "DNSKEY RRSET signature validity period (hours):" setting, configure to a value between 48-168 hours. Select the ZSK Tab. For the "DNSKEY signature validity period (hours):" setting, configure to a value between 48-168 hours.

b

NSEC3 must be used for all internal DNS zones.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58591 - SV-73021r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000009

Vuln IDs

V-58591

Rule IDs

SV-73021r3_rule

NSEC records list the resource record types for the name, as well as the name of the next resource record. With this information it is revealed that the resource record type for the name queried, or the resource record name requested, does not exist. NSEC uses the actual resource record names, whereas NSEC3 uses a one-way hash of the name. In this way, walking zone data from one record to the next is prevented, at the expense of some CPU cycles both on the authoritative server as well as the resolver. To prevent giving access to an entire zone file, NSEC3 should be configured and in order to use NSEC3, RSA/SHA-1 should be used as the algorithm, as some resolvers that understand RSA/SHA-1 might not understand NSEC3. Using RSA/SHA-256 is a safe alternative.

Checks: C-59463r2_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Open an elevated Windows PowerShell prompt on a DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Type the following command: PS C:\> Get-DnsServerResourceRecord -ZoneName example.com <enter> Where example.com is replaced with the zone hosted on the DNS Server. All of the zone's resource records will be returned, among which should be the NSEC3 RRs, as depicted below. If NSEC3 RRs are not returned for the zone, this is a finding. 2vf77rkf63hrgismnuvnb8... NSEC3 0 01:00:00 [RsaSha1][False][50][F2738D980008F73C] 7ceje475rse25gppr3vphs... NSEC3 0 01:00:00 [RsaSha1][False][50][F2738D980008F73C]

Fix: F-63975r1_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. If not automatically started, initialize the Server Manager window by clicking its icon from the bottom left corner of the screen. Once the Server Manager window is initialized, from the left pane, click to select the DNS category. From the right pane, under the SERVERS section, right-click the DNS server. From the context menu that appears, click DNS Manager. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Right-click the zone, select DNSSEC, Sign the Zone. Re-sign the zone, using an NSEC3 algorithm (RSA/SHA-1 (NSEC3), RSA/SHA-256, RSA/SHA-512).

c

The Windows 2012 DNS Servers zone files must have NS records that point to active name servers authoritative for the domain specified in that record.

CM-6 - High - CCI-000366 - V-58593 - SV-73023r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

H

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000010

Vuln IDs

V-58593

Rule IDs

SV-73023r3_rule

Poorly constructed NS records pose a security risk because they create conditions under which an adversary might be able to provide the missing authoritative name services that are improperly specified in the zone file. The adversary could issue bogus responses to queries that clients would accept because they learned of the adversary's name server from a valid authoritative name server, one that need not be compromised for this attack to be successful. The list of slave servers must remain current within 72 hours of any changes to the zone architecture that would affect the list of slaves. If a slave server has been retired or is not operational but remains on the list, then an adversary might have a greater opportunity to impersonate that slave without detection, rather than if the slave was actually online. For example, the adversary may be able to spoof the retired slave's IP address without an IP address conflict, which would not be likely to occur if the true slave were active.

Checks: C-59465r2_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Review the NS records for the zone. Verify each of the name servers, represented by the NS records, is active. At a command prompt, type: nslookup <enter>; At the nslookup prompt, type: server=###.###.###.### <enter>; (where the ###.###.###.### is replaced by the IP of each NS record) Enter a FQDN for a known host record in the zone. If the NS server does not respond at all or responds with a non-authoritative answer, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63977r2_fix

If DNS servers are AD-integrated, troubleshoot and remedy the replication problem where the non-responsive name server is not getting updated. If DNS servers are not AD-integrated, log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Review the NS records for the zone. Select the NS record for the non-responsive name server and remove the record.

b

All authoritative name servers for a zone must be located on different network segments.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58595 - SV-73025r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000012

Vuln IDs

V-58595

Rule IDs

SV-73025r3_rule

Most enterprises have an authoritative primary server and a host of authoritative secondary name servers. It is essential that these authoritative name servers for an enterprise be located on different network segments. This dispersion ensures the availability of an authoritative name server not only in situations in which a particular router or switch fails but also during events involving an attack on an entire network segment. A network administrator may choose to use a "hidden" master authoritative server and only have secondary servers visible on the network. A hidden master authoritative server is an authoritative DNS server whose IP address does not appear in the name server set for a zone. If the master authoritative name server is "hidden", a secondary authoritative name server may reside on the same network as the hidden master.

Checks: C-59467r2_chk

Windows 2008 DNS Servers that are Active Directory-integrated must be located where required to meet the Active Directory services. If all of the Windows 2008 DNS Servers are AD-integrated, this check is not applicable. If any or all of the Windows 2008 DNS Servers are stand-alone and non-AD-integrated, verify with the System Administrator their geographic dispersal. If all of the authoritative name servers are located on the same network segment, and the master authoritative name server is not "hidden", this is a finding.

Fix: F-63979r2_fix

For non-AD-integrated Windows 2008 DNS Servers, distribute secondary authoritative servers on separate network segments from the primary authoritative server.

b

All authoritative name servers for a zone must have the same version of zone information.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58597 - SV-73027r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000013

Vuln IDs

V-58597

Rule IDs

SV-73027r3_rule

The only protection approach for content control of a DNS zone file is the use of a zone file integrity checker. The effectiveness of integrity checking using a zone file integrity checker depends upon the database of constraints built into the checker. The deployment process consists of developing these constraints with the right logic, and the only determinant of the truth value of these logical predicates is the parameter values for certain key fields in the format of various RRTypes. The serial number in the SOA RDATA is used to indicate to secondary name servers that a change to the zone has occurred and a zone transfer should be performed. It should always be increased whenever a change is made to the zone data. DNS NOTIFY must be enabled on the master authoritative name server.

Checks: C-59469r3_chk

Note: Due to the manner in which Active Directory replication increments SOA records for zones when transferring zone information via AD replication, this check is not applicable for AD-integrated zones. Log on to the DNS server hosting a non-AD-integrated zone using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Review the SOA information for the zone and obtain the Serial Number. Access each secondary name server for the same zone and review the SOA information. Verify the Serial Number is the same on all authoritative name servers. If the Serial Number is not the same on one or more authoritative name servers, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63981r2_fix

If all DNS servers are AD-integrated, troubleshoot why and mitigate the replication is not taking place to the out-of-sync secondary name servers. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Initiate a zone transfer to all secondary name servers for the zone.

c

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must be configured to enable DNSSEC Resource Records.

CM-6 - High - CCI-000366 - V-58599 - SV-73029r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

H

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000014

Vuln IDs

V-58599

Rule IDs

SV-73029r3_rule

The specification for a digital signature mechanism in the context of the DNS infrastructure is in IETF's DNSSEC standard. In DNSSEC, trust in the public key (for signature verification) of the source is established not by going to a third party or a chain of third parties (as in public key infrastructure [PKI] chaining), but by starting from a trusted zone (such as the root zone) and establishing the chain of trust down to the current source of response through successive verifications of signature of the public key of a child by its parent. The public key of the trusted zone is called the trust anchor. After authenticating the source, the next process DNSSEC calls for is to authenticate the response. DNSSEC mechanisms involve two main processes: sign and serve, and verify signature. Before a DNSSEC-signed zone can be deployed, a name server must be configured to enable DNSSEC processing.

Checks: C-59471r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select each zone. Review the RRs for each zone and verify all of the DNSEC record types are included for the zone: RRSIG (Resource Read Signature) DNSKEY (Public Key) DS (Delegation Signer) NSEC3 (Next Secure 3) If the zone does not show all of the DNSSEC record types, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63983r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

Digital signature algorithm used for DNSSEC-enabled zones must be FIPS-compatible.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58601 - SV-73031r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000015

Vuln IDs

V-58601

Rule IDs

SV-73031r3_rule

The choice of digital signature algorithm will be based on recommended algorithms in well-known standards. NIST's Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [FIPS186] provides three algorithm choices: * Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) * RSA * Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA). Of these three algorithms, RSA and DSA are more widely available and hence are considered candidates of choice for DNSSEC. In terms of performance, both RSA and DSA have comparable signature generation speeds, but DSA is much slower for signature verification. RSA is the recommended algorithm as far as this guideline is concerned. RSA with SHA-1 is currently the only cryptographic algorithm mandated to be implemented with DNSSEC, although other algorithm suites (i.e. RSA/SHA-256, ECDSA) are also specified. It can be expected that name servers and clients will be able to use the RSA algorithm at the minimum. It is suggested that at least one ZSK for a zone use the RSA algorithm. NIST's Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (FIPS 180-3) specifies SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as approved hash algorithms to be used as part of the algorithm suite for generating digital signatures using the digital signature algorithms in NIST's DSS[FIPS186]. It is expected that there will be support for Elliptic Curve Cryptography in the DNSSEC. The migration path for USG DNSSEC operation will be to ECDSA (or similar) from RSA/SHA-1 and RSA/SHA-256 before September 30th, 2015.

Checks: C-59473r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Review the zone's RRs in the right window pane. Review the DNSKEY encryption in the Data column. example: [DNSKEY][RsaSha1][31021] Confirm the encryption algorithm specified in the DNSKEY's Data is at RsaSha1, at a minimum. If the specified encryption algorithm is not RsaSha1 or stronger, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63985r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

For zones split between the external and internal sides of a network, the RRs for the external hosts must be separate from the RRs for the internal hosts.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58603 - SV-73033r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000016

Vuln IDs

V-58603

Rule IDs

SV-73033r3_rule

Authoritative name servers for an enterprise may be configured to receive requests from both external and internal clients. External clients need to receive RRs that pertain only to public services (public Web server, mail server, etc.) Internal clients need to receive RRs pertaining to public services as well as internal hosts. The zone information that serves the RRs on both the inside and the outside of a firewall should be split into different physical files for these two types of clients (one file for external clients and one file for internal clients).

Checks: C-59475r2_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. For each zone, review the records. If any RRs (Resource Records) on an internal DNS server resolve to IP addresses located outside the internal DNS server's network, this is a finding. If any RRs (Resource Records) on an external DNS server resolve to IP addresses located inside the network, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63987r2_fix

Remove any RRs from the internal zones for which the resolution is for an external IP address. Remove any RRs from the external zones for which the resolution is for an internal IP address.

b

In a split DNS configuration, where separate name servers are used between the external and internal networks, the external name server must be configured to not be reachable from inside resolvers.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58605 - SV-73035r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000017

Vuln IDs

V-58605

Rule IDs

SV-73035r3_rule

Instead of having the same set of authoritative name servers serve different types of clients, an enterprise could have two different sets of authoritative name servers. One set, called external name servers, can be located within a DMZ; these would be the only name servers that are accessible to external clients and would serve RRs pertaining to hosts with public services (Web servers that serve external Web pages or provide B2C services, mail servers, etc.) The other set, called internal name servers, is to be located within the firewall and should be configured so they are not reachable from outside and hence provide naming services exclusively to internal clients.

Checks: C-59477r2_chk

Consult with the System Administrator to review the external Windows 2008 DNS Server's HBSS firewall policy. The inbound TCP and UDP ports 53 rule should be configured to only restrict IP addresses from the internal network. If the HBSS firewall policy is not configured with the restriction, consult with the network firewall administrator to confirm the restriction on the network firewall. If neither the DNS server's HBSS firewall policy nor the network firewall is configured to block internal hosts from querying the external DNS server, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63989r2_fix

Configure the external DNS server's firewall policy, or the network firewall, to block queries from internal hosts.

b

In a split DNS configuration, where separate name servers are used between the external and internal networks, the internal name server must be configured to not be reachable from outside resolvers.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58607 - SV-73037r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000018

Vuln IDs

V-58607

Rule IDs

SV-73037r3_rule

Instead of having the same set of authoritative name servers serve different types of clients, an enterprise could have two different sets of authoritative name servers. One set, called external name servers, can be located within a DMZ; these would be the only name servers that are accessible to external clients and would serve RRs pertaining to hosts with public services (Web servers that serve external Web pages or provide B2C services, mail servers, etc.) The other set, called internal name servers, is to be located within the firewall and should be configured so they are not reachable from outside and hence provide naming services exclusively to internal clients.

