Network Infrastructure Policy Security Technical Implementation Guide

V9R7 2018-09-27       U_Network_Infrastructure_Policy_STIG_V9R7_Manual-xccdf.xml
V9R1 2016-07-11       U_Network_Infrastructure_Policy_STIG_V9R1_Manual-xccdf.xml
This Security Technical Implementation Guide is published as a tool to improve the security of Department of Defense (DoD) information systems. The requirements are derived from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-53 and related documents. Comments or proposed revisions to this document should be sent via e-mail to the following address: [email protected]
Comparison
All 74
No Change 68
Updated 6
Added 0
Removed 0
V-8046 No Change
Findings ID: NET0090 Rule ID: SV-8532r3_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001098

Discussion

To assist in the management, auditing, and security of the network infrastructure facility drawings and topology maps are a necessity. Topology maps are important because they show the overall layout of the network infrastructure and where devices are physically located. They also show the relationship and interconnectivity between devices and where possible intrusive attacks could take place. Having up to date network topology diagrams will also help show what the security, traffic, and physical impact of adding a new user(s) will be on the network.

Checks

Validate the network diagram by correlating the information with all routers, multi-layer switches, and firewall configurations.

Validate all subnets have been documented accordingly.

Validate any connectivity documented on the diagram by physically examining the cable connections for the downstream and upstream links, as well as connections for major network components (Routers, Switches, Firewalls, IDS/IPS, etc.).

If the site has not maintained network topology diagrams for the enclave, this is a finding.

Fix

Update the enclave's network topology diagram to represent the current state of the network and its connectivity.
V-8047 No Change
Findings ID: NET0130 Rule ID: SV-8533r3_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001121

Discussion

Every site must have a security policy to address filtering of the traffic to and from those connections. This documentation along with diagrams of the network topology is required to be submitted to the Connection Approval Process (CAP) for approval to connect to the NIPRNet or SIPRNet. SIPRNet connections must also comply with the documentation required by the Classified Connection Approval Office (CCAO) to receive the SIPRNet Interim Approval to Connect (IATC) or final Approval to Connect (ATC). Also any additional requirements must be met as outlined in the Interim Authority to Operate (IATO) or Authority to Operate (ATO) forms signed by the Authorizing Official (AO).

Checks

Review the network topology and interview the ISSO to verify that each external connection to the site’s network has been validated and approved by the AO and CAO and that CAP requirements have been met.

If there are any external connections that have not been validated and approved, this is a finding.

Fix

All external connections will be validated and approved prior to connection. Interview the ISSM to verify that all connections have a mission requirement and that the AO is aware of the requirement.
V-8048 No Change
Findings ID: NET0135 Rule ID: SV-8534r4_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001121

Discussion

A network is only as secure as its weakest link. It is imperative that all external connections be reviewed and kept to a minimum needed for operations. All external connections should be treated as untrusted networks. Reviewing who or what the network is connected to empowers the security manager to make sound judgements and security recommendations. Minimizing backdoor circuits and connections reduces the risk for unauthorized access to network resources.

Checks

Review the network topology and interview the ISSO to verify that external connections to the network are reviewed and documented on a semi-annual basis.

If there are any external connections that have not been documented, or if the connections are not reviewed on a semi-annual basis, this is a finding.

Fix

Implement a semi-annual review process to document and account for external connections to the organization.
V-8049 No Change
Findings ID: NET0140 Rule ID: SV-8535r3_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001121

Discussion

DOD leased lines carry an aggregate of sensitive and non-sensitive data; therefore unauthorized access must be restricted. Inadequate cable protection can lead to damage and denial of service attacks against the site and the LAN infrastructure.

Checks

Review the network topology to determine external connections and inspect location where CSU/DSUs and data service jacks reside.

If these components are not in a secured environment, this is a finding.

Fix

Move all critical communications to controlled access areas. Controlled access areas in this case means controlled restriction to authorize site personnel, i.e., dedicated communications rooms or locked cabinets. This is an area afforded entry control at a security level commensurate with the operational requirement. This protection will be sufficient to protect the network from unauthorized personnel. The keys to the locked cabinets and dedicated communications rooms will be controlled and only provided to authorized network/network security individuals.
V-8051 Updated
Findings ID: NET0160 Rule ID: SV-8537r34_rule Severity: high CCI: CCI-001101

Discussion

Analysis of DoD reported incidents reveal current protective measures at the NIPRNet boundary points are insufficient. Documented ISPs and validated architectures for DMZs are necessary to protect internal network resources from cyber attacks originating from external Internet sources by protective environments.System Administrator

Checks

Any connection to an internet service provider (ISP) must be approved by the Office of the DoD CIO before a connection is made to the ISP. Based on the use cases below, verify written approval has been obtained from the Office of the DoD CIO or verify a renewal request has been appropriately submitted. There are three basic use cases for an ISP connection.

