Exchange 2010 Edge Transport Server STIG

Email is only as secure as the recipient. When the recipient is an email server accepting inbound messages, authenticating the sender enables the receiver to better assess message quality and to validate the sending domain as authentic. One or more authentication techniques used in combination can be effective in reducing SPAM, PHISHING, and FORGERY attacks. The Sender ID Framework (SIDF) receiver accesses specially formatted DNS records (SPF format) that contain the IP address of authorized sending servers for the sending domain that can be compared to data in the email message header. Receivers are able to validate the authenticity of the sending domain, helping to avoid receiving inbound messages from PHISHING or other SPAM domains.

Email system availability depends in part on best practices strategies for setting tuning configurations. Careful tuning reduces the risk that system or network congestion will contribute to availability impacts. Filters that govern inbound Email evaluation can significantly reduce SPAM, PHISHING, and SPOOFED Emails. Messages from blank senders, known SPAMMERS, or 0-day attack modifications must be enabled to be effective. Failure to enable the filter will result in no action taken. This setting should always be enabled.

Email system availability depends in part on best practices strategies for setting tuning configurations. Careful tuning reduces the risk that system or network congestion will contribute to availability impacts. Filters that govern inbound Email evaluation can significantly reduce SPAM, PHISHING, and SPOOFED Emails. Messages from blank senders, known SPAMMERS, or 0-day attack modifications must be enabled to be effective. Having items identified in the ‘allow’ list causes other SPAM evaluation steps to be bypassed, and therefore should be used only with an abundance of caution. If SPAMMERS were to learn of entries in the ‘allow list’ it could enable them to plan a denial of service attack (or other attack) by spoofing that source.

Email system availability depends in part on best practices strategies for setting tuning configurations. Careful tuning reduces the risk that system or network congestion will contribute to availability impacts. Filters that govern inbound Email evaluation can significantly reduce SPAM, PHISHING, and SPOOFED Emails. Messages from blank senders, known SPAMMERS, or 0-day attack modifications must be enabled to be effective. Having items identified in the ‘allow’ list causes other SPAM evaluation steps to be bypassed, and therefore should be used only with an abundance of caution. If SPAMMERS were to learn of entries in the ‘allow list’ it could enable them to plan a denial of service attack (or other attack) by spoofing that source.

This control is used to limit the servers that may use this server as a relay. If a Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) sender does not have a direct connection to the Internet (for example, an application that produces reports to be emailed) then it will need to use an SMTP Receive Connector that does have a path to the Internet (for example, a local email server) as a relay. SMTP relay functions must be protected so third parties are not able to hijack a relay service for their own purposes. Most commonly, hijacking of relays is done by SPAMMERS to disguise the source of their messages, and may also be used to cover the source of more destructive attacks. Relays can be restricted in one of three ways; by blocking relays (restrict to a blank list of servers), by restricting use to lists of valid servers, or by restricting use to servers that can authenticate. Because authenticated connections are the most secure for SMTP Receive Connectors, it is recommended that relays allow only servers that can authenticate.ECSC-1

The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) Receive Connector is used by Exchange to send and receive messages from server to server using SMTP protocol. This setting controls the encryption strength used for client connections to the SMTP Receive Connector. With this feature enabled, only clients capable of supporting secure communications will be able to send mail using this SMTP server. Where secure channels are required, encryption can also be selected. The use of secure communication prevents eavesdroppers from reading or modifying communications between mail clients and servers. While sensitive message bodies should be encrypted by the sender at the client, requiring a secure connection from the client to the server adds protection by encrypting the sender and recipient information that cannot be encrypted by the sender. Individually, channel security and encryption have been compromised by attackers. Used together, email becomes a more difficult target, and security is heightened. Failure to enable this feature gives eavesdroppers an opportunity to read or modify messages between the client and server.ECSC-1

The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) connector is used by Exchange to send and receive messages from server to server. There are several controls that work together to provide security between internal servers. This setting controls the authentication method used for communications between servers. With this feature enabled, messages can be securely passed from a partner domain securely. The use of secure communication prevents eavesdroppers from reading or modifying communications between mail clients and servers. While sensitive message bodies should be encrypted by the sender at the client, requiring a secure connection from server to server adds protection by encrypting the sender and recipient information that cannot be encrypted by the sender. Individually, channel security and encryption can be compromised by attackers. Used together, email becomes a more difficult target, and security is heightened. Failure to enable this feature gives eavesdroppers an opportunity to read or modify messages between servers.ECSC-1