Checks: C-59479r2_chk

Consult with the System Administrator to review the internal Windows 2008 DNS Server's HBSS firewall policy. The inbound TCP and UDP ports 53 rule should be configured to only allow hosts from the internal network to query the internal DNS server. If the HBSS firewall policy is not configured with the restriction, consult with the network firewall administrator to confirm the restriction on the network firewall. If neither the DNS server's HBSS firewall policy nor the network firewall is configured to block external hosts from querying the internal DNS server, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63991r2_fix

Configure the internal DNS server's firewall policy, or the network firewall, to block queries from external hosts.

b

Primary authoritative name servers must be configured to only receive zone transfer requests from specified secondary name servers.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58609 - SV-73039r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000019

Vuln IDs

V-58609

Rule IDs

SV-73039r3_rule

Authoritative name servers (especially primary name servers) should be configured with an allow-transfer access control sub statement designating the list of hosts from which zone transfer requests can be accepted. These restrictions address the denial-of-service threat and potential exploits from unrestricted dissemination of information about internal resources. Based on the need-to-know, the only name servers that need to refresh their zone files periodically are the secondary name servers. Zone transfer from primary name servers should be restricted to secondary name servers. The zone transfer should be completely disabled in the secondary name servers. The address match list argument for the allow-transfer sub statement should consist of IP addresses of secondary name servers and stealth secondary name servers.

Checks: C-59481r4_chk

Verify whether the authoritative primary name server is AD-integrated. Verify whether all secondary name servers for every zone for which the primary name server is authoritative are all AD-integrated in the same Active Directory. If the authoritative primary name server is AD-integrated and all secondary name servers also part of the same AD, this check is not a finding since AD handles the replication of DNS data. If one or more of the secondary name servers are non-AD integrated, verify the primary name server is configured to only send zone transfers to a specific list of secondary name servers. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Right-click the zone and select “Properties”. Select the “Zone Transfers” tab. If the "Allow zone transfers:" check box is not selected, this is not a finding. If the "Allow zone transfers:" check box is selected, verify either "Only to servers listed on the Name Server tab" or "Only to the following servers" is selected. If the "To any server" option is selected, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63993r2_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Right-click the zone and select “Properties”. Select the "Zone Transfers" tab. Select the "Only to servers listed on the Name Server tab" or "Only to the following servers" check box or deselect the "Allow zone transfers" check box. Click “OK”.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Servers zone database files must not be accessible for edit/write by users and/or processes other than the Windows 2012 DNS Server service account and/or the DNS database administrator.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58611 - SV-73041r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000020

Vuln IDs

V-58611

Rule IDs

SV-73041r3_rule

Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is based on the premise that individual users are "owners" of objects and therefore have discretion over who should be authorized to access the object and in which mode (e.g., read or write). Ownership is usually acquired as a consequence of creating the object or via specified ownership assignment. In a DNS implementation, DAC should be granted to a minimal number of individuals and objects because DNS does not interact directly with users and users do not store and share data with the DNS application directly. The primary objective of DNS authentication and access control is the integrity of DNS records; only authorized personnel must be able to create and modify resource records, and name servers should only accept updates from authoritative master servers for the relevant zones. Integrity is best assured through authentication and access control features within the name server software and the file system the name server resides on. In order to protect the zone files and configuration data, which should only be accessed by the name service or an administrator, access controls need to be implemented on files, and rights should not be easily propagated to other users. Lack of a stringent access control policy places the DNS infrastructure at risk to malicious persons and attackers, in addition to potential denial of service to network resources. DAC allows the owner to determine who will have access to objects they control. An example of DAC includes user-controlled file permissions. DAC models have the potential for the access controls to propagate without limit, resulting in unauthorized access to said objects. When applications provide a DAC mechanism, the DNS implementation must be able to limit the propagation of those access rights.

Checks: C-59483r2_chk

In an Active Directory-integrated DNS implementation, this is not a finding by virtue of being compliant with the Windows 2008 AD STIG since DNS data within an AD-integrated zone is kept within the Active Directory. For a file-back Windows DNS implementation, log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select each zone. Right-click each zone and select “Properties”. Select the “Security” tab. Review the permissions applied to the zone. No group or user should have greater than READ privileges other than the DNS Admins and the System service account under which the DNS Server Service is running. If any other account/group has greater than READ privileges, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63995r2_fix

For a file-back Windows DNS implementation, log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select each zone. Right-click each zone and select “Properties”. Select the “Security” tab. Downgrade to READ privileges assigned to any group or user which has greater than READ privileges.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must implement internal/external role separation.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58613 - SV-73043r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000021

Vuln IDs

V-58613

Rule IDs

SV-73043r3_rule

DNS servers with an internal role only process name/address resolution requests from within the organization (i.e., internal clients). DNS servers with an external role only process name/address resolution information requests from clients external to the organization (i.e., on the external networks, including the Internet). The set of clients that can access an authoritative DNS server in a particular role is specified by the organization using address ranges, explicit access control lists, etc. In order to protect internal DNS resource information, it is important to isolate the requests to internal DNS servers. Separating internal and external roles in DNS prevents address space that is private (e.g., 10.0.0.0/24) or is otherwise concealed by some form of Network Address Translation from leaking into the public DNS system.

Checks: C-59485r2_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, review each zone. Consult with the DNS Admin to determine if any of the zones also have hostnames needing to be resolved from the external network. If the zone is split between internal and external networks, verify separate DNS servers have been implemented for each network. If internal and external DNS servers have not been implemented for zones which require resolution from both the internal and external networks, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63997r2_fix

Configure separate DNS servers for each of the external and internal networks.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server authoritative for local zones must only point root hints to the DNS servers that host the internal root domain.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58615 - SV-73045r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000022

Vuln IDs

V-58615

Rule IDs

SV-73045r3_rule

All caching name servers must be authoritative for the root zone because, without this starting point, they would have no knowledge of the DNS infrastructure and thus would be unable to respond to any queries. The security risk is that an adversary could change the root hints and direct the caching name server to a bogus root server. At that point, every query response from that name server is suspect, which would give the adversary substantial control over the network communication of the name servers' clients. When authoritative servers are sent queries for zones that they are not authoritative for, and they are configured as a non-caching server (as recommended), they can either be configured to return a referral to the root servers or they can be configured to refuse to answer the query. The recommendation is to configure authoritative servers to refuse to answer queries for any zones for which they are not authoritative. This is more efficient for the server and allows it to spend more of its resources doing what its intended purpose is, answering authoritatively for its zone.

Checks: C-59487r2_chk

Log on to the authoritative DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select “Properties”. Select the "Root Hints" tab. Verify the "Root Hints" is either empty or only has entries for internal zones under "Name servers:". All Internet root server entries must be removed. If "Root Hints" is not empty and the entries on the "Root Hints" tab under "Name servers:" are external to the local network, this is a finding.

Fix: F-63999r2_fix

Log on to the authoritative DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. Right-click the DNS server, select “Properties”. Select the "Root Hints" tab. Remove all entries under "Name servers:" which are for name servers outside of the internal network.

b

The DNS name server software must be at the latest version.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58617 - SV-73047r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000023

Vuln IDs

V-58617

Rule IDs

SV-73047r3_rule

Each newer version of the name server software, especially the BIND software, generally is devoid of vulnerabilities found in earlier versions because it has design changes incorporated to take care of those vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities have been exploited (i.e., some form of attack was launched), and sufficient information has been generated with respect to the nature of those exploits. It makes good business sense to run the latest version of name server software because theoretically it is the safest version. Even if the software is the latest version, it is not safe to run it in default mode. The security administrator should always configure the software to run in the recommended secure mode of operation after becoming familiar with the new security settings for the latest version.

Checks: C-59489r2_chk

Consult with the network IAVM scanner to confirm all Microsoft Operating System IAVMs applicable to Windows 2008/2008 R2 have been applied to the DNS server. If the Windows Operating System has not been patched to handle all IAVMs, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64001r2_fix

Apply all related Microsoft Operating System IAVM patches to the DNS server.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Servers zone files must not include resource records that resolve to a fully qualified domain name residing in another zone.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58619 - SV-73049r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000024

Vuln IDs

V-58619

Rule IDs

SV-73049r3_rule

If a name server were able to claim authority for a resource record in a domain for which it was not authoritative, this would pose a security risk. In this environment, an adversary could use illicit control of a name server to impact IP address resolution beyond the scope of that name server (i.e., by claiming authority for records outside of that server's zones). Fortunately, all but the oldest versions of BIND and most other DNS implementations do not allow for this behavior. Nevertheless, the best way to eliminate this risk is to eliminate from the zone files any records for hosts in another zone. The exceptions are glue records supporting zone delegations, CNAME records supporting a system migration, or CNAME records that point to third-party Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or cloud computing platforms. In the case of third-party CDNs or cloud offerings, an approved mission need must be demonstrated.

Checks: C-59491r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Confirm with the DNS administrator that the hosts defined in the zone files do not resolve to hosts in another zone with its fully qualified domain name. The exceptions are glue records supporting zone delegations, CNAME records supporting a system migration, or CNAME records that point to third-party Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or cloud computing platforms. In the case of third-party CDNs or cloud offerings, an approved mission need must be demonstrated. Additional exceptions are CNAME records in a multi-domain Active Directory environment pointing to hosts in other internal domains in the same multi-domain environment. If resource records are maintained that resolve to a fully qualified domain name in another zone, and the usage is not for resource records resolving to hosts that are glue records supporting zone delegations, CNAME records supporting a system migration, or CNAME records that point to third-party Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or cloud computing platforms with a documented and approved mission need, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64003r1_fix

Remove any resource records in a zone file if the resource record resolves to a fully qualified domain name residing in another zone.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Servers zone files must not include CNAME records pointing to a zone with lesser security for more than six months.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58621 - SV-73051r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000025

Vuln IDs

V-58621

Rule IDs

SV-73051r3_rule

The use of CNAME records for exercises, tests, or zone-spanning aliases should be temporary (e.g., to facilitate a migration). When a host name is an alias for a record in another zone, an adversary has two points of attack: the zone in which the alias is defined and the zone authoritative for the alias's canonical name. This configuration also reduces the speed of client resolution because it requires a second lookup after obtaining the canonical name. Furthermore, in the case of an authoritative name server, this information is promulgated throughout the enterprise to caching servers and thus compounds the vulnerability.

Checks: C-59493r2_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Review the RRs to confirm that there are no CNAME records older than 6 months. The exceptions are glue records supporting zone delegations, CNAME records supporting a system migration, or CNAME records that point to third-party Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or cloud computing platforms. In the case of third-party CDNs or cloud offerings, an approved mission need must be demonstrated (AO approval of use of a commercial cloud offering would satisfy this requirement). Additional exceptions are CNAME records in a multi-domain Active Directory environment pointing to hosts in other internal domains in the same multi-domain environment. If there are zone-spanning CNAME records older than 6 months and the CNAME records resolve to anything other than fully qualified domain names for glue records supporting zone delegations, CNAME records supporting a system migration, or CNAME records that point to third-party Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or cloud computing platforms with an AO-approved and documented mission need, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64005r2_fix

Remove any zone-spanning CNAME records that have been active for more than six months, which are not supporting zone delegations, CNAME records supporting a system migration, or CNAME records that point to third-party Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or cloud computing platforms. In the case of third-party CDNs or cloud offerings, an approved mission need must be demonstrated (AO approval of use of a commercial cloud offering would satisfy this requirement).

b

Non-routable IPv6 link-local scope addresses must not be configured in any zone.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58623 - SV-73053r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000026

Vuln IDs

V-58623

Rule IDs

SV-73053r3_rule

IPv6 link-local scope addresses are not globally routable and must not be configured in any DNS zone. Similar to RFC1918 addresses, if a link-local scope address is inserted into a zone provided to clients, most routers will not forward this traffic beyond the local subnet.