Use case (1): An ISP connection that originates from an approved DISN infrastructure source (includes IAP connections at the DECCs). A DoDIN Waiver is required for a CC/S/A to connect the unclassified DISN to an ISP. These connection requests must come to the Waiver Panel with a Component CIO endorsement of the requirement. These connections should not be provisioned and put into use until waived. Expired waivers pending renewal from the OSD DoDIN Waiver Panel may be downgraded to a Severity 3 category, if proof of a requested renewal can be verified. A DISN enclave that cannot prove DoDIN Waiver approval for the ISP connection is a Severity 1 category. Note: If discovered during a CCRI assessment, the review team lead will immediately report the unapproved ISP connection to the USCYBERCOM
(301-688-3585) and the Connection Approval Office (301-225-2900/2901). USCYBERCOM will direct the connection be immediately disconnected.

Use Case (2): An ISP connection to a Stand Alone Enclave (physically and logically separated from any DISN connection) requires DoDIN Waiver approval prior to connection. The Stand Alone Enclave must have an AO issued ATO and the connection must be logically and physically separated from the DISN. An unapproved ISP connection in this use case will be assigned a Severity 3 category.

Use Case (3): An ISP connection to a non-DoD network (such as a contractor-owned infrastructure) co-located on the same premises as the DoD network. The non-DoD network is physically and logically separated from any DoD IP network. Furthermore, it is not connected to any DoD IP network. The non-DoD network infrastructure is not DoD funded nor is it operated or administered by DoD military or civilian personnel. In addition, the non-DoD network with the ISP connection is not storing, processing, or transmitting any DoD data. For such a network as defined herein, a DoDIN Waiver approval is not required for deploying a connection to an ISP. However, the AO must perform and have on file a risk assessment endorsed by the facility or installation command.

If any of the above use cases that are applicable and written approval has been not been obtained from the Office of the DoD CIO or if a renewal request has not been submitted, this is a finding.

Fix

Written mission justification approval must be obtained from the Office of the DoD CIO prior to establishing a direct connection to the Internet via commercial service provider outside DoD CIO approved Internet access points (e.g. DISA IAP, Cloud Access Point, NIPRnet Federated Gateway, DREN IAP, etc.).
V-8052 No Change
Findings ID: NET0170 Rule ID: SV-8538r4_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001102

Discussion

Without taking the proper safeguards, external networks connected to the organization will impose security risks unless properly routed through the perimeter security devices. Since external networks to the organization are considered to be untrusted, this could prove detrimental since there is no way to verify traffic inbound or outbound on this backdoor connection. An attacker could carry out attacks or steal data from the organization without any notification. An external connection is considered to be any link from the organization's perimeter to the NIPRNet, SIPRNet, Commercial ISP, or other untrusted network outside the organization's defined security policy. The DREN and SREN are DoD's Research & Engineering Network. A DoD Network that is the official DoD long-haul network for computational scientific research, engineering, and testing in support of DoD's S&T and T&E communities. It has also been designated as a DoD IPv6 pilot network by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks & Information Integration)/DoD Chief Information Officer ASD (NII)/DoD CIO. A DISN enclave should not have connectivity to the DREN unless approved by the AO and the requirements have been met for all external connections described in NET0130.

Checks

Review the network topology diagram and verify that ingress and egress traffic via external connections to the enclave do not bypass the enclave’s perimeter security.

If there are external connections to the enclave that bypass the enclaves’ perimeter security, this is a finding.

Fix

Disconnect any external network connections not routed through the organization's perimeter security or validated and approved by the AO.
V-8054 No Change
Findings ID: NET0210 Rule ID: SV-8540r3_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000921

Discussion

If all communications devices are not installed within controlled access areas, risk of unauthorized access and equipment failure exists, which could result in denial of service or security compromise. It is not sufficient to limit access to only the outside world or non-site personnel. Not everyone within the site has the need-to-know or the need-for-access to communication devices.