Sending unencrypted email over the Internet increases the risk that messages can be intercepted or altered. Transport Layer Security (TLS) is designed to protect confidentiality and data integrity by encrypting email messages between servers and thereby reducing the risk of eavesdropping, interception, and alteration. This setting forces Exchange to offer TLS before using basic authentication.ECSC-1

Attackers can use automated messages to determine whether a user account is active, in the office, traveling, and so on. An attacker might use this information to conduct future attacks. Ensure Automatic Forwards to remote domains are disabled, except for enterprise mail that must be restricted to forward-only to .mil and .gov. domains. Before enabling this setting first configure a remote domain.

Tarpitting is the practice of artificially delaying server responses for specific SMTP communication patterns that indicate high volumes of SPAM or other unwelcome messages. The intent of tarpitting is to slow down the communication process for SPAM batches so that the cost effectiveness of sending SPAM is reduced and directory harvest attacks may be thwarted. A directory harvest attack is an attempt to collect valid email addresses from a particular organization so that the email addresses can be added to a spam database. A program can be written to collect email addresses that return a 'Recipient OK' SMTP response and discards all email addresses that return a 'User unknown' SMTP response. Tarpitting makes directory harvest attacks too costly to automate efficiently.ECSC-1

Email system availability depends in part on best practices strategies for setting tuning configurations. Careful tuning reduces the risk that system or network congestion will contribute to availability impacts. Filters that govern inbound Email evaluation can significantly reduce SPAM, PHISHING, and SPOOFED Emails. Messages from blank senders, known SPAMMERS, or 0-day attack modifications must be enabled to be effective. ECSC-1

The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) connector is used by Exchange to send and receive messages from server to server. There are several controls that work together to provide security between internal servers. This setting controls the authentication method used for communications between servers. With this feature enabled, only servers capable of supporting domain authentication will be able to send and receive mail within the domain. The use of secure communication prevents eavesdroppers from reading or modifying communications between mail clients and servers. While sensitive message bodies should be encrypted by the sender at the client, requiring a secure connection from server to server adds protection by encrypting the sender and recipient information that cannot be encrypted by the sender. Individually, channel security and encryption can be compromised by attackers. Used together, email becomes a more difficult target, and security is heightened. Failure to enable this feature gives eavesdroppers an opportunity to read or modify messages between servers.ECSC-1

The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) connector is used by Exchange to send and receive messages from server to server. There are several controls that work together to provide security between internal servers. This setting controls the encryption method used for communications between servers. With this feature enabled, only servers capable of supporting Transport Layer Security (TLS) will be able to send and receive mail within the domain. The use of secure communication prevents eavesdroppers from reading or modifying communications between mail clients and servers. While sensitive message bodies should be encrypted by the sender at the client, requiring a secure connection from server to server adds protection by encrypting the sender and recipient information that cannot be encrypted by the sender. Individually, channel security and encryption can be compromised by attackers. Used together, email becomes a more difficult target, and security is heightened. Failure to enable this feature gives eavesdroppers an opportunity to read or modify messages between servers.

In the case of identifying a 'Smart Host' for the email environment, a logical send connector is the preferred method. A 'Smart Host' acts as an Internet Facing Concentrator for other email servers. Appropriate hardening can be applied to the Smart Host rather than at multiple locations throughout the enterprise. Failure to identify a 'Smart Host' could default to each email server performing its own lookups (potentially through protective firewalls). Exchange servers should not be Internet facing, and should therefore not perform any 'Smart Host' functions. When the Exchange servers are Internet facing they must, however, be configured to identify the Internet facing server that is performing the 'Smart Host' function.