Checks: C-59495r4_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Expand the Forward Lookup Zones folder. Expand each zone folder and examine the host record entries. The third column titled “Data” will display the IP. Verify this column does not contain any IP addresses that begin with the prefixes "FE8", "FE9", "FEA", or "FEB". If any non-routable IPv6 link-local scope addresses are in any zone, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64007r2_fix

The SA should remove any link-local addresses and replace with appropriate Site-Local or Global scope addresses.

b

AAAA addresses must not be configured in a zone for hosts that are not IPv6-aware.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58625 - SV-73055r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000027

Vuln IDs

V-58625

Rule IDs

SV-73055r3_rule

DNS is only responsible for resolving a domain name to an IP address. Applications and operating systems are responsible for processing the IPv6 or IPv4 record that may be returned. With this in mind, a denial of service could easily be implemented for an application that is not IPv6-aware. When the application receives an IP address in hexadecimal, it is up to the application/operating system to decide how to handle the response. Combining both IPv6 and IPv4 records into the same domain can lead to application problems that are beyond the scope of the DNS administrator.

Checks: C-59497r2_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, select each zone and examine the host record entries. The third column titled “Data” will display the IP. Verify if any contain both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. If any hostnames contain both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, confirm with the SA that the actual hosts are IPv6-aware. If any zone contains hosts with both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses but are determined to be non-IPv6-aware, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64009r2_fix

Remove any IPv6 records for hosts which are not IPv6-aware.

b

When IPv6 protocol is installed, the server must also be configured to answer for IPv6 AAAA records.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58627 - SV-73057r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-CM-000028

Vuln IDs

V-58627

Rule IDs

SV-73057r3_rule

To prevent the possibility of a denial of service in relation to an IPv4 DNS server trying to respond to IPv6 requests, the server should be configured not to listen on any of its IPv6 interfaces unless it does contain IPv6 AAAA resource records in one of the zones.

Checks: C-59499r2_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Locate the “Network Internet Access” icon, right-click on it and select "Open Network & Sharing Center". Click on "Change adapter settings". Right-click on the Ethernet and click “Properties”. If the display shows Microsoft TCP/IP version 6 with a check, but the DNS server is not hosting any AAAA records, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64011r2_fix

Uninstall IPv6 from any LAN interface that is not hosting IPv6 AAAA records within its zones.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must be configured to prohibit or restrict unapproved ports and protocols.

CM-7 - Medium - CCI-000382 - V-58629 - SV-73059r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-7

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-000382

Version

WDNS-CM-000029

Vuln IDs

V-58629

Rule IDs

SV-73059r3_rule

In order to prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or unauthorized tunneling (i.e., embedding of data types within data types), organizations must disable or restrict unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols on information systems. Applications are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services provided by default may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations. Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from a single component (e.g., email and web services); however, doing so increases risk over limiting the services provided by any one component. To support the requirements and principles of least functionality, the application must support the organizational requirements by providing only essential capabilities and limiting the use of ports, protocols, and/or services to only those required, authorized, and approved to conduct official business or to address authorized quality of life issues. On Windows 2012 DNS Server, during DNS resolution, DNS messages are sent from DNS clients to DNS servers or between DNS servers. Messages are sent over UDP and DNS servers bind to UDP port 53. When the message length exceeds the default message size for a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) datagram (512 octets), the first response to the message is sent with as much data as the UDP datagram will allow, and then the DNS server sets a flag indicating a truncated response. The message sender can then choose to reissue the request to the DNS server using TCP (over TCP port 53). The benefit of this approach is that it takes advantage of the performance of UDP but also has a backup failover solution for longer queries. In general, all DNS queries are sent from a high-numbered source port (49152 or above) to destination port 53, and responses are sent from source port 53 to a high-numbered destination port.

Checks: C-59501r1_chk

By default, the Windows 2012 DNS Server listens on TCP and UDP ports 53. Also by default, Windows 2012 DNS Server sends from random, high-numbered source ports 49152 and above. To confirm the listening ports, log onto Windows 2012 DNS Server as an Administrator. Open a command window with the Run-as Administrator option. In the command window, type the following command: netstat -a -b |more <enter> The result is a list of all services running on the server, with the respective TCP and UDP ports upon which the services are listening. Find Windows 2012 DNS Server service and verify the State is "LISTENING" and the port(s) are TCP 53 and UDP 53. If the server is listening on UDP and TCP port 53, this is not a finding.

Fix: F-64013r1_fix

Re-install DNS.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must require devices to re-authenticate for each dynamic update request connection attempt.

IA-11 - Medium - CCI-002039 - V-58631 - SV-73061r3_rule

RMF Control

IA-11

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002039

Version

WDNS-IA-000001

Vuln IDs

V-58631

Rule IDs

SV-73061r3_rule

Without re-authenticating devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity. In addition to the re-authentication requirements associated with session locks, organizations may require re-authentication of devices, including, but not limited to, the following other situations: (i) When authenticators change; (ii) When roles change; (iii) When security categories of information systems change; (iv) After a fixed period of time; or (v) Periodically. DNS does perform server authentication when DNSSEC or TSIG/SIG(0) are used, but this authentication is transactional in nature (each transaction has its own authentication performed). So this requirement is applicable for every server-to-server transaction request.

Checks: C-59503r1_chk

Authentication of dynamic updates is accomplished in Windows Server 2012 DNS by configuring the zones to only accept secure dynamic updates. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Once selected, right-click the name of the zone, and from the displayed context menu, go to Properties. On the opened domain's properties box, click the General tab. Verify the Type: is Active Directory-Integrated. Verify the Dynamic updates has "Secure only" selected. If the zone is Active Directory-Integrated and the Dynamic updates are not configured for "Secure only", this is a finding.

Fix: F-64015r1_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Once selected, right-click the name of the zone, and from the displayed context menu, go to Properties. On the opened domain's properties box, click the General tab. If the Type: is not Active Directory-Integrated, configure the zone for AD-integration. Select "Secure only" from the Dynamic updates: drop-down list.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must uniquely identify the other DNS server before responding to a server-to-server transaction.

IA-3 - Medium - CCI-000778 - V-58633 - SV-73063r3_rule

RMF Control

IA-3

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-000778

Version

WDNS-IA-000002

Vuln IDs

V-58633

Rule IDs

SV-73063r3_rule

Without identifying devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity. This applies to server-to-server (zone transfer) transactions only and is provided by TSIG/SIG(0), which enforces mutual server authentication using a key that is unique to each server pair (TSIG) or using PKI-based authentication (SIG(0)), thus uniquely identifying the other server. TSIG and SIG(0) are not configurable in Windows 2012 DNS Server. To meet the requirement for authentication between Windows DNS servers, IPsec will be implemented between the Windows DNS servers which host any non-AD-integrated zones.

Checks: C-59505r6_chk

Note: This requirement applies to any Windows 2008 DNS Server which host non-AD-integrated zones even if the DNS servers host AD-integrated zones, too. If the Windows 2008 DNS Servers only host AD-integrated zones, this requirement is not applicable. Log on to the DNS server which hosts non-AD-integrated zones using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute gpme.msc to open the Group Policy Management feature. In the “Browse for Group Policy Object” dialog box, double-click “Domain Controllers.domain.com”. Click “Default Domain Controllers Policy” and click “OK”. In the console tree, open Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Windows Firewall with Advanced Security\Windows Firewall with Advanced Security - LDAP. Click “Connection Security Rules”. Confirm at least one rule is configured for TCP 53. Double-click on each Rule to verify the following: On the “Authentication” tab, "Authentication mode:" is set to "Request authentication for inbound and outbound connections". Confirm the "Signing Algorithm" is set to "RSA (default)". On the “Remote Computers” tab, Endpoint1 and Endpoint2 are configured with the IP addresses of all DNS servers. On the “Protocols and Ports” tab, "Protocol type:" is set to either TCP (depending upon which rule is being reviewed) and the "Endpoint 1 port:" is set to "Specific ports" and "53". If there are not rules(s) configured with the specified requirements, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64017r5_fix

Complete the following procedures twice for each pair of name servers. First create a rule for TCP connections. Refer to the U_Windows_Domain_Name_Service_2008_Overview.pdf for Microsoft links for this procedure. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute gpme.msc to open the Group Policy Management feature. In the Browse for “Group Policy Object” dialog box, double-click “Domain Controllers.domain.com”. Click “Default Domain Controllers Policy” and click “OK”. In the console tree, open Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Windows Firewall with Advanced Security\Windows Firewall with Advanced Security - LDAP. Right-Click “Connection Security Rules” and select “New”. For Rule Type, select the "Server-to-server" radio button, click “Next”. For Endpoint 1 and Endpoint 2, select "These IP addresses:" and add the IP addresses of all DNS servers, click “Next”. For Requirements, select "Request authentication for inbound and outbound connections", click “Next”. For Authentication Method, select Computer certificate and from the "Signing Algorithm:" drop-down, select "RSA (default)". From the "Certificate store type:" drop-down, select "Root CA (default)”. From the "CA name:", click “Browse” and select the certificate for the CA, click “Next”. On Profile, accept default selections, click “Next”. On Name, enter a name applicable to the rule's function, click “Finish”.

b

The secondary Windows DNS name servers must cryptographically authenticate zone transfers from primary name servers.

IA-3 - Medium - CCI-001958 - V-58635 - SV-73065r3_rule

RMF Control

IA-3

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001958

Version

WDNS-IA-000003

Vuln IDs

V-58635

Rule IDs

SV-73065r3_rule

Without authenticating devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity. Device authentication is a solution enabling an organization to manage devices. It is an additional layer of authentication ensuring only specific pre-authorized devices can access the system. This requirement applies to server-to-server (zone transfer) transactions only and is provided by TSIG/SIG(0), which enforces mutual server authentication using a key that is unique to each server pair (TSIG) or using PKI-based authentication (SIG(0)).

Checks: C-59507r1_chk

Authenticity of zone transfers within Windows AD integrated zones is accomplished by AD replication. For zones which are completely AD-integrated, this check is not a finding. For authenticity of zone transfers between non-AD-integrated zones, DNSSEC must be implemented. Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, indicating the zone has been signed with DNSSEC, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64019r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. If not automatically started, initialize the Server Manager window by clicking its icon from the bottom left corner of the screen. Once the Server Manager window is initialized, from the left pane, click to select the DNS category. From the right pane, under the SERVERS section, right-click the DNS server. From the context menu that appears, click DNS Manager. In the DNS Manager console tree on the DNS server being validated, navigate to Forward Lookup Zones. Right-click the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows DNS primary server must only send zone transfers to a specific list of secondary name servers.

IA-3 - Medium - CCI-001958 - V-58637 - SV-73067r3_rule

RMF Control

IA-3

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001958

Version

WDNS-IA-000004

Vuln IDs

V-58637

Rule IDs

SV-73067r3_rule

Primary name servers also make outbound connection to secondary name servers to provide zone transfers and accept inbound connection requests from clients wishing to provide a dynamic update. Primary name servers should explicitly limit zone transfers to only be made to designated secondary name servers. Because zone transfers involve the transfer of entire zones and use TCP connections, they place substantial demands on network resources relative to normal DNS queries. Errant or malicious frequent zone transfer requests on the name servers of the enterprise can overload the master zone server and result in DoS to legitimate users. AD-integrated DNS servers replicate zone information via AD replication. Non-AD-integrated DNS servers replicate zone information via zone transfers.