Checks

Inspect the site to validate physical network components are in a secure environment with limited access.

If there are any network components not located in a secure environment, this is a finding.

Fix

Move all critical communications into controlled access areas. Controlled access area in this case means controlled restriction to authorize site personnel, i.e., dedicated communications rooms or locked cabinets. This is an area afforded entry control at a security level commensurate with the operational requirement. This protection will be sufficient to protect the network from unauthorized personnel. The keys to the locked cabinets and dedicated communications rooms will be controlled and only provided to authorized network/network security individuals.
V-8060 No Change
Findings ID: NET1025 Rule ID: SV-8546r2_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001575

Discussion

Maintaining an audit trail of system activity logs can help identify configuration errors, understand past intrusions, troubleshoot service disruptions, and react to probes and scans of the network.

Checks

Review the network topology and verify that a syslog server is located within the management network. Note the IP address as documented on the management network topology and verify that this is what is configured on the network elements as the host device for sending syslog data.

If a centralized syslog server has not been deployed in the management network, this is a finding.

Fix

Stand up a syslog server and connect it to the management network. Configure all managed network elements to send syslog data to the syslog server.
V-8061 No Change
Findings ID: NET1040 Rule ID: SV-8547r2_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001785

Discussion

If the network element's non-volatile memory is lost without a recent configuration stored in an offline location, it may take time to recover that segment of the network. Users connected directly to the switch or router will be without service for a longer than acceptable time.

Checks

At a minimum, a copy of the current and previous network element configurations must be saved. Storage can take place on a classified network, OOB network, or offline.

If the current and previous network element configurations are not stored in a secured location, this is a finding.

Fix

The network administrator will store the current and previous router and switch configurations in a secure location. Storage can take place on a classified network, OOB network, or offline. Configurations can only be accessed by server or network admin.
V-8066 No Change
Findings ID: NET0351 Rule ID: SV-8552r3_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000262

Discussion

The only way to mediate the flow of traffic between the inside network, the outside connection, and the DMZ is to place the firewall into the architecture in a manner that allows the firewall the ability to screen content for all three destinations.

Checks

Review the network topology diagrams and visually inspect the firewall location to validate correct position on the network.

If the firewall is not positioned between the perimeter router and the private network and between the perimeter router and the DMZ, this is a finding.

Exception: If the perimeter security for the enclave or B/C/P/S is provisioned via the JRSS, then this requirement is not applicable.

Fix

Move the firewall into the prescribed location to allow for enforcement of the Enclave Security Policy and allow for all traffic to be screened.
V-8078 No Change
Findings ID: NET-IDPS-033 Rule ID: SV-8564r3_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

IDPS data needs to be backed up to ensure preservation in the case a loss of data due to hardware failure or malicious activity.

Checks

Interview the SA to determine the IDPS backup procedures as well as have SA display the backup files saved on the file server.

If the IDPS data is not backed up on a weekly basis, this is a finding.

Fix

The organization must establish weekly backup procedures for the network IDS/IPS data.
V-8080 No Change
Findings ID: NET-IDPS-035 Rule ID: SV-8566r2_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

Keeping the IDPS software updated with the latest engine and attack signatures will allow for the IDPS to detect all forms of known attacks. Not maintaining the IDPS properly could allow for attacks to go unnoticed.

Checks

Interview the ISSO and the IDPS administrator. Have the IDPS administrator display update notifications that have been received, the build number or patch level, then search the vendor’s vulnerability database for current release and patch level.

If software and signatures are not updated when updates are provided by the vendor, this is a finding.

Fix

Have the IDPS administrator subscribe to the X-press notification or similar service offered by the vendor. Ensure the IDPS software is updated when software is available either by DISA or the vendor for security related distributions.
V-8081 No Change
Findings ID: NET-VLAN-001 Rule ID: SV-8567r3_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

Since the IDF includes all hardware required to connect horizontal wiring to the backbone, it is imperative that all switches and associated cross-connect hardware are kept in a secured IDF or an enclosed cabinet that is kept locked. This will also prevent an attacker from gaining privilege mode access to the switch. Several switch products only require a reboot of the switch in order to reset or recover the password.

Checks

Inspect switches and associated cross-connect hardware are kept in a secured IDF. If the hardware is located in an open area, verify all hardware is located in a secured and locked cabinet.