A connectivity log is a record of the SMTP connection activity of the outbound message delivery queues to the destination Mailbox server, smart host, or domain. Connectivity logging is available on Hub Transport servers and Edge Transport servers. By default, connectivity logging is disabled. If events are not recorded it may be difficult or impossible to determine the root cause of system problems or the unauthorized activities of malicious users. NOTE: Transport configuration settings apply to the organization/global level of the Exchange SMTP path. By checking and setting them at the Hub server the setting will apply to both Hub and Edge roles.ECSC-1

Attackers can use automated messages to determine whether a user account is active, in the office, traveling, and so on. An attacker might use this information to conduct future attacks. Ensure that delivery reports to remote domains are disabled. Before enabling this setting first configure a remote domain using the EMC or the New-RemoteDomain cmdlet.ECSC-1

Attackers can use automated messages to determine whether a user account is active, in the office, traveling, and so on. An attacker might use this information to conduct future attacks. Ensure that non-delivery reports to remote domains are disabled. Before enabling this setting first configure a remote domain using the EMC or the New-RemoteDomain cmdlet.ECSC-1

SPAM originators, in an effort to refine mailing lists, sometimes use a technique where they monitor transmissions for automated bounce back messages, such as 'Out of Office' messages. Automated messages include such items as Out of Office responses, non-delivery messages, or automated message forwarding. Automated bounce back messages can be used by a third party to determine if users exist on the server. This can result in the disclosure of active user accounts to third parties, paving the way for possible future attacks. ECSC-1

Attackers can use automated messages to determine whether a user account is active, in the office, traveling, and so on. An attacker might use this information to conduct future attacks. Remote users will not receive automated 'Out Of Office' delivery reports. This setting can be used to determine if all the servers in the Organization can send 'Out of Office' messages.ECSC-1

Log files help establish a history of activities, and can be useful in detecting attack attempts or determining tuning adjustments to improve availability. Diagnostic logging, however, characteristically produces large volumes of data and requires care in managing the logs to prevent risk of disk capacity denial of service conditions. Exchange diagnostic logging is broken up into 29 main “services”, each of which has anywhere from 2 to 26 “categories” of events to be monitored. Moreover, each category may be set to one of four levels of logging: Lowest, Low, Medium, and High, depending on how much detail one desires. The higher the level of detail, the more disk space required to store the audit material. Diagnostic logging is intended to help administrators debug problems with their systems, not as a general purpose auditing tool. Because the diagnostic logs collect a great deal of information, the log files may grow huge very quickly. Diagnostic log levels may be raised for limited periods of time when attempting to debug relevant pieces of Exchange functionality. Once debugging has finished, diagnostic log levels should be reduced again.

Log files help establish a history of activities, and can be useful in detecting attack attempts or determining tuning adjustments to improve availability. This setting enables an automated log entry to be sent to Microsoft giving general details about the nature and location of the error. Microsoft, in turn, uses this information to improve the robustness of their product. While this type of debugging information would not ordinarily contain sensitive information, it may alert eavesdroppers to the existence of problems in your Exchange organization. At the very least, it could alert them to (possibly) advantageous timing to mount an attack. At worst, it may provide them with information as to which aspects of Exchange are causing problems and might be vulnerable (or at least sensitive) to attack. All system errors in Exchange will result in outbound traffic that may be identified by an eavesdropper. For this reason, the 'Report Fatal Errors to Microsoft' feature must be disabled.

Log files help establish a history of activities, and can be useful in detecting attack attempts or determining tuning adjustments to improve availability. Audit log content must always be considered sensitive, and in need of protection. Audit data available for modification by a malicious user can be altered to conceal malicious activity. Audit data might also provide a means for the malicious user to plan unauthorized activities that exploit weaknesses. The contents of audit logs are protected against unauthorized access, modification, or deletion. Only authorized auditors and the audit functions should be granted Read and Write access to audit log data.ECSC-1

Default product installations may provide more generous access permissions than are necessary to run the application. By examining and tailoring access permissions to more closely provide the least amount of privilege possible, attack vectors that align with user permissions are less likely to access more highly secured areas.ECSC-1

Log files help establish a history of activities, and can be useful in detecting attack attempts or determining tuning adjustments to improve availability. This setting enables an automated entry to be sent to Microsoft giving general details about how the product is used. Microsoft, in turn, uses this information to improve the robustness of their product. While this type of information does not ordinarily contain sensitive information, it may alert eavesdroppers to the existence of the environment and its configurations. It could alert them to (possibly) advantageous timing or weaknesses toward which to mount an attack. ECSC-1