Checks: C-59509r5_chk

If the DNS server only hosts AD-integrated zones and there are not any non-AD-integrated DNS servers acting as secondary DNS servers for the zones, this check is not applicable. For a non-AD-integrated DNS server: Log on to the DNS server using an Administrator account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select, and then right-click the zone name. From the displayed context menu, click the “Properties” option. On the opened zone's properties box, go to the “Zone Transfers” tab. On the displayed interface, verify if the "Allow zone transfers" check box is selected. If the "Allow zone transfers" check box is not selected, this is not a finding. If the "Allow zone transfers" check box is selected, verify that either the "Only to servers listed on the Name Servers tab" radio button is selected or the "Only to the following servers" radio button is selected. If the "To any server" radio button is selected, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64021r3_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. From the displayed context menu, click the “Properties” option. On the opened zone's properties box, go to the “Zone Transfers” tab. On the displayed interface, select the "Allow zone transfers" check box. Select the "Only to servers listed on the Name Servers tab" radio button OR select the "Only to the following servers" radio button. Click on “Apply”. Click on “OK”.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must provide its identity with returned DNS information by enabling DNSSEC and TSIG/SIG(0).

IA-3 - Medium - CCI-001958 - V-58639 - SV-73069r3_rule

RMF Control

IA-3

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001958

Version

WDNS-IA-000005

Vuln IDs

V-58639

Rule IDs

SV-73069r3_rule

Weakly bound credentials can be modified without invalidating the credential; therefore, non-repudiation can be violated. This requirement supports audit requirements that provide organizational personnel with the means to identify who produced specific information in the event of an information transfer. Organizations and/or data owners determine and approve the strength of the binding between the information producer and the information based on the security category of the information and relevant risk factors. DNSSEC and TSIG/SIG(0) both use digital signatures to establish the identity of the producer of particular pieces of information.

Checks: C-59511r1_chk

Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64023r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. In the DNS Manager console tree on the DNS server being validated, navigate to Forward Lookup Zones. Right-click the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using saved parameters or custom parameters.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must be configured to enforce authorized access to the corresponding private key.

IA-5 - Medium - CCI-000186 - V-58641 - SV-73071r3_rule

RMF Control

IA-5

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-IA-000006

Vuln IDs

V-58641

Rule IDs

SV-73071r3_rule

The cornerstone of the PKI is the private key used to encrypt or digitally sign information. If the private key is stolen, this will lead to the compromise of the authentication and non-repudiation gained through PKI because the attacker can use the private key to digitally sign documents and pretend to be the authorized user. Both the holders of a digital certificate and the issuing authority must protect the computers, storage devices, or whatever they use to keep the private keys. SIG(0) is used for server-to-server authentication for DNS transactions, and it uses PKI-based authentication. So, in cases where SIG(0) is being used instead of TSIG (which uses a shared key, not PKI-based authentication), this requirement is applicable.

Checks: C-59513r4_chk

Access Windows Explorer. Navigate to the following location: %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Microsoft\Crypto Verify the permissions on the keys folder, sub-folders, and files are limited to SYSTEM and Administrators FULL CONTROL. If any other user or group has greater than READ privileges to the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Microsoft\Crypto folder, sub-folders and files, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64025r3_fix

Access Windows Explorer. Navigate to the following location: %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Microsoft\Crypto Modify permissions on the keys folder, sub-folders, and files to be limited to SYSTEM and Administrators FULL CONTROL and to all other Users/Groups to READ.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server key file must be owned by the account under which the Windows 2012 DNS Server service is run.

IA-5 - Medium - CCI-000186 - V-58643 - SV-73073r3_rule

RMF Control

IA-5

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-IA-000007

Vuln IDs

V-58643

Rule IDs

SV-73073r3_rule

To enable zone transfer (requests and responses) through authenticated messages, it is necessary to generate a key for every pair of name servers. The key can also be used for securing other transactions, such as dynamic updates, DNS queries, and responses. The binary key string that is generated by most key generation utilities used with DNSSEC is Base64-encoded. TSIG is a string used to generate the message authentication hash stored in a TSIG RR and used to authenticate an entire DNS message.

Checks: C-59515r2_chk

Access Windows Explorer. Navigate to the following location: %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Microsoft\Crypto Right-click on each sub-folder, choose “Properties”, click on the “Security” tab, click on the “Advanced” button. Verify the Owner on the folder, sub-folders, and files are Administrators. If any other user or group is listed as OWNER of the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Microsoft\Crypto folder, sub-folders, and files, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64027r3_fix

Access Windows Explorer. Navigate to the following location: %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Microsoft\Crypto Right-click on each sub-folder, choose “Properties”, click on the “Security” tab, click on the “Advanced” button. Click on "Change" next to the listed Owner: and change to be Administrators.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server permissions must be set so that the key file can only be read or modified by the account that runs the name server software.

IA-5 - Medium - CCI-000186 - V-58645 - SV-73075r3_rule

RMF Control

IA-5

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-IA-000008

Vuln IDs

V-58645

Rule IDs

SV-73075r3_rule

To enable zone transfer (requests and responses) through authenticated messages, it is necessary to generate a key for every pair of name servers. The key can also be used for securing other transactions, such as dynamic updates, DNS queries, and responses. The binary key string that is generated by most key generation utilities used with DNSSEC is Base64-encoded. TSIG is a string used to generate the message authentication hash stored in a TSIG RR and used to authenticate an entire DNS message.

Checks: C-59517r1_chk

Access Windows Explorer. Navigate to the following location: %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Microsoft\Crypto Verify the permissions on the folder, sub-folders and files are limited to SYSTEM and Administrators FULL CONTROL. If any other user or group has greater than READ privileges to the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Microsoft\Crypto folder, sub-folders and files, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64029r1_fix

Access Windows Explorer. Navigate to the following location: %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Microsoft\Crypto Modify permissions on the folder, sub-folders and files to be limited to SYSTEM and Administrators FULL CONTROL and to all other Users/Groups to READ.

b

The private key corresponding to the ZSK must only be stored on the name server that does support dynamic updates.

IA-5 - Medium - CCI-000186 - V-58647 - SV-73077r3_rule

RMF Control

IA-5

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-IA-000009

Vuln IDs

V-58647

Rule IDs

SV-73077r3_rule

The private keys in the KSK and ZSK key pairs must be protected from unauthorized access. If possible, the private keys should be stored off-line (with respect to the Internet-facing, DNSSEC-aware name server) in a physically secure, non-network-accessible machine along with the zone file master copy. This strategy is not feasible in situations in which the DNSSEC-aware name server has to support dynamic updates. To support dynamic update transactions, the DNSSEC-aware name server (which usually is a primary authoritative name server) has to have both the zone file master copy and the private key corresponding to the zone-signing key (ZSK-private) online to immediately update the signatures for the updated RRsets. The private key corresponding to the key-signing key (KSK-private) can still be kept off-line.

Checks: C-59519r1_chk

For Active Directory-integrated zones, private zone signing keys replicate automatically to all primary DNS servers through Active Directory replication. Each authoritative server signs its own copy of the zone when it receives the key. For optimal performance, and to prevent increasing the size of the Active Directory database file, the signed copy of the zone remains in memory for Active Directory-integrated zones. A DNSSEC-signed zone is only committed to disk for file-backed zones. Secondary DNS servers pull a full copy of the zone, including signatures, from the primary DNS server. If all DNS servers are AD integrated, this check is not applicable. If a DNS server is not AD integrated and has file-backed zones, does not accept dynamic updates and has a copy of the private key corresponding to the ZSK, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64031r1_fix

Ensure the private key corresponding to the ZSK is only stored on the name server accepting dynamic updates.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must implement a local cache of revocation data for PKIauthentication in the event revocation information via the network is not accessible.

IA-5 - Medium - CCI-001991 - V-58649 - SV-73079r3_rule

RMF Control

IA-5

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001991

Version

WDNS-IA-000011

Vuln IDs

V-58649

Rule IDs

SV-73079r3_rule

Without configuring a local cache of revocation data, there is the potential to allow access to users who are no longer authorized (users with revoked certificates). SIG(0) is used for server-to-server authentication for DNS transactions, and it uses PKI-based authentication. So, in cases where SIG(0) is being used instead of TSIG (which uses a shared key, not PKI-based authentication), this requirement is applicable.

Checks: C-59521r2_chk

Consult with the SA to determine if there is a third-party CRL server being used for certificate revocation lookup. If there is, verify if a documented procedure is in place to store a copy of the CRL locally (local to the site, as an alternative to querying the actual Certificate Authorities). An example would be an OCSP responder installed at the local site. If there is no local cache of revocation data, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64033r3_fix

Configure local revocation data to be used in the event access to Certificate Authorities is hindered.

b

The salt value for zones signed using NSEC3 RRs must be changed every time the zone is completely re-signed.

SC-13 - Medium - CCI-002450 - V-58651 - SV-73081r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-13

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002450

Version

WDNS-SC-000001

Vuln IDs

V-58651

Rule IDs

SV-73081r3_rule

NSEC records list the resource record types for the name, as well as the name of the next resource record. With this information it is revealed that the resource record type for the name queried, or the resource record name requested, does not exist. NSEC uses the actual resource record names, whereas NSEC3 uses a one-way hash of the name. In this way, walking zone data from one record to the next is prevented, at the expense of some CPU cycles both on the authoritative server as well as on the resolver. To prevent giving access to an entire zone file, NSEC3 should be configured, and, in order to use NSEC3, RSA/SHA-1 should be used as the algorithm, as some resolvers that understand RSA/SHA-1 might not understand NSEC3. Using RSA/SHA-256 is a safe alternative.

Checks: C-59523r1_chk

In Windows 2012, the NSEC3 salt values are automatically changed when the zone is resigned. To validate: Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS Server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Review the zone's RRs in the right window pane. Determine the RRSIG NSEC3PARAM's Inception (in the Data column). Compare the Inception to the RRSIG DNSKEY Inception. The date and time should be the same. If the NSEC3PARAM's Inception date and time is different than the DNSKEY Inception Date and Time, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64035r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters. Re-validate the NSEC3PARAM Inception date and time against the DNSKEY date and time.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must include data origin with authoritative data the system returns in response to external name/address resolution queries.

SC-20 - Medium - CCI-001178 - V-58653 - SV-73083r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-20

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001178

Version

WDNS-SC-000002

Vuln IDs

V-58653

Rule IDs

SV-73083r3_rule

The underlying feature in the major threat associated with DNS query/response (i.e., forged response or response failure) is the integrity of DNS data returned in the response. The security objective is to verify the integrity of each response received. An integral part of integrity verification is to ensure that valid data has originated from the right source. Establishing trust in the source is called data origin authentication. The security objectives--and consequently the security services--that are required for securing the DNS query/response transaction are data origin authentication and data integrity verification. The specification for a digital signature mechanism in the context of the DNS infrastructure is in IETF's DNSSEC standard. In DNSSEC, trust in the public key (for signature verification) of the source is established not by going to a third party or a chain of third parties (as in public key infrastructure [PKI] chaining), but by starting from a trusted zone (such as the root zone) and establishing the chain of trust down to the current source of response through successive verifications of signature of the public key of a child by its parent. The public key of the trusted zone is called the trust anchor.