If switches and associated cross-connect hardware are not kept in secured IDFs or locked cabinet, this is a finding.

Fix

Place switches and associated cross-connect hardware in a secured IDF. If the hardware is located in an open area, ensure the hardware is located in a secured and locked cabinet.
V-8099 No Change
Findings ID: NET0198 Rule ID: SV-8585r3_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001902

Discussion

In order to identify and combat IP address spoofing, it is highly recommended that the DHCP server logs MAC addresses and hostnames on the DHCP server.

Checks

Verify the DHCP audit and event logs include hostnames and MAC addresses of all clients. Also, validate logs are kept online for thirty days and offline for one year.

If the logs do not include hostnames and MAC addresses or if the logs are not kept online for thirty days and offline for one year, this is a finding.

Fix

Configure the DHCP audit and event logs to log hostname and MAC addresses.

Store the logs for a minimum of thirty days online and then offline for one year.
V-8100 No Change
Findings ID: NET0199 Rule ID: SV-8586r3_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001902

Discussion

In order to trace, audit, and investigate suspicious activity, DHCP servers within the SIPRNet infrastructure must have the minimum lease duration time configured to 30 or more days.

Checks

Review the configuration of SIPRNet DHCP servers to verify that the lease duration is set to a minimum of thirty days.

If the lease duration is less than thirty days, this is a finding.

Fix

Configure any DHCP server used on the SIPRNet with a minimum lease duration of thirty days.
V-8272 No Change
Findings ID: NET-IDPS-021 Rule ID: SV-8758r3_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001097

Discussion

Per CJCSI 6510.01F, Enclosure A-5, Paragraph 8, “DOD ISs (e.g., enclaves, applications, outsourced IT-based process, and platform IT interconnections) shall be monitored to detect and react to incidents, intrusions, disruption of services, or other unauthorized activities (including insider threat) that threaten the security of DOD operations or IT resources, including internal misuse.”

An Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) allows the sensor to monitor, alert, and actively attempt to drop/block malicious traffic. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) uses a passive method; receiving a copy of the packets to analyze and alert authorized persons about any malicious activity. While an IDS or an IPS in a passive role cannot stop the attack itself, it can typically notify and dynamically assign ACLs or other rules to a firewall or router for filtering. The preferred method of installation is to have the IDPS configured for inline mode. Only when there is a valid technical reason, should the IDPS be placed into a passive or IDS mode. For a full uninhibited view of the traffic, the IDPS must sit behind the enclave’s firewall. This will allow the IDPS to monitor all traffic unencrypted, entering or leaving the enclave.

Checks

Review the network topology to ensure the enclave has the IDPS positioned to monitor all traffic to and from the enclave. Review any type of report that was recently produced from information provided by the sensor showing any recent alerts, an escalation activity and any type of log or configuration changes. This will show the sensor is being actively monitored and alerts are being acted upon. If the enclave’s CNDSP requires continuous monitoring of the IDPS, the CNDSPs management team (e.g. sensor grid management team at DISA) will verify the operational status by providing information about the enclave’s IDPS such as a network diagram, MOA, current alert information, or other information to validate its operational status.

If there is no IDPS positioned and enabled to monitor all ingress and egress traffic, this is a finding.

Exception: If the perimeter security for the enclave or B/C/P/S is provisioned via the JRSS, then this requirement is not applicable.

Fix

Install an IDPS inline or passively, behind the enclave firewall to monitor all unencrypted traffic, inbound and outbound.
V-11796 Updated
Findings ID: NET0369 Rule ID: SV-12294r45_rule Severity: high CCI: CCI-002080

Discussion

To prevent malicious or accidental leakage of traffic, organizations must implement a deny-by-default security posture at the network perimeter. Such rulesets prevent many malicious exploits or accidental leakage by restricting the traffic to only known sources and only those ports, protocols, or services that are permitted and operationally necessary.

Applications, protocols, TCP/UDP ports, and endpoints (specific hosts or networks) are identified and used to develop rulesets and access control lists to restrict traffic to and from an enclave.
Rules or access control statements containing "any" for either the host, destination, protocol, or port are prohibited.Other

Checks

Determine if a deny-by-default security posture has been implemented for both inbound and outbound traffic on the perimeter router or firewall.