Log files help establish a history of activities, and can be useful in detecting attack attempts or determining tuning adjustments to improve availability. Audit log content must always be considered sensitive, and in need of protection. Successful exploit of an application server vulnerability may well be logged by monitoring or audit processes when it occurs. By writing log and audit data to a separate partition where separate security contexts protect them, it may offer the ability to protect this information from being modified or removed by the exploit mechanism.ECSC-1

Monitors are automated “process watchers” that respond to performance changes, and can be useful in detecting outages and alerting administrators where attention is needed. Exchange has built-in monitors that enable the administrator to generate alerts if thresholds are reached, better enabling them to react in a timely fashion. The intent of this check is for system administrators to have awareness of performance changes on their network. Notification choices include email an alert to an email-enabled account, for example, an email Administrator, or invoke a script to take other action, for example, to add an Event to the Microsoft Application Event Log, where external monitors might detect it. Data elements configured to be monitored should be specific to the organization’s network. .

The INFOCON system provides a framework within which the Commander USSTRATCOM regional commanders, service chiefs, base/post/camp/station/vessel commanders, or agency directors can increase the measurable readiness of their networks to match operational priorities. The readiness strategy provides the ability to continuously maintain and sustain one’s own information systems and networks throughout their schedule of deployments, exercises, and operational readiness life cycle independent of network attacks or threats. The system provides a framework of prescribed actions and cycles necessary for reestablishing the confidence level and security of information systems for the commander and thereby supporting the entire Global Information Grid (GIG) (SD 527-1 Purpose). The Exchange software files and directories are vulnerable to unauthorized changes if not adequately protected. An unauthorized change could affect the integrity or availability of email services overall. For this reason, all application software installations must monitor for change against a software baseline that is preserved when installed, and updated periodically as patches or upgrades are installed. Automated and manual schedules for software change monitoring must be compliant with SD527-1 frequencies. Note: Policy Auditor 5.2 or later, File Integrity Monitor (FIM) module will meet the requirement for file integrity checking. The Asset module within HBSS does not meet this requirement. ECSC-1

Exchange software, as with other application software installed on a host system, must be included in a system baseline record and periodically reviewed; otherwise unauthorized changes to the software may not be discovered. This effort is a vital step to securing the host and the applications, as it is the only method that may provide the ability to detect and recover from otherwise undetected changes, such as those that result from worm or bot intrusions. The Exchange software and configuration baseline is created and maintained for comparison during scanning efforts. Operational procedures must include baseline updates as part of configuration management tasks that change the software and configuration. ECSC-1

Exchange may be configured to accept email for multiple domain names. This setting identifies the domains for which the server will accept mail. This check verifies the email server is not accepting email for unauthorized domains.ECSC-1

Unneeded, but running, services offer attackers an enhanced attack profile, and attackers are constantly watching to discover open ports with running services. By analyzing and disabling unneeded services, the associated open ports become unresponsive to outside queries, and servers become more secure as a result. Exchange Server has role-based server deployment to enable protocol path control and logical separation of network traffic types. For example, a server implemented in the Client Access role (i.e., Outlook Web App [OWA]) is configured and tuned as a web server using web protocols. A client access server exposes only web protocols (HTTP/HTTPS) enabling system administrators to optimize the protocol path and disable all services unnecessary for Exchange web services. Similarly, servers created to host mailboxes are dedicated to that task, and must operate only the services needed for mailbox hosting. (Exchange servers must also operate some Web services, but only to the degree that Exchange requires the IIS engine in order to function). Because POP3, and IMAP4 clients are not included in the standard desktop offering, they must be disabled.

In the same way that added security layers can provide a cumulative positive effect on security posture, multiple applications can provide a cumulative negative effect. A vulnerability and subsequent exploit to one application can lead to an exploit of other applications sharing the same security context. For example, an exploit to a web server process that leads to unauthorized administrative access to the host system can most likely lead to a compromise of all applications hosted by the same system. Email services should be installed on a partition that does not host other applications. Email services should never be installed on a Domain Controller / Directory Services server.