Checks: C-59525r1_chk

Authenticity of query responses is provided with DNSSEC signing of zones. Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by Windows 2012 DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64037r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. If not automatically started, initialize the Server Manager window by clicking its icon from the bottom left corner of the screen. Once the Server Manager window is initialized, from the left pane, click to select the DNS category. From the right pane, under the SERVERS section, right-click the DNS server. From the context menu that appears, click DNS Manager. In the DNS Manager console tree on the DNS server being validated, navigate to Forward Lookup Zones. Right-click the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Servers IP address must be statically defined and configured locally on the server.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58655 - SV-73085r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-SC-000003

Vuln IDs

V-58655

Rule IDs

SV-73085r3_rule

The major threat associated with DNS forged responses or failures are the integrity of the DNS data returned in the response. The principle of DNSSEC is to mitigate this threat by providing data origin authentication, establishing trust in the source. By requiring remote clients to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service, data origin is validated. Ensuring all name servers have static IP addresses makes it possible to configure restricted DNS communication, such as with DNSSEC, between the name servers.

Checks: C-59527r3_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Locate the “Network Internet Access” icon, right-click on it and select "Open Network & Sharing Center". Click on "Change adapter settings". Right-click on the Ethernet and click “Properties”. Select Internet Protocol Version 4 (TCP/IPv4) and click “Properties”. Verify the “Use the following IP address” is selected, with an IP address, subnet mask, and default gateway assigned. If the “Use the following IP address” is not selected with a configured IP address, subnet mask, and default gateway, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64039r3_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Locate the “Network Internet Access” icon, right-click on it and select "Open Network & Sharing Center". Click on "Change adapter settings". Right-click on the Ethernet and click “Properties”. Select Internet Protocol Version 4 (TCP/IPv4) and click “Properties”. Select the “Use the following IP address” and populate with an IP address, subnet mask, and default gateway.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must return data information in responses to internal name/address resolution queries.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58657 - SV-73087r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-SC-000004

Vuln IDs

V-58657

Rule IDs

SV-73087r3_rule

The major threat associated with DNS forged responses or failures is the integrity of the DNS data returned in the response. The principle of DNSSEC is to mitigate this threat by providing data origin authentication, establishing trust in the source. By requiring remote clients to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service, data origin is validated.

Checks: C-59529r1_chk

By default, when DNS servers are configured with DNSSEC signed zones, they will automatically respond to query requests, providing validating data in the response, whenever the query requests that validation. Since this takes place inherently when the zone is signed with DNSSEC, the requirement is satisfied by ensuring zones are signed. Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64041r2_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must use DNSSEC data within queries to confirm data origin to DNS resolvers.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58659 - SV-73089r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-SC-000005

Vuln IDs

V-58659

Rule IDs

SV-73089r3_rule

The major threat associated with DNS forged responses or failures are the integrity of the DNS data returned in the response. The principle of DNSSEC is to mitigate this threat by providing data origin authentication, establishing trust in the source. By requiring remote clients to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service, data origin is validated. A DNS server is an example of an information system providing name/address resolution service. Digital signatures and cryptographic keys are examples of additional artifacts. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. Applications other than the DNS, to map between host/service names and network addresses, must provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data. In the case of DNS, employ DNSSEC to provide an additional data origin and integrity artifacts along with the authoritative data the system returns in response to DNS name/address resolution queries.

Checks: C-59531r1_chk

Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64043r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

WINS lookups must be disabled on the Windows 2012 DNS Server.

SC-20 - Medium - CCI-002462 - V-58661 - SV-73091r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-20

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002462

Version

WDNS-SC-000006

Vuln IDs

V-58661

Rule IDs

SV-73091r3_rule

The major threat associated with DNS forged responses or failures is the integrity of the DNS data returned in the response. The principle of DNSSEC is to mitigate this threat by providing data origin authentication, establishing trust in the source. By requiring remote clients to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service, data origin is validated. A DNS server is an example of an information system providing name/address resolution service. Digital signatures and cryptographic keys are examples of additional artifacts. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. Applications other than the DNS, to map between host/service names and network addresses, must provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data. In the case of DNS, employ DNSSEC to provide an additional data origin and integrity artifacts along with the authoritative data the system returns in response to DNS name/address resolution queries. If/when WINS lookups are enabled, the validity of the data becomes questionable since the WINS data is provided to the requestor, unsigned and invalidated. In order to be assured only the DNSSEC-signed data is being returned, WINS lookups must be disabled.

Checks: C-59533r3_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click each zone, and then click “Properties”. In the “Properties” dialog box for the zone, click the “WINS” tab. Verify the "Use WINS forward lookup" check box is not selected. If the "Use WINS forward lookup" check box is selected, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64045r3_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click each zone, and then click “Properties”. In the “Properties” dialog box for the zone, click the “WINS” tab. Uncheck the "Use WINS forward" lookup check box. Click “OK”.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must use DNSSEC data within queries to confirm data integrity to DNS resolvers.

SC-20 - Medium - CCI-002462 - V-58663 - SV-73093r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-20

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002462

Version

WDNS-SC-000007

Vuln IDs

V-58663

Rule IDs

SV-73093r3_rule

The major threat associated with DNS forged responses or failures is the integrity of the DNS data returned in the response. The principle of DNSSEC is to mitigate this threat by providing data origin authentication, establishing trust in the source. By requiring remote clients to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service, data origin is validated. A DNS server is an example of an information system providing name/address resolution service. Digital signatures and cryptographic keys are examples of additional artifacts. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. Applications other than the DNS, to map between host/service names and network addresses, must provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data. In the case of DNS, employ DNSSEC to provide an additional data origin and integrity artifacts along with the authoritative data the system returns in response to DNS name/address resolution queries.

Checks: C-59535r1_chk

Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64047r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must be configured with the DS RR carrying the signature for the RR that contains the public key of the child zone.

SC-20 - Medium - CCI-001179 - V-58665 - SV-73095r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-20

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001179

Version

WDNS-SC-000008

Vuln IDs

V-58665

Rule IDs

SV-73095r3_rule

If name server replies are invalid or cannot be validated, many networking functions and communication would be adversely affected. With DNS, the presence of Delegation Signer (DS) records associated with child zones informs clients of the security status of child zones. These records are crucial to the DNSSEC chain of trust model. Each parent domain's DS record is used to verify the DNSKEY record in its sub domain, from the top of the DNS hierarchy down. A DNS server is an example of an information system providing name/address resolution service. Digital signatures and cryptographic keys are examples of additional artifacts. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. Applications other than the DNS, to map between host/service names and network addresses, must provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data. In DNS, trust in the public key of the source is established by starting from a trusted name server and establishing the chain of trust down to the current source of response through successive verifications of signature of the public key of a child by its parent. A trust anchor is an authoritative entity represented via a public key and associated data. It is used in the context of public key infrastructures, X.509 digital certificates, and Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). When there is a chain of trust, usually the top entity to be trusted becomes the trust anchor. A certification path starts with the subject certificate and proceeds through a number of intermediate certificates up to a trusted root certificate. In DNS, a trust anchor is a DNSKEY that is placed into a validating resolver so the validator can cryptographically validate the results for a given request back to a known public key (the trust anchor). An example means to indicate the security status of child subspaces is through the use of delegation signer (DS) resource records in the DNS. Path validation is necessary for a relying party to make an informed trust decision when presented with any certificate not already explicitly trusted. Without path validation and a chain of trust, there can be no trust that the data integrity authenticity has been maintained during a transaction.

Checks: C-59537r1_chk

Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64049r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must enforce approved authorizations between DNS servers through the use of digital signatures in the RRSet.

SC-20 - Medium - CCI-001663 - V-58667 - SV-73097r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-20

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-SC-000009

Vuln IDs

V-58667

Rule IDs

SV-73097r3_rule

A mechanism to detect and prevent unauthorized communication flow must be configured or provided as part of the system design. If information flow is not enforced based on approved authorizations, the system may become compromised. Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to travel within a system and between interconnected systems. The flow of all application information must be monitored and controlled so it does not introduce any unacceptable risk to the systems or data. Application-specific examples of enforcement occur in systems that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information system services or provide a message filtering capability based on message content (e.g., implementing key word searches or using document characteristics). Applications providing information flow control must be able to enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information between interconnected systems in accordance with applicable policy. Within the context of DNS, this is applicable in terms of controlling the flow of DNS information between systems, such as DNS zone transfers.

Checks: C-59539r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Review the records for the zone and ensure the complete RRSet of records are present: RRSIG, NSEC3, DNSKEY, indicating DNSSEC compliance. If the RRSet of records are not in the zone, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64051r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Right-click the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Name Resolution Policy Table (NRPT) must be configured in Group Policy to enforce clients to request DNSSEC validation for a domain.

SC-20 - Medium - CCI-001663 - V-58669 - SV-73099r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-20

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-SC-000010

Vuln IDs

V-58669

Rule IDs

SV-73099r3_rule

The Name Resolution Policy Table (NRPT) is used to require DNSSEC validation. The NRPT can be configured in local Group Policy for a single computer or domain Group Policy for some or all computers in the domain.

Checks: C-59541r3_chk

The Name Resolution Policy Table (NRPT) is configured in, and deployed to clients from, Group Policy and will be pushed to all clients in the domain. The Active Directory zones will be signed and the clients, with NRPT, will require a validation of signed data when querying. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. At the Windows PowerShell prompt, type the following command: get-dnsclientnrptpolicy <enter> In the results, verify the "DnsSecValidationRequired" is True. If there are no results to the get-dnsclientnrptpolicy cmdlet or the "DnsSecValidationRequired" is not True, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64053r4_fix

On Domain Controller, on the Server Manager menu bar, click Tools, and then click Group Policy Management. In the Group Policy Management console tree, under Domains >; domainname >; Group Policy Objects, right-click Default Domain Policy, and then click Edit. In the Group Policy Management Editor console tree, navigate to Computer Configuration >; Policies >; Windows Settings >; Name Resolution Policy. In the details pane, under Create Rules and to which part of the namespace does this rule apply, choose Suffix from the drop-down list and type domain.mil next to Suffix. On the DNSSEC tab, select the Enable DNSSEC in this rule check box and then under Validation select the Require DNS clients to check that name and address data has been validated by the DNS server check box. In the bottom right corner, click Create and then verify that a rule for domain.mil was added under Name Resolution Policy Table. Click Apply, and then close the Group Policy Management Editor. Open a Windows PowerShell prompt and enter the following commands: gpupdate /force <enter> get-dnsclientnrptpolicy <enter> In the results, select the True for "DnsSecValidationRequired" setting for the domain.mil namespace.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must be configured to validate an authentication chain of parent and child domains via response data.

SC-20 - Medium - CCI-001663 - V-58671 - SV-73101r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-20

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-SC-000011

Vuln IDs

V-58671

Rule IDs

SV-73101r3_rule

If name server replies are invalid or cannot be validated, many networking functions and communication would be adversely affected. With DNS, the presence of Delegation Signer (DS) records associated with child zones informs clients of the security status of child zones. These records are crucial to the DNSSEC chain of trust model. Each parent domain's DS record is used to verify the DNSKEY record in its sub domain, from the top of the DNS hierarchy down. A DNS server is an example of an information system providing name/address resolution service. Digital signatures and cryptographic keys are examples of additional artifacts. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. Applications other than the DNS, to map between host/service names and network addresses, must provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data. DNSSEC provides the means to verify integrity assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. By using the delegation signer (DS) resource records in the DNS, the security status of a child domain can be validated. The DS resource record is used to identify the DNSSEC signing key of a delegated zone. Starting from a trusted name server (such as the root name server) and down to the current source of response through successive verifications of signature of the public key of a child by its parent, the chain of trust is established. The public key of the trusted name servers is called the trust anchor. After authenticating the source, the next process DNSSEC calls for is to authenticate the response. This requires that responses consist of not only the requested RRs but also an authenticator associated with them. In DNSSEC, this authenticator is the digital signature of a Resource Record (RR) Set. The digital signature of an RRSet is encapsulated through a special RRType called RRSIG. The DNS client using the trusted public key of the source (whose trust has just been established) then verifies the digital signature to detect if the response is valid or bogus. This control enables the DNS to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. Without indication of the security status of a child domain and enabling verification of a chain of trust, integrity and availability of the DNS infrastructure cannot be assured.