If a deny-by-default security posture has not been implemented at the network perimeter, this is a finding.

Fix

Implement a deny-by-default security posture on either the enclave perimeter router or firewall.
V-12072 No Change
Findings ID: WIR0035 Rule ID: SV-12625r6_rule Severity: high CCI: CCI-002327

Discussion

Emanations from computing devices in the secured area may be transmitted or picked up inadvertently by wireless devices.Other

Checks

Work with the traditional reviewer or interview the ISSO or SM.

Determine if the site SCIF CSA has approved wireless CMDs in the site SCIFs.

Determine if the SCIF CSA has approved wireless devices in site SCIFs. Ask for approval documentation.

If wireless devices are allowed in site SCIFs without required approval, this is a finding.

Fix

Train users to comply with this requirement as well as site procedures document and include the requirement in the site User Agreement.
V-12101 No Change
Findings ID: NET1815 Rule ID: SV-12654r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

The ISSM will ensure Releasable Local Area Network (REL LAN) environments are documented in the SSAA.Other

Checks

Interview the ISSM and review the SSAA. GRE tunnels found on a premise or edge SIPRNet router that have an endpoint within the REL IP address space must be documented in the SSAA.

If the REL LAN has not been documented in the SSAA, this is a finding.

Fix

The ISSM will document GRE tunnels defined on a premise or edge SIPRNet router that have an endpoint within the REL IP address space.
V-12102 No Change
Findings ID: NET1816 Rule ID: SV-12655r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

The ISSM will ensure Releasable Local Area Network (REL LAN) reviews are performed annually.

Checks

Have the ISSM disclose documentation that a REL LAN review has been performed annually.

If annual reviews are not being performed, this is a finding.

Fix

The ISSM will document REL LAN reviews being performed annually.
V-12106 No Change
Findings ID: WIR0040 Rule ID: SV-12659r5_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-002327

Discussion

The operation of electronic equipment and emanations must be controlled in and around areas where sensitive information is kept or processed. Sites should post signs and train users to this requirement to mitigate this vulnerability.System Administrator

Checks

Detailed Policy Requirements:
DoD Components may operate unclassified WLAN systems and WLAN-enabled PEDs in secure spaces when classified systems are turned off and RF transmitter separation is implemented in accordance with CNSS Advisory Memorandum TEMPEST/1-13, the Mobile Policy SRG, and the Network Policy and Mobility Policy STIGs.

The ISSO will ensure unclassified wireless devices are not operated in areas where classified information is electronically stored, processed, or transmitted unless:
- Approved by the AO.
- The unclassified wireless equipment is separated from the classified data equipment at the minimum distance described in CNSS Advisory Memorandum TEMPEST/1-13.
- Classified processing equipment is turned off.

Review written policies, training material, or user agreements to see if wireless usage in these areas is addressed. Verify proper procedures for wireless device use in classified areas is addressed in training program.
Review documentation. Work with the traditional security reviewer to verify the following:

If classified information is not processed at this site, this is not a finding.

If any of the following are found, this is a finding:
- Unclassified wireless equipment is being operated in a Secure Space while classified equipment is turned on.
- AO has not approved the use of unclassified wireless equipment in the Secure Space.
- Users are not trained or made aware (using signage or user agreement) of procedures for wireless device usage in and around classified processing areas.

Fix

Central Computer and Telecommunication Agency (CTTA) must designate a separation distance in writing.

AO must coordinate with the CTTA.

Train users or get a signed user agreement on procedures for wireless device usage in and around classified processing areas.
V-14634 Updated
Findings ID: NET0168 Rule ID: SV-15259r34_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001101

Discussion

The incorrect placement of the external IDPS may allow unauthorized access to go undetected and limit the ability of security personnel to stop malicious or unauthorized use of the network. In order to ensure that an attempted or existing attack goes unnoticed, the data from the sensors must be monitored continuously.

Checks

Inspect the network topology and physical connectivity to verify compliance.

If the site has a non-DoD external connection and does not have an IDPS located between the site’s Approved Gateway and the perimeter router, this is a finding.


Note: An Approved Gateway (AG) is any external connection from a DoD NIPRNet enclave to an Internet Service Provider, or network owned by a contractor, or non-DoD federal agency that has been approved by either the DoD CIO or the DoD Component CIO. This AG requirement does not apply to commercial cloud connections when the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) network is connected via the NIPRNet Boundary Cloud Access Point (BCAP).

