SEL-2740S NDM Security Technical Implementation Guide


This Security Technical Implementation Guide is published as a tool to improve the security of Department of Defense (DoD) information systems. The requirements are derived from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-53 and related documents. Comments or proposed revisions to this document should be sent via email to the following address: [email protected]

Version / Release: V1R1

Published: 2019-05-06

Updated At: 2019-07-06 21:59:45




Vuln Rule Version CCI Severity Title Description
SV-102379r1_rule SELS-ND-000230 CCI-000169 MEDIUM The SEL-2740S must be configured to create log records for DoD-defined events. Without the capability to generate audit records, it would be difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one. Audit records can be generated from various components within the network device (e.g., process, module). Certain specific device functionalities may be audited as well. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated. This set of events is typically a subset of the list of all events for which the system is capable of generating audit records. DoD has defined the list of events for which the device will provide an audit record generation capability as the following: (i) Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access, modify, or delete privileges, security objects, security levels, or categories of information (e.g., classification levels); (ii) Access actions, such as successful and unsuccessful logon attempts, privileged activities or other system level access, starting and ending time for user access to the system, concurrent logons from different workstations, successful and unsuccessful accesses to objects, all program initiations, and all direct access to the information system; and (iii) All account creation, modification, disabling, and termination actions.
SV-102381r1_rule SELS-ND-000340 CCI-000139 MEDIUM The SEL-2740S must alert the ISSO and SA (at a minimum) in the event of an audit processing failure. It is critical for the appropriate personnel to be aware if a system is at risk of failing to process audit logs as required. Without this notification, the security personnel may be unaware of an impending failure of the audit capability and system operation may be adversely affected. Audit processing failures include software/hardware errors, failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded.
SV-102383r1_rule SELS-ND-000430 CCI-001348 MEDIUM The SEL-2740S must be configured to send log data to a Syslog server or collected by another parent OTSDN Controller. Protection of log data includes assuring log data is not accidentally lost or deleted. Regularly backing up audit records to a different system or onto separate media than the system being audited helps to assure, in the event of a catastrophic system failure, the audit records will be retained.
SV-102385r1_rule SELS-ND-001000 CCI-001891 MEDIUM The SEL-2740S must be configured to compare internal information system clocks at least every 24 hours with an authoritative time server. Inaccurate time stamps make it more difficult to correlate events and can lead to an inaccurate analysis. Determining the correct time a particular event occurred on a system is critical when conducting forensic analysis and investigating system events. Sources outside of the configured acceptable allowance (drift) may be inaccurate. Additionally, unnecessary synchronization may have an adverse impact on system performance and may indicate malicious activity. Synchronizing internal information system clocks provides uniformity of time stamps for information systems with multiple system clocks and systems connected over a network.
SV-102387r1_rule SELS-ND-001010 CCI-002046 MEDIUM The SEL-2740S must be configured to synchronize internal system clocks with an authoritative time source. Inaccurate time stamps make it more difficult to correlate events and can lead to an inaccurate analysis. Determining the correct time a particular event occurred on a system is critical when conducting forensic analysis and investigating system events. Synchronizing internal information system clocks provides uniformity of time stamps for information systems with multiple system clocks and systems connected over a network. Organizations should consider setting time periods for different types of systems (e.g., financial, legal, or mission-critical systems). Organizations should also consider endpoints that may not have regular access to the authoritative time server (e.g., mobile, teleworking, and tactical endpoints). This requirement is related to the comparison done every 24 hours in CCI-001891 because a comparison must be done in order to determine the time difference. The organization-defined time period will depend on multiple factors, most notably the granularity of time stamps in audit logs. For example, if time stamps only show to the nearest second, there is no need to have accuracy of a tenth of a second in clocks.
SV-102389r1_rule SELS-ND-001020 CCI-000366 MEDIUM The SEL-2740S must be configured to maintain internal system clocks with a backup authoritative time server. The loss of connectivity to a particular authoritative time source will result in the loss of time synchronization (free-run mode) and increasingly inaccurate time stamps on audit events and other functions. Multiple time sources provide redundancy by including a secondary source. Time synchronization is usually a hierarchy; clients synchronize time to a local source while that source synchronizes its time to a more accurate source. The network device must utilize an authoritative time server and/or be configured to use redundant authoritative time sources. This requirement is related to the comparison done in CCI-001891. DoD-approved solutions consist of a combination of a primary and secondary time source using a combination or multiple instances of the following: a time server designated for the appropriate DoD network (NIPRNet/SIPRNet); United States Naval Observatory (USNO) time servers; and/or the Global Positioning System (GPS). The secondary time source must be located in a different geographic region than the primary time source.