Checks: C-59543r2_chk

Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: PS C:\> Get-DnsServerResourceRecord -ZoneName adatum.com -RRType DS Replace adatum.com with the parent zone on the DNS server being evaluated. HostName RecordType Timestamp TimeToLive RecordData -------- ---------- --------- ---------- ---------- corp DS 0 01:00:00 [58555][Sha1][RsaSha1NSec3] corp DS 0 01:00:00 [58555][Sha256][RsaSha1NSec3] corp DS 0 01:00:00 [63513][Sha1][RsaSha1NSec3] corp DS 0 01:00:00 [63513][Sha256][RsaSha1NSec3] If the results do not show the DS records for child domain(s), this is a finding. In the previous example, DS records for the child zone, corp.adatum.com, were imported into the parent zone, adatum.com, by using the DSSET file that is located in the c:\windows\system32\dns directory. The DSSET file was located in this directory because the local DNS server is the Key Master for the child zone. If the Key Master DNS server for a child zone is not the same computer as the primary authoritative DNS server for the parent zone where the DS record is being added, the DSSET file must be obtained for the child zone and made available to the primary authoritative server for the parent zone. Alternatively, the DS records can be added manually.

Fix: F-64055r2_fix

A DS records must be added manually or imported. The DS resource record set (DSSET) is automatically added as a file to the Key Master when a zone is signed. This file can be used with the Import-DnsServerResourceRecordDS cmdlet to import DS records to the parent zone. PS C:\> Import-DnsServerResourceRecordDS -ZoneName adatum.com -DSSetFile "c:\windows\system32\dns\dsset-corp.adatum.com"

b

Trust anchors must be exported from authoritative Windows 2012 DNS Servers and distributed to validating Windows 2012 DNS Servers.

SC-20 - Medium - CCI-001663 - V-58673 - SV-73103r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-20

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-SC-000012

Vuln IDs

V-58673

Rule IDs

SV-73103r3_rule

If name server replies are invalid or cannot be validated, many networking functions and communication would be adversely affected. With DNS, the presence of Delegation Signer (DS) records associated with child zones informs clients of the security status of child zones. These records are crucial to the DNSSEC chain of trust model. Each parent domain's DS record is used to verify the DNSKEY record in its sub domain, from the top of the DNS hierarchy down. A DNS server is an example of an information system providing name/address resolution service. Digital signatures and cryptographic keys are examples of additional artifacts. DNS resource records are examples of authoritative data. Applications other than the DNS, to map between host/service names and network addresses, must provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data. DNSSEC provides the means to verify integrity assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. By using the delegation signer (DS) resource records in the DNS, the security status of a child domain can be validated. The DS resource record is used to identify the DNSSEC signing key of a delegated zone. Starting from a trusted name server (such as the root name server) and down to the current source of response through successive verifications of signature of the public key of a child by its parent, the chain of trust is established. The public key of the trusted name servers is called the trust anchor. After authenticating the source, the next process DNSSEC calls for is to authenticate the response. This requires that responses consist of not only the requested RRs but also an authenticator associated with them. In DNSSEC, this authenticator is the digital signature of a Resource Record (RR) Set. The digital signature of an RRSet is encapsulated through a special RRType called RRSIG. The DNS client using the trusted public key of the source (whose trust has just been established) then verifies the digital signature to detect if the response is valid or bogus. This control enables the DNS to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. Without indication of the security status of a child domain and enabling verification of a chain of trust, integrity and availability of the DNS infrastructure cannot be assured. A trust anchor is a preconfigured public key associated with a specific zone. A validating DNS server must be configured with one or more trust anchors in order to perform validation. If the DNS server is running on a domain controller, trust anchors are stored in the forest directory partition in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) and can be replicated to all domain controllers in the forest. On standalone DNS servers, trust anchors are stored in a file named TrustAnchors.dns. A DNS server running Windows Server 2012 or Windows Server 2012 R2 also displays configured trust anchors in the DNS Manager console tree in the Trust Points container. Trust anchors can also be viewed by executing Windows PowerShell commands or Dnscmd.exe at a Windows command prompt.

Checks: C-59545r2_chk

Log onto each of the validating Windows 2012 DNS Servers. In the DNS Manager console tree, navigate to each hosted zone under the Trust Points folder. Two DNSKEY trust points should be displayed, one for the active key and one for the standby key. If each validating Windows 2012 DNS Servers does not reflect the DNSKEY trust points for each of the hosted zone(s), this is a finding.

Fix: F-64057r1_fix

Log onto the primary DNS server and click Windows Explorer on the taskbar. Navigate to C:\Windows\System32, right-click the dns folder, point to Share with, and then click Advanced sharing. In the dns Properties dialog box, click Advanced Sharing, select the Share this folder check box, verify the Share name is dns, and then click OK. Click Close and then close Windows Explorer. Log onto each of the validating Windows 2012 DNS Servers. In the DNS Manager console tree, navigate to the Trust Points folder. Right-click Trust Points, point to Import, and then click DNSKEY. In the Import DNSKEY dialog box, type \\primaryhost\dns\keyset-domain.mil (where primaryhost represent the FQDN of the Primary DNS Server and domain.mil represents the zone(s)). Click OK.

b

Automatic Update of Trust Anchors must be enabled on key rollover.

SC-20 - Medium - CCI-001663 - V-58675 - SV-73105r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-20

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-SC-000013

Vuln IDs

V-58675

Rule IDs

SV-73105r3_rule

A trust anchor is a preconfigured public key associated with a specific zone. A validating DNS server must be configured with one or more trust anchors in order to perform validation. If the DNS server is running on a domain controller, trust anchors are stored in the forest directory partition in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) and can be replicated to all domain controllers in the forest. On standalone DNS servers, trust anchors are stored in a file named TrustAnchors.dns. A DNS server running Windows Server 2012 or Windows Server 2012 R2 also displays configured trust anchors in the DNS Manager console tree in the Trust Points container. Trust anchors can also be viewed by executing Windows PowerShell commands or Dnscmd.exe at a Windows command prompt.

Checks: C-59547r1_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. If not automatically started, initialize the Server Manager window by clicking its icon from the bottom left corner of the screen. Once the Server Manager window is initialized, from the left pane, click to select the DNS category. From the right pane, under the SERVERS section, right-click the DNS server. From the context menu that appears, click DNS Manager. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select and then right-click the zone name. From the displayed context menu, click DNSSEC>>Properties. Click the KSK tab. For each KSK that is listed under Key signing keys (KSKs), click the KSK, click Edit, and in the Key Rollover section verify the "Enable automatic rollover" check box is selected. If the "Enable automatic rollover" check box is not selected for every KSK listed, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64059r1_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. If not automatically started, initialize the Server Manager window by clicking its icon from the bottom left corner of the screen. Once the Server Manager window is initialized, from the left pane, click to select the DNS category. From the right pane, under the SERVERS section, right-click the DNS server. From the context menu that appears, click DNS Manager. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select and then right-click the zone name. From the displayed context menu, click DNSSEC>>Properties. Click the KSK tab. For each KSK that is listed under Key signing keys (KSKs), click the KSK, click Edit, and in the Key Rollover section, select the "Enable automatic rollover" check box.

b

The Windows DNS secondary servers must request data origin authentication verification from the primary server when requesting name/address resolution.

SC-21 - Medium - CCI-002465 - V-58677 - SV-73107r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-21

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002465

Version

WDNS-SC-000014

Vuln IDs

V-58677

Rule IDs

SV-73107r3_rule

If data origin authentication and data integrity verification are not performed, the resultant response could be forged, it may have come from a poisoned cache, the packets could have been intercepted without the resolver's knowledge, or resource records could have been removed that would result in query failure or denial of service. Data origin authentication must be performed to thwart these types of attacks. Each client of name resolution services either performs this validation on its own or has authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching DNS servers. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations.

Checks: C-59549r1_chk

Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64061r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows DNS secondary server must request data integrity verification from the primary server when requesting name/address resolution.

SC-21 - Medium - CCI-002466 - V-58679 - SV-73109r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-21

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002466

Version

WDNS-SC-000015

Vuln IDs

V-58679

Rule IDs

SV-73109r3_rule

If data origin authentication and data integrity verification are not performed, the resultant response could be forged, it may have come from a poisoned cache, the packets could have been intercepted without the resolver's knowledge, or resource records could have been removed that would result in query failure or denial of service. Data integrity verification must be performed to thwart these types of attacks. Each client of name resolution services either performs this validation on its own or has authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching DNS servers. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations.

Checks: C-59551r1_chk

Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64063r2_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows DNS secondary server must validate data integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses received from primary name servers.

SC-21 - Medium - CCI-002467 - V-58681 - SV-73111r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-21

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002467

Version

WDNS-SC-000017

Vuln IDs

V-58681

Rule IDs

SV-73111r3_rule

If data origin authentication and data integrity verification are not performed, the resultant response could be forged, it may have come from a poisoned cache, the packets could have been intercepted without the resolver's knowledge, or resource records could have been removed that would result in query failure or denial of service. Data integrity verification must be performed to thwart these types of attacks. Each client of name resolution services either performs this validation on its own or has authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching DNS servers. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations.

Checks: C-59553r1_chk

Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64065r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows DNS secondary server must validate data origin verification authentication on the name/address resolution responses received from primary name servers.

SC-21 - Medium - CCI-002468 - V-58683 - SV-73113r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-21

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002468

Version

WDNS-SC-000018

Vuln IDs

V-58683

Rule IDs

SV-73113r3_rule

If data origin authentication and data integrity verification are not performed, the resultant response could be forged, it may have come from a poisoned cache, the packets could have been intercepted without the resolver's knowledge, or resource records could have been removed that would result in query failure or denial of service. Data origin authentication verification must be performed to thwart these types of attacks. Each client of name resolution services either performs this validation on its own or has authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems that provide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive resolving or caching DNS servers. DNS client resolvers either perform validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that perform such validations.

Checks: C-59555r1_chk

Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64067r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must protect the authenticity of zone transfers via transaction signing.

SC-23 - Medium - CCI-001184 - V-58685 - SV-73115r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-23

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001184

Version

WDNS-SC-000019

Vuln IDs

V-58685

Rule IDs

SV-73115r3_rule

Without identifying devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity. This applies to server-to-server (zone transfer) transactions and is provided by TSIG/SIG(0), which enforces mutual server authentication using a key that is unique to each server pair (TSIG) or using PKI-based authentication (SIG(0)), thus uniquely identifying the other server. TSIG and SIG(0) are not configurable in Windows 2012 DNS Server. To meet the requirement for authentication between Windows DNS servers, IPsec will be implemented between the Windows DNS servers which hosts any non-AD-integrated zones.