Fix

Install and configure an IDPS between the site’s Approved Gateway and the premise router.
V-14638 No Change
Findings ID: NET0346 Rule ID: SV-15263r4_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-002395

Discussion

Without the protection of a DMZ, production networks will be prone to outside attacks as they are allowing externally accessible services to be accessed on the internal LAN. This can cause many undesired consequences such as access to the entire network, Denial of Service attacks, or theft of sensitive information.

Checks

Review the network topology diagram and interview the ISSO to verify that all NIPRNet-only applications are located in a local enclave DMZ.

If there are any NIPRNet-only applications not hosted in the enclave’s DMZ, this is a finding.

Fix

Implement and move NIPRNet-only applications to a local enclave DMZ.
V-14640 No Change
Findings ID: NET0348 Rule ID: SV-15265r4_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

Without the protection of a DMZ, production networks will be prone to outside attacks as they are allowing externally accessible services to be accessed on the internal LAN. This can cause many undesired consequences such as access to the entire network, Denial of Service attacks, or theft of sensitive information.

Checks

Review the network topology diagram and interview the ISSO to verify that all Internet-facing applications are hosted in a DoD DMZ Extension.

If there are any Internet-facing applications hosted in the enclave’s DMZ or private network, this is a finding.

Fix

Implement and move internet facing applications logically to a DoD DMZ Extension.
V-14642 No Change
Findings ID: NET0365 Rule ID: SV-15268r6_rule Severity: high CCI: CCI-001116

Discussion

Deep packet inspection (DPI) examines the packet beyond the Layer 4 header by examining the payload to identify the application or service. DPI searches for illegal statements, predefined criteria, malformed packets, and malicious code, thereby enabling the IA appliances to make a more informed decision on whether to allow or not allow the packet through. DPI engines can delve into application centric information to allow different applications to be protected in different ways from different threats. Examples of DPI appliances include next-generation firewalls, application layer gateways as well as specific gateways for web, email and SSL traffic.

Checks

Determine which type of solution is used for deep packet inspection at the enclave boundary. Acceptable solutions for meeting this requirement are a deep packet inspection firewall, or a stateful packet inspection firewall in conjunction with any combination of application firewalls or application layer gateways.

If the organization does not have any implementation of deep packet inspection protecting their network perimeter boundaries, this is a finding.

Exception: If the perimeter security for the enclave or B/C/P/S is provisioned via the JRSS, then this requirement is not applicable.

Fix

Implement a deep packet inspection solution at the enclave boundaries. Verify any IA appliances used for deep packet inspection are connected, properly configured, and actively inspecting all ingress and egress network traffic.
V-14716 No Change
Findings ID: NET1622 Rule ID: SV-15442r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

From an architectural point of view, providing Out-Of-Band (OOB) management of network systems is the best first step in any management strategy. No production traffic resides on an out-of-band network. The biggest advantage to implementation of an OOB network is providing support and maintenance to the network that has become degraded or compromised. During an outage or degradation period the in band management link may not be available. The consequences of loss of availability of a MAC I system is unacceptable and could include the immediate and sustained loss of mission effectiveness. Mission Assurance Category I systems require the most stringent protection measures. Maintenance support for key IT assets must be available to respond 24x7 immediately upon failure.

Checks

Review the network topology and verify that an OOB network provides connectivity from the management network to all of the managed network elements.

If an OOB network has not been deployed, verify that the network administrators have management access via the console to the managed network elements.

If there is no OOB network or if network administrators do not have management access via the console to the managed network elements, this is a finding.

Fix

The network administrator will manage devices via direct connection or access via OOB management network.
V-14723 No Change
Findings ID: NET0445 Rule ID: SV-15473r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000765

Discussion

Without secure management implemented with authenticated access controls, strong two-factor authentication, encryption of the management session and audit logs, unauthorized users may gain access to network managed devices compromised, large parts of the network could be incapacitated with only a few commands.

Checks

Review all network element configurations to ensure that an authentication server is being used. Then verify that a two-factor authentication method has been implemented. The RADIUS or TACACS server referenced in the configurations will call a two-factor authentication server.

If two-factor authentication is not being used to access all network elements, this is a finding.