Server certificates are required for many security features in Exchange; without them the server cannot engage in many forms of secure communication. Failure to implement valid certificates makes it virtually impossible to secure Exchange's communications.

Failure to install the most current Exchange service pack leaves a system vulnerable to exploitation. Current service packs correct known security and system vulnerabilities.

Sender Identification (SID) is an email anti-spam sanitization process. Sender ID uses DNS MX record lookups to verify the SMTP sending server is authorized to send email for the originating domain. Failure to implement Sender ID risks that SPAM could be admitted into the email domain that originates from rogue servers. Most SPAM content originates from domains where the IP address has been spoofed prior to sending, thereby avoiding detection. For example, messages with malformed or incorrect 'purported responsible sender' data in the message header could be (best case) created by using RFI non-compliant software, but is more likely to be SPAM. ECSC-1

Scripts often provide a way for attackers to infiltrate a system, especially those downloaded from untrusted locations. By setting machine policy to prevent unauthorized script executions, unanticipated system impacts can be avoided. Failure to allow only signed remote scripts reduces the attack vector vulnerabilities from unsigned remote scripts. ECSC-1

Block List filtering is a sanitization process performed on email messages prior to their arrival at the destination mailbox. By performing this process at the email perimeter, threats can be eliminated outside the enclave, where there is less risk they can do harm. Block List Services (sometimes called Reputation Data Services) are fee based data providers that collect the IP addresses of known SPAMmers and other malware purveyors. Block List Service Subscribers benefit from more effective SPAM elimination, which has been estimated as comprising up to 90% of inbound mail volume. Failure to specify a Block List provider risks that manual email administration effort would be needed to maintain and update larger block lists than a single email site administrator could conveniently or accurately maintain. The 'Block List' Services vendor provides a value for this field, usually the DNS suffix for their domain.

Automated connection responses occur as a result of FTP or Telnet connections, when connecting to those services. They report a successful connection by greeting the connecting client, stating the name, release level, and (often) additional information regarding the responding product. While useful to the connecting client, connection responses can also be used by a third party to determine operating system (OS) or product release levels on the target server. The result can include disclosure of configuration information to third parties, paving the way for possible future attacks. For example, when querying the SMTP service on port 25, the default response looks similar to this one: 220 exchange.mydomain.org Microsoft ESMTP MAIL Service, Version: 6.0.3790.211 ready at Wed, 2 Feb 2005 23:40:00 -0500 Changing the response to hide local configuration details reduces the attack profile of the target. ECSC-1

By performing filtering at the perimeter, up to 90% of SPAM, malware, and other undesirable messages may be eliminated from the transport message stream, preventing their entry into the Exchange environment. This significantly reduces the attack vector for inbound email-borne SPAM and malware. SPAM evaluation (heuristic) filters scan inbound email messages for evidence of SPAM and other attacks that primarily use 'Social Engineering' techniques. Upon evaluation completion, a rating is assigned to each message estimating the likelihood of its being SPAM. Upon arrival at the destination mailbox, the junk mail filter threshold (also configurable) determines whether the message will be withheld from delivery, delivered to the junk mail folder, or delivered to the user’s inbox. ECSC-1

By performing filtering at the perimeter, up to 90 percent of spam, malware, and other undesirable messages are eliminated from the message stream rather than admitting them into the mail server environment. Attachments are being used more frequently for different forms of attacks. By filtering undesirable attachments a large percent of malicious code can be prevented from entering the system. Attachments must be controlled at the entry point into the email environment to prevent successful attachment-based attacks. The following is a basic list of known attachments that should be filtered from Internet mail attachments. *.ade *.crt *.jse *.msi *.scr *.wsh *.dir *.adp *.csh *.ksh *.msp *.sct *.htm *.dcr *.app *.exe *.lnk *.mst *.shb *.html *.plg *.asx *.fxp *.mda *.ops *.shs *.htc *.spl *.bas *.hlp *.mdb *.pcd *.url *.mht *.swf *.bat *.hta *.mde *.pif *.vb *.mhtml *.chm *.inf *.mdt *.prf *.vbe *.shtm *.cmd *.ins *.mdw *.prg *.vbs *.shtml *.com *.isp *.mdz *.reg *.wsc *.stm *.cpl *.js *.msc *.scf *.wsf