Checks: C-59557r2_chk

NOTE: This requirement applies to any Windows 2012 DNS Servers which host non-AD-integrated zones (file based) even if the DNS servers host AD-integrated zones, too. If the Windows 2012 DNS Servers only host AD-integrated zones, this requirement is not applicable. To protect authenticity of zone transfers between Windows 2012 DNS Servers with file based zones, IPsec must be configured on each pair of name servers in a zone transfer transaction for those zones. Log on to the DNS server which hosts non-AD-integrated, file based zones, using the Administrator, Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute gpme.msc to open the Group Policy Management feature. In the Browse for Group Policy Object dialog box, double-click Domain Controllers.domain.com. Click Default Domain Controllers Policy and click OK. In the console tree, open Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Windows Firewall with Advanced Security\Windows Firewall with Advanced Security - LDAP. Click Connection Security Rules. Consult with the SA to determine which Rules meet the intent of the server-to-server authentication. If Rules exist, double-click on each Rule to verify the following: For the "Authentication:" tab, click on the "Customize..." button. On the Authentication tab, verify "Authentication mode:" is set to "Request authentication for inbound and outbound connections". Confirm the "Signing Algorithm" is set to "RSA (default)". Under "Method", ensure the "Advanced:" radio button is selected. Click on the "Customize" button. For "First authentication methods:", double-click on the entry. Verify the "Select the credential to use for first authentication:" has "Computer certificate from this certification authority (CA):" radio button selected. Review the certificate specified and verify the certificate used was generated by the internally-managed server performing the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) role. If rules do not exist for server-to-server authentication, this is a finding. If rules exist for this server to authenticate to other name servers hosting the same file based zones when transacting zone transfers, but the rules are not configured with the above settings, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64069r1_fix

Complete the following procedures twice for each pair of name servers. First create a rule for UDP connections, and then create a rule for TCP connections. Refer to the U_Windows_Domain_Name_Service_2012_Overview.pdf for Microsoft links for this procedure. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute gpme.msc to open the Group Policy Management feature. In the Browse for Group Policy Object dialog box, double-click Domain Controllers.domain.com. Click Default Domain Controllers Policy and click OK. In the console tree, open Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Windows Firewall with Advanced Security\Windows Firewall with Advanced Security - LDAP. Right-Click Connection Security Rules and select New. For Rule Type, select the "Server-to-server" radio button, click Next. For Endpoint 1 and Endpoint 2, select "These IP addresses:" and add the IP addresses of all DNS servers, click Next. For Requirements, select "Request authentication for inbound and outbound connections", click Next. For Authentication Method, select Computer certificate and from the "Signing Algorithm:" drop-down, select "RSA (default)". From the "Certificate store type:" drop-down, select "Root CA (default). From the "CA name:", click Browse and select the certificate generated by the internally-managed server performing the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) role, click Next. On Profile, accept default selections, click Next. On Name, enter a name applicable to the rule's function (i.e., DNSSEC UDP), click Finish.

c

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must protect the authenticity of dynamic updates via transaction signing.

SC-23 - High - CCI-001184 - V-58687 - SV-73117r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-23

Severity

H

CCI

CCI-001184

Version

WDNS-SC-000020

Vuln IDs

V-58687

Rule IDs

SV-73117r3_rule

DNS is a fundamental network service that is prone to various attacks, such as cache poisoning and man-in-the middle attacks. If communication sessions are not provided appropriate validity protections, such as the employment of DNSSEC, the authenticity of the data cannot be guaranteed. The combination of signing DNS zones by DNSSEC and requiring clients to send their dynamic updates securely assures the authenticity of those DNS records when providing query responses for them.

Checks: C-59559r2_chk

Once resource records are received by a DNS server via a secure dynamic update, the resource records will automatically become signed by DNSSEC as long as the zone was originally signed by DNSSEC. Authenticity of query responses for resource records dynamically updated can be validated by querying for whether the zone/record is signed by DNSSEC. To do so, validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace 131.77.60.235 with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an Expirations, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name : www.zonename.mil QueryType : RRSIG TTL : 189 Section : Answer TypeCovered : CNAME Algorithm : 8 LabelCount : 3 OriginalTtl : 300 Expiration : 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed : 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer : zonename.mil Signature : {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name : origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType : A TTL : 201 Section : Answer IP4Address : 156.112.108.76 If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64071r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. If not automatically started, initialize the Server Manager window by clicking its icon from the bottom left corner of the screen. Once the Server Manager window is initialized, from the left pane, click to select the DNS category. From the right pane, under the SERVERS section, right-click the DNS server. From the context menu that appears, click DNS Manager. In the DNS Manager console tree on the DNS server being validated, navigate to Forward Lookup Zones. Right-click the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must protect the authenticity of query responses via DNSSEC.

SC-23 - Medium - CCI-001184 - V-58689 - SV-73119r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-23

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001184

Version

WDNS-SC-000021

Vuln IDs

V-58689

Rule IDs

SV-73119r3_rule

The underlying feature in the major threat associated with DNS query/response (i.e., forged response or response failure) is the integrity of DNS data returned in the response. An integral part of integrity verification is to ensure that valid data has originated from the right source. DNSSEC is required for securing the DNS query/response transaction by providing data origin authentication and data integrity verification through signature verification and the chain of trust.

Checks: C-59561r1_chk

Authenticity of query responses is provided with DNSSEC signing of zones. Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64073r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. In the DNS Manager console tree on the DNS server being validated, navigate to Forward Lookup Zones. Right-click the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using saved parameters or custom parameters.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must only allow the use of an approved DoD PKI-established certificate authorities for verification of the establishment of protected transactions.

SC-23 - Medium - CCI-002470 - V-58691 - SV-73121r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-23

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002470

Version

WDNS-SC-000022

Vuln IDs

V-58691

Rule IDs

SV-73121r3_rule

Untrusted Certificate Authorities (CA) can issue certificates, but they may be issued by organizations or individuals that seek to compromise DoD systems or by organizations with insufficient security controls. If the CA used for verifying the certificate is not a DoD-approved CA, trust of this CA has not been established. The DoD will only accept PKI certificates obtained from a DoD-approved internal or external certificate authority. Reliance on CAs for the establishment of secure sessions includes, for example, the use of SSL/TLS certificates. TSIG and SIG(0) are not configurable in Windows 2012 DNS Server. To meet the requirement for authentication between Windows DNS servers, IPsec must be implemented between the Windows DNS servers. NOTE: If multiple certificates from the same CA are present on the DNS server, IPsec authentication might fail due to an incorrect certificate being chosen. For this purpose, an Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) role must be installed and configured as an Enterprise certification authority (CA). Refer to the U_Windows_Domain_Name_Service_2012_Overview.pdf for references on deploying certificates for this procedure.

Checks: C-59563r2_chk

NOTE: This requirement applies to any Windows 2012 DNS Servers which host non-AD-integrated zones even if the DNS servers host AD-integrated zones, too. If the Windows 2012 DNS Servers only host AD-integrated zones, this requirement is not applicable. Log on to the DNS server which hosts non-AD-integrated zones using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute gpme.msc to open the Group Policy Management feature. In the Browse for Group Policy Object dialog box, double-click Domain Controllers.domain.com. Click Default Domain Controllers Policy and click OK. In the console tree, open Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Windows Firewall with Advanced Security\Windows Firewall with Advanced Security - LDAP. Click Connection Security Rules. Consult with the SA to determine which Rules meet the intent of DNSSEC server-to-server authentication. Double-click on each Rule to verify the following: For the "Authentication:" tab, click on the "Customize..." button. On the Authentication tab, verify "Authentication mode:" is set to "Request authentication for inbound and outbound connections". Confirm the "Signing Algorithm" is set to "RSA (default)". Under "Method", ensure the "Advanced:" radio button is selected. Click on the "Customize" button. For "First authentication methods:", double-click on the entry. Verify the "Select the credential to use for first authentication:" has "Computer certificate from this certification authority (CA):" radio button selected. Review the certificate specified and verify the certificate used was generated by the internally-managed server performing the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) role. If the certificate used does not meet the requirements, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64075r1_fix

Complete the following procedures twice for each pair of name servers. First create a rule for UDP connections, and then create a rule for TCP connections. Refer to the U_Windows_Domain_Name_Service_2012_Overview.pdf for Microsoft links for this procedure. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute gpme.msc to open the Group Policy Management feature. In the Browse for Group Policy Object dialog box, double-click Domain Controllers.domain.com. Click Default Domain Controllers Policy and click OK. In the console tree, open Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Windows Firewall with Advanced Security\Windows Firewall with Advanced Security - LDAP. Right-Click Connection Security Rules and select New. For Rule Type, select the "Server-to-server" radio button, click Next. For Endpoint 1 and Endpoint 2, select "These IP addresses:" and add the IP addresses of all DNS servers, click Next. For Requirements, select "Request authentication for inbound and outbound connections", click Next. For Authentication Method, select Computer certificate and from the "Signing Algorithm:" drop-down, select "RSA (default)". From the "Certificate store type:" drop-down, select "Root CA (default). From the "CA name:", click Browse and select the certificate generated by the internally-managed server performing the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) role, click Next. On Profile, accept default selections, click Next. On Name, enter a name applicable to the rule's function (i.e., DNSSEC UDP), click Finish.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must protect secret/private cryptographic keys while at rest.

SC-28 - Medium - CCI-001199 - V-58693 - SV-73123r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-28

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001199

Version

WDNS-SC-000024

Vuln IDs

V-58693

Rule IDs

SV-73123r3_rule

Information at rest refers to the state of information when it is located on a secondary storage device within an organizational information system. Mobile devices, laptops, desktops, and storage devices can be either lost or stolen, and the contents of their data storage (e.g., hard drives and non-volatile memory) can be read, copied, or altered. Applications and application users generate information throughout the course of their application use. The DNS server must protect the confidentiality and integrity of shared keys (for TSIG) and private keys (for SIG(0)) and must protect the integrity of DNS information. There is no need to protect the confidentiality of DNS information because it is accessible by all devices that can contact the server.

Checks: C-59565r2_chk

To ensure the cryptographic keys are protected after being backed up to tape, consult with the System Administrator to determine the backup policy in place for the DNS Server. Determine how and where backup tapes are stored. Verify the protection of the backup tapes are secured to the same level, or higher, as the server itself. If a backup policy does not exist or the backup policy does not specify the protection required for backup tapes to be at or above the same level as the server, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64077r2_fix

To ensure the cryptographic keys are protected after being backed up to tape, develop a backup policy to include the protection of backup tapes to be at or above the same level as the DNS server itself.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must not contain zone records that have not been validated in over a year.

SC-28 - Medium - CCI-002475 - V-58695 - SV-73125r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-28

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002475

Version

WDNS-SC-000025

Vuln IDs

V-58695

Rule IDs

SV-73125r3_rule

If zone information has not been validated in over a year, then there is no assurance that it is still valid. If invalid records are in a zone, then an adversary could potentially use their existence for improper purposes. An SOP detailing this process can resolve this requirement.

Checks: C-59567r3_chk

This requirement is not applicable for a Windows 2008 DNS Server which is only hosting AD-integrated zones. For a Windows 2008 DNS Server which hosts a mix of AD-integrated zones and manually maintained zones, ask the DNS database administrator if they maintain a separate database with record documentation for the non-AD-integrated zone information. The reviewer should check that the record's last verified date is less than one year prior to the date of the review. If a separate database with record documentation is not maintained for the non-AD-integrated zone information, this is a finding. If a separate database with record documentation is maintained for the non-AD-integrated zone information, log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Review the zone records of the non-AD-integrated zones and compare to the separate documentation maintained. Determine if any records have not been validated in over a year. If zone records exist which have not been validated in over a year, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64079r3_fix

Create a separate database to maintain record documentation for non-AD-integrated zones. Develop a procedure to validate annually all zone information on the DNS server against the separately maintained database. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. Select the zone records which have not been validated in over a year and revalidate.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must restrict individuals from using it for launching Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against other information systems.

SC-5 - Medium - CCI-001094 - V-58697 - SV-73127r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-5

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001094

Version

WDNS-SC-000026

Vuln IDs

V-58697

Rule IDs

SV-73127r3_rule

Applications and application developers must take the steps needed to ensure users cannot use an authorized application to launch DoS attacks against other systems and networks. For example, applications may include mechanisms that throttle network traffic so users are not able to generate unlimited network traffic via the application. Limiting system resources that are allocated to any user to a bare minimum may also reduce the ability of users to launch some DoS attacks.