Fix

The network administrator must ensure strong two-factor authentication is being incorporated in the access scheme.
V-14737 No Change
Findings ID: NET-TUNL-026 Rule ID: SV-15493r5_rule Severity: high CCI: CCI-000028

Discussion

Allowing encapsulated traffic to bypass the enclave's network perimeter without being filtered and inspected leaves the enclave vulnerable to malicious traffic that could result in compromise and denial of service. The destination of these packets could be servers that provide mission critical services and data.

Checks

Review network device configurations and topology diagrams to validate encapsulated traffic received from other enclaves terminate at the perimeter for filtering and content inspection. If the tunnel is terminated on a VPN gateway, validate the traffic is inspected by a firewall and IDPS before gaining access to the private network.

If the tunnel is being provided by the perimeter router with a direct connection to the tenant's perimeter router, then the perimeter router (of the enclave providing the transient service) must be configured (examples: policy based routing or VRF bound to this interface with only a default route pointing out) to insure all traffic received by this connecting interface is forwarded directly to the NIPR/SIPR interface regardless of destination. If this isn't being done then the connecting interface will have to be treated as an external interface with all the applicable checks.

Secured connections such as SSL or TLS which are used for remote access, secure web access, etc. is also applicable to this rule. These types of connections like the other types above must terminate at the enclave perimeter, enclave DMZ, or an enclave service network for filtering and content inspection before passing into the enclave's private network.

If the tunnels do not meet any of the criteria above and bypass the enclave's perimeter without filtering and inspection, this is a finding.

Note: This vulnerability is not applicable for any VPN connectivity between multiple sites of the same enclave, nor is it applicable for VPN remote access to the enclave. For theses deployments, the implementation must be compliant with all requirements specified within IPsec VPN STIG.

Fix

Move tunnel decapsulation to a secure end-point at the enclave's perimeter for filtering and inspection.
V-14738 No Change
Findings ID: NET-TUNL-028 Rule ID: SV-15494r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-002396

Discussion

CJCSI 6211.02E instruction establishes policy and responsibilities for the connection of any information systems to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) provided transport. Enclosure E mandates that the CC/S/A document all IP tunnels transporting classified communication traffic in the enclave’s security authorization package prior to implementation. An ATC or IATC amending the current connection approval must be in place prior to implementation.

Checks

Review the enclave's security authorization package and the ATC or Interim ATC amending the connection approval received.

If the tunneling of classified traffic is not documented in the security authorization package and an ATC or Interim ATC, this is a finding.

Fix

Document the tunneling of classified traffic in the security authorization package and the ATC or Interim ATC.
V-14740 No Change
Findings ID: NET-TUNL-030 Rule ID: SV-15496r2_rule Severity: high CCI: CCI-002396

Discussion

CJCSI 6211.02E instruction establishes policy and responsibilities for the connection of any information systems to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) provided transport. Enclosure E mandates that the CC/S/A obtain DSAWG approval before tunneling classified data outside component’s local area network boundaries across a non-DISN or OCONUS DISN unclassified IP-wide area transport infrastructure.

Checks

Review the network topology diagram.

If there is a connection between the classified network and the unclassified network for the purpose of tunneling classified traffic across a non-DISN or OCONUS DISN unclassified IP network, verify there is approval by the DSAWG.

If there is no document stating DSAWG approval, this is a finding.

Fix

Remove the connection between the classified and unclassified network. Obtain approval from the DSAWG for the purpose of tunneling classified traffic across a non-DISN or OCONUS DISN unclassified IP network.
V-14741 No Change
Findings ID: NET1826 Rule ID: SV-15497r2_rule Severity: high CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

Having a circuit provisioned that connects the SIPRNet enclave to a non-DoD, foreign, or contractor network puts the enclave and the entire SIPRNet at risk. If the termination point is not operated by the government, there is no control to ensure that the network element at the remote facility is not compromised or connected to another network.

Checks

Review the topology diagram of the classified network.

If there are any leased circuits connecting to DoD Vendor, Foreign, or Federal Mission Partner enclave or network without a signed DoD CIO-approved sponsorship memo, this is a finding.

If classified connectivity is not to a DSS-approved contractor facility or DoD Component-approved foreign government facility, this is a finding.

Fix

Terminate all leased circuits connecting to DoD Vendor, Foreign, or Federal Mission Partner enclave or network without a signed DoD CIO-approved sponsorship memo.