SV-102391r1_rule SELS-ND-001180 CCI-003123 HIGH The SEL-2740S must be adopted by OTSDN Controllers for secure communication identifiers and initial trust for configuration of remote maintenance and diagnostic communications. This requires the use of secure protocols instead of their unsecured counterparts, such as SSH instead of telnet, SCP instead of FTP, and HTTPS instead of HTTP. If unsecured protocols (lacking cryptographic mechanisms) are used for sessions, the contents of those sessions will be susceptible to eavesdropping, potentially putting sensitive data (including administrator passwords) at risk of compromise and potentially allowing hijacking of maintenance sessions.
SV-102393r1_rule SELS-ND-001190 CCI-002385 MEDIUM The SEL-2740S must be configured to permit the maintenance and diagnostics communications to specified OTSDN Controller(s). DoS is a condition when a resource is not available for legitimate users. When this occurs, the organization either cannot accomplish its mission or must operate at degraded capacity. This requirement addresses the configuration of network devices to mitigate the impact of DoS attacks that have occurred or are ongoing on device availability. For each network device, known and potential DoS attacks must be identified and solutions for each type implemented. A variety of technologies exist to limit or, in some cases, eliminate the effects of DoS attacks (e.g., limiting processes or restricting the number of sessions the device opens at one time). Employing increased capacity and bandwidth, combined with service redundancy, may reduce the susceptibility to some DoS attacks. The security safeguards cannot be defined at the DoD level because they vary according to the capabilities of the individual network devices and the security controls applied on the adjacent networks (e.g., firewalls performing packet filtering to block DoS attacks).
SV-102395r1_rule SELS-ND-001410 CCI-000366 MEDIUM The SEL-2740S must be adopted by OTSDN Controller(s) and obtain its public key certificates from an appropriate certificate policy through an approved service provider. For user certificates, each organization obtains certificates from an approved, shared service provider, as required by OMB policy. For federal agencies operating a legacy public key infrastructure cross-certified with the Federal Bridge Certification Authority at medium assurance or higher, this Certification Authority will suffice.
SV-102397r1_rule SELS-ND-001420 CCI-000803 MEDIUM The SEL-2740S must be configured to establish trust relationships with parent OTSDN Controller(s). Machine to machine initial trust must be established between the OTSDN controller and the SEL-2740S for authenticating all communications and configuration thereafter. Certificates must be created and safely stored. Backup OTSDN controller trust should also be established and locked down. Any time that these need to be modified the SEL-2740S must be factory default reset and adoption process must be re-executed.
SV-102399r1_rule SELS-ND-001430 CCI-000366 MEDIUM The SEL-2740S must be configured to send log data to a syslog server for the purpose of forwarding alerts to the administrators and the ISSO. Once an attacker establishes initial access to a system, the attacker often attempts to create a persistent method of reestablishing access. One way to accomplish this is for the attacker to simply create a new account. Notification of account creation is one method for mitigating this risk. A comprehensive account management process will ensure an audit trail which documents the creation of accounts and notifies administrators and Information System Security Officers (ISSOs). Such a process greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be surreptitiously created and provides logging that can be used for forensic purposes.
SV-104419r2_rule SELS-ND-001025 CCI-001967 MEDIUM The SEL-2740S must authenticate Network Time Protocol sources using authentication that is cryptographically based. If Network Time Protocol is not authenticated, an attacker can introduce a rogue NTP server. This rogue server can then be used to send incorrect time information to network devices, which will make log timestamps inaccurate and affect scheduled actions. NTP authentication is used to prevent this tampering by authenticating the time source.
SV-104421r2_rule SELS-ND-001400 CCI-000366 MEDIUM The SEL-2740S must employ automated mechanisms to assist in the tracking of security incidents. Despite the investment in perimeter defense technologies, enclaves are still faced with detecting, analyzing, and remediating network breaches and exploits that have made it past the network device. An automated incident response infrastructure allows network operations to immediately react to incidents by identifying, analyzing, and mitigating any network device compromise. Incident response teams can perform root cause analysis, determine how the exploit proliferated, and identify all affected nodes, as well as contain and eliminate the threat. The network device assists in the tracking of security incidents by logging detected security events. The audit log and network device application logs capture different types of events. The audit log tracks audit events occurring on the components of the network device. The application log tracks the results of the network device content filtering function. These logs must be aggregated into a centralized server and can be used as part of the organization's security incident tracking and analysis.