Checks: C-59569r2_chk

Review the DNS server to confirm the server restricts direct and remote console access to users other than Administrators. Verify the effective setting in Local Group Policy Editor. Run "gpedit.msc". Navigate to Local Computer Policy >> Computer Configuration >> Windows Settings >> Security Settings >> Local Policies >> User Rights Assignment. If any accounts or groups other than the following are granted the "Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services" user right, this is a finding: Administrators Navigate to Local Computer Policy >> Computer Configuration >> Windows Settings >> Security Settings >> Local Policies >> User Rights Assignment. If the following accounts or groups are not defined for the "Deny access to this computer from the network" user right, this is a finding: Guests Group Navigate to Local Computer Policy >> Computer Configuration >> Windows Settings >> Security Settings >> Local Policies >> User Rights Assignment. If the following accounts or groups are not defined for the "Deny log on locally" user right, this is a finding: Guests Group

Fix: F-64081r2_fix

Configure the policy value for Computer Configuration >> Windows Settings >> Security Settings >> Local Policies >> User Rights Assignment >> "Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services" to only include the following accounts or groups: Administrators Configure the policy value for Computer Configuration >> Windows Settings >> Security Settings >> Local Policies >> User Rights Assignment >> "Deny access to this computer from the network" to include the following: Guests Group Configure the policy value for Computer Configuration >> Windows Settings >> Security Settings >> Local Policies >> User Rights Assignment >> "Deny log on locally" to include the following: Guests Group

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must use DNS Notify to prevent denial of service through increase in workload.

SC-5 - Medium - CCI-001095 - V-58699 - SV-73129r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-5

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001095

Version

WDNS-SC-000027

Vuln IDs

V-58699

Rule IDs

SV-73129r3_rule

In the case of application DoS attacks, care must be taken when designing the application to ensure the application makes the best use of system resources. SQL queries have the potential to consume large amounts of CPU cycles if they are not tuned for optimal performance. Web services containing complex calculations requiring large amounts of time to complete can bog down if too many requests for the service are encountered within a short period of time.

Checks: C-59571r2_chk

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. In the list of hosts, review the Name Server (NS) records. Determine if any of the hosts listed as NS records are non-AD-integrated servers. If the DNS server only hosts AD-integrated zones and there are not any non-AD-integrated DNS servers acting as secondary DNS servers for the zones, this check is not applicable. For a non-AD-integrated DNS server, right click on the Forward Lookup zone and select “Properties”. On the opened zone's properties box, go to the “Zone Transfers” tab. On the displayed interface, verify if the "Allow zone transfers" check box is selected. If the "Allow zone transfers" check box is selected, click on the “Notify” button and verify “Automatically notify with Servers” is listed on the “Name Servers” tab is selected. If the “Notify” button is not enabled for non-AD-integrated DNS servers, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64083r3_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select the zone. In the list of hosts, review the Name Server (NS) records. Determine if any of the hosts listed as NS records are non-AD-integrated servers. If the DNS server only hosts AD-integrated zones and there are not any non-AD-integrated DNS servers acting as secondary DNS servers for the zones, this check is Not Applicable. For a non-AD-integrated DNS server, log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select and then right-click the zone name. From the displayed context menu, click the “Properties” option. On the opened zone's properties box, go to the “Zone Transfers” tab. On the displayed interface, verify if the "Allow zone transfers" check box is selected. If the "Allow zone transfers" check box is selected, click on the “Notify” button and enable Notify to the non-AD-integrated DNS servers.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must protect the integrity of transmitted information.

SC-8 - Medium - CCI-002418 - V-58701 - SV-73131r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-8

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002418

Version

WDNS-SC-000028

Vuln IDs

V-58701

Rule IDs

SV-73131r3_rule

Without protection of the transmitted information, confidentiality and integrity may be compromised since unprotected communications can be intercepted and either read or altered. Communication paths outside the physical protection of a controlled boundary are exposed to the possibility of interception and modification. Protecting the confidentiality and integrity of organizational information can be accomplished by physical means (e.g., employing physical distribution systems) or by logical means (e.g., employing cryptographic techniques). If physical means of protection are employed, then logical means (cryptography) do not have to be employed, and vice versa. Confidentiality is not an objective of DNS, but integrity is. DNSSEC and TSIG/SIG(0) both digitally sign DNS information to authenticate its source and ensure its integrity.

Checks: C-59573r2_chk

Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64085r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must maintain the integrity of information during preparation for transmission.

SC-8 - Medium - CCI-002421 - V-58703 - SV-73133r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-8

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002421

Version

WDNS-SC-000029

Vuln IDs

V-58703

Rule IDs

SV-73133r3_rule

Information can be either unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or modified during preparation for transmission, including, for example, during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and during packing/unpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information.

Checks: C-59577r2_chk

Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64087r2_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must maintain the integrity of information during reception.

SC-8 - Medium - CCI-002420 - V-58705 - SV-73135r3_rule

RMF Control

SC-8

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002420

Version

WDNS-SC-000030

Vuln IDs

V-58705

Rule IDs

SV-73135r3_rule

Information can be either unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or modified during preparation for transmission, including, for example, during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and during packing/unpacking. These unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the information.

Checks: C-59579r1_chk

Validate this check from either a Windows 8 client or a Windows 2008 or higher server, authenticated as a Domain Administrator. Determine a valid host in the zone. Open the Windows PowerShell prompt on the Windows 8/Windows 2008 or higher client. Issue the following command: (Replace www.zonename.mil with a FQDN of a valid host in the zone being validated. Replace ###.###.###.### with the FQDN or IP address of the Windows 2012 DNS Server hosting the signed zone.) resolve-dnsname www.zonename.mil -server ###.###.###.### -dnssecok <enter> NOTE: It is important to use the -server switch followed by the DNS Server name/IP address. The result should show the "A" record results. In addition, the results should show QueryType: RRSIG with an expiration, date signed, signer and signature, similar to the following: Name: www.zonename.mil QueryType: RRSIG TTL: 189 Section: Answer TypeCovered: CNAME Algorithm: 8 LabelCount: 3 OriginalTtl: 300 Expiration: 11/21/2014 10:22:28 PM Signed: 10/22/2014 10:22:28 PM Signer: zonename.mil Signature: {87, 232, 34, 134...} Name: origin-www.zonename.mil QueryType: A TTL: 201 Section: Answer IP4Address: ###.###.###.### If the results do not show the RRSIG and signature information, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64089r1_fix

Sign, or re-sign, the hosted zone(s) on the DNS server being validated. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. Press Windows Key + R, execute dnsmgmt.msc. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name for the DNS server, and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, right-click to select the zone (repeat for each hosted zone), point to DNSSEC, and then click Sign the Zone, either using approved saved parameters or approved custom parameters.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must be configured to only allow zone information that reflects the environment for which it is authoritative, to include IP ranges and IP versions.

SI-10 - Medium - CCI-001310 - V-58707 - SV-73137r3_rule

RMF Control

SI-10

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-001310

Version

WDNS-SI-000001

Vuln IDs

V-58707

Rule IDs

SV-73137r3_rule

DNS zone data for which a Windows 2012 DNS server is authoritative should represent the network for which it is responsible. If a Windows 2012 DNS server hosts zone records for other networks or environments, there is the possibility for the records to become invalid or stale or be redundant/conflicting with a DNS server truly authoritative for the other network environment.

Checks: C-59581r3_chk

Consult with the System Administrator to determine the IP ranges for the environment. Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. If not automatically started, initialize the “Server Manager” window by clicking its icon from the bottom left corner of the screen. Once the “Server Manager” window is initialized, from the left pane, click to select the DNS category. From the right pane, under the “SERVERS” section, right-click the DNS server. From the context menu that appears, click DNS Manager. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. From the expanded list, click to select and then right-click the zone name. Review the zone information and compare to the IP ranges for the environment. If any zone information is for a different IP range or domain, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64091r2_fix

Log on to the DNS server using the Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin account. If not automatically started, initialize the “Server Manager” window by clicking its icon from the bottom left corner of the screen. Once the “Server Manager” window is initialized, from the left pane, click to select the DNS category. From the right pane, under the “SERVERS” section, right-click the DNS server. From the context menu that appears, click DNS Manager. On the opened DNS Manager snap-in from the left pane, expand the server name and then expand Forward Lookup Zones. Remove any zone information which is not part of the environment.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must follow procedures to re-role a secondary name server as the master name server should the master name server permanently lose functionality.

SI-10 - Medium - CCI-002754 - V-58709 - SV-73139r3_rule

RMF Control

SI-10

Severity

M

CCI

CCI-002754

Version

WDNS-SI-000002

Vuln IDs

V-58709

Rule IDs

SV-73139r3_rule

Failing to an unsecure condition negatively impacts application security and can lead to system compromise. Failure conditions include, for example, loss of communications among critical system components or between system components and operational facilities. Fail-safe procedures include, for example, alerting operator personnel and providing specific instructions on subsequent steps to take (e.g., do nothing, reestablish system settings, shutdown processes, restart the system, or contact designated organizational personnel). If a component such as the DNSSEC or TSIG/SIG(0) signing capabilities were to fail, the DNS server should shut itself down to prevent continued execution without the necessary security components in place. Transactions such as zone transfers would not be able to work correctly anyway in this state.

Checks: C-59583r2_chk

Active Directory integrated DNS servers will handle the promotion of a secondary DNS server whenever a primary DNS server loses functionality. If all of the DNS servers are AD-integrated, this is not a finding. Consult with the System Administrator to determine if there are documented procedures for re-roling a non-AD-integrated secondary name server to a master name server role in the event a master name server loses functionality. If there is not any documented procedures for re-roling a non-AD-integrated secondary name server to primary in the event a master name server loses functionality, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64093r3_fix

Active Directory-integrated DNS servers will handle the promotion of a secondary DNS server whenever a primary DNS server loses functionality. Develop, test, and implement documented procedures for re-roling a non-AD-integrated secondary name server to a master name server role in the event a master name server loses functionality.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must, when a component failure is detected, activate a notification to the system administrator.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58711 - SV-73141r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI

Version

WDNS-SI-000005

Vuln IDs

V-58711

Rule IDs

SV-73141r3_rule

Predictable failure prevention requires organizational planning to address system failure issues. If components key to maintaining systems security fail to function, the system could continue operating in an insecure state. The organization must be prepared, and the application must support requirements that specify if the application must alarm for such conditions and/or automatically shut down the application or the system. This can include conducting a graceful application shutdown to avoid losing information. Automatic or manual transfer of components from standby to active mode can occur, for example, upon detection of component failures. If a component such as the DNSSEC or TSIG/SIG(0) signing capabilities were to fail, the DNS server should shut itself down to prevent continued execution without the necessary security components in place. Transactions such as zone transfers would not be able to work correctly anyway in this state.

Checks: C-59585r2_chk

Notification to system administrator is not configurable in Windows 2008. In order for system administrators to be notified when a component fails, the system administrator would need to implement a third-party monitoring system. At a minimum, the system administrator should have a documented procedure in place to review the diagnostic logs on a routine basis every day. If a third-party monitoring system is not in place to detect and notify the system administrator upon component failures and the system administrator does not have a documented procedure in place to review the diagnostic logs on a routine basis every day, this is a finding.

Fix: F-64095r3_fix

Implement a third-party monitoring system to detect and notify the system administrator upon component failure or, at a minimum, document and implement a procedure to review the diagnostic logs on a routine basis every day.

b

The Windows 2012 DNS Server must perform verification of the correct operation of security functions: upon system start-up and/or restart; upon command by a user with privileged access; and/or every 30 days.

CM-6 - Medium - CCI-000366 - V-58713 - SV-73143r3_rule

RMF Control

CM-6

Severity

M

CCI