By performing filtering at the perimeter, up to 90% of SPAM, malware, and other undesirable messages are eliminated from the message stream rather than admitting them into the mail server environment. Sender reputation is anti-SPAM functionality that blocks messages according to many characteristics of the sender. Sender reputation relies on persisted data about the sender to determine what action, if any, to take on an inbound message. This setting enables the threshold at which an email will be considered SPAM.ECSC-1

By performing filtering at the perimeter, up to 90% of SPAM, malware, and other undesirable messages are eliminated from the message stream rather than admitting them into the Mail server environment. Sender reputation is anti-SPAM functionality that blocks messages according to many characteristics of the sender. Sender reputation relies on persisted data about the sender to determine what action, if any, to take on an inbound message. This setting enables the sender reputation function.ECSC-1

SPAM originators, in an effort to refine mailing lists, sometimes use a technique where they first create fictitious names, and then monitor rejected emails for non-existent recipients. Those not rejected, of course, are deemed to exist, and are therefore used in future SPAM mailings. To prevent this disclosure of existing email accounts to Spammers, this feature should not be employed. Instead, it is recommended that all messages be received, then evaluated and disposed of without enabling the sender to determine recipients that are existing vs. non-existing. ECSC-1

SPAM origination sites and other sources of suspected Email-borne malware have the ability to corrupt, compromise, or otherwise limit availability of Email servers. Limiting exposure to unfiltered inbound messages can reduce the risk of SPAM and malware impacts. The Global Deny list block messages originating from specific sources. Most Black List filtering is done using a commercial 'Block List' service, because eliminating threats from known SPAMMERS prevents the messages being evaluated inside the enclave where there is more risk they can do harm. Additional sources should also be blocked to supplement the contents of the commercial 'Block List Service'. For example, during a 0-Day threat action, entries can be added, and then removed when the threat is mitigated. An additional best practice is to enter the enterprise’s home domains in the Deny List, because inbound Email with a ‘from’ address of the home domain is very likely to be SPOOFED SPAM. ECSC-1

By performing filtering at the perimeter, up to 90% of SPAM, malware, and other undesirable messages are eliminated from the message stream rather than admitting them into the mail server environment. This significantly reduces the attack vector for inbound Email-borne SPAM and malware. As messages are filtered, it is prudent to temporarily host them in an archive for evaluation by administrators or users. The archive can be used to recover messages that might have been inappropriately filtered, preventing data loss, and to provide a base of analysis that can provide future filter refinements. ECSC-1

By performing filtering at the perimeter, up to 90% of SPAM, malware, and other undesirable messages are eliminated from the message stream rather than admitting them into the mail server environment. Anonymous email (messages with blank sender fields) cannot be replied to. Messages formatted in this way may be attempting to hide their true origin to avoid responses, or to SPAM any receiver with impunity while hiding their source of origination. Rather than spend resource and risk infection while evaluating them, it is recommended that these messages be filtered immediately upon receipt and not forwarded to end users.ECSC-1

By performing filtering at the perimeter, up to 90% of SPAM, malware, and other undesirable messages are eliminated from the message stream rather than admitting them into the mail server environment. Anonymous Email (messages with blank sender fields) cannot be replied to. Messages formatted in this way may be attempting to hide their true origin to avoid responses, or to SPAM any receiver with impunity while hiding their source of origination. Rather than spend resource and risk infection while evaluating them, it is recommended that these messages be filtered immediately upon receipt and not forwarded to end users. ECSC-1

The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) connector is used by Exchange to send and receive messages from server to server. There are several controls that work together to provide security between internal servers. This setting controls the encryption method used for communications between servers. With this feature enabled, only servers capable of supporting Transport Layer Security (TLS) will be able to send and receive mail within the domain. The use of secure communication prevents eavesdroppers from reading or modifying communications between mail clients and servers. While sensitive message bodies should be encrypted by the sender at the client, requiring a secure connection from server to server adds protection by encrypting the sender and recipient information that cannot be encrypted by the sender. Individually, channel security and encryption can be compromised by attackers. Used together, email becomes a more difficult target, and security is heightened. Failure to enable this feature gives eavesdroppers an opportunity to read or modify messages between servers.