Terminate all leased circuits for a classified network that is not connecting to a DSS-approved contractor facility or DoD Component-approved foreign government facility.
V-14742 No Change
Findings ID: NET1827 Rule ID: SV-15498r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

Any exception to use SIPRNet must be documented in an update to the enclave’s accreditation package and an Authority to Connect (ATC) or Interim ATC amending the connection approval received prior to implementation.

Checks

Review SIPRNet accreditation package and an Interim Authority to Connect/Authority to Connect (IATC/ATC) amending the connection approval received.

If C2 and non-C2 exceptions are not documented, this is a finding.

Fix

Document all SIPRNet connections.
V-14743 No Change
Findings ID: NET-TUNL-031 Rule ID: SV-15499r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-002396

Discussion

When transporting classified data over an unclassified IP network, it is imperative that traffic from the classified enclave or community of interest is encrypted prior reaching the point of presence or service delivery node of the unclassified network. Confidentiality and integrity of the classified traffic must be preserved by employing cryptographic algorithms in accordance with CNSS Policy No. 15 which requires the appropriate Suite B cryptographic algorithms listed in ANNEX B or a commensurate suite of NSA-approved cryptographic algorithms.

Checks

Review the configuration of the IPsec VPN gateway and verify that the tunnel provisioned for transporting classified traffic across an unclassified IP transport network is using cryptographic algorithms in accordance with CNSS Policy No. 15.

If cryptographic algorithms used for tunneling classified traffic across an unclassified network are not in accordance with CNSS Policy No. 15, this is a finding.

Fix

Configure the tunnel used for transporting classified traffic across an unclassified IP transport network to negotiate with the remote end point to employ cryptographic algorithms in accordance with CNSS Policy No. 15.
V-14745 No Change
Findings ID: NET1832 Rule ID: SV-15501r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

When transporting classified data over an unclassified IP network, it is imperative that the network elements deployed to provision the encrypted tunnels are located in a facility authorized to process the data at the proper classification level.

Checks

Review the network topology diagram. If there is a connection between the classified network and the unclassified network for the purpose of tunneling classified traffic across the unclassified IP network, verify that the IPsec VPN gateway used to provision the tunnel is compliant with appropriate physical security protection standards for processing classified information.

If appropriate physical security protection has not been enforced, this is a finding.

Fix

Employ the necessary physical security protection for the VPN gateway devices used for tunneling classified traffic across the unclassified IP network.
V-17772 No Change
Findings ID: NET0998 Rule ID: SV-18981r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

To deploy a management network for the purpose of controlling, monitoring, and restricting management traffic, a separate management subnet must be implemented. Define a large enough address block that will enable the management network to scale in proportion to the managed network.

Checks

Review the network topology diagram to determine if a management network has been implemented. Validate the IP address space documented for this network by verifying the IP addresses referenced for management access (SSH, NTP, AAA, SNMP manager, Syslog server, etc.) to the managed network elements.

If a management network has not been implemented, this is a finding.

Fix

Define a large enough address block that will enable the management network to scale in proportion to the managed network.
V-17860 No Change
Findings ID: NET0810 Rule ID: SV-19152r2_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

NTP provides an efficient and scalable method for managed network elements to actively synchronize to an accurate time source. Insuring that there are always NTP servers available to provide time is critical. It is imperative that all single points of failure for the NTP infrastructure are eliminated. Knowing the correct time is not only crucial for proper network functioning but also for security. Compromising an NTP server opens the door to more sophisticated attacks that include NTP poisoning, replay attacks, and denial of service.

Where possible, deploy multiple gateways with diverse paths to the NTP servers. An alternative design is to have one server connected to a reference clock and the other server reference an external stratum-1 server. With this scenario, the NTP clients should be configured to prefer the stratum-1 server over the stratum-2 server.

The NTP servers should be configured to easily scale by creating a hierarchy of lower level (stratum-2 to stratum-15) servers to accommodate the workload. The width and depth of the hierarchy is dependent on the number of NTP clients as well as the amount of redundancy that is required.

Checks

Review the network topology to determine that there are two NTP servers and what network they are connected to. Verify that they are both online according to the documented IP address.

Where possible, deploy multiple gateways with diverse paths to the NTP servers. An alternative design is to have one server connected to a reference clock and the other server reference an external stratum-1 server. With this scenario, the NTP clients should be configured to prefer the stratum-1 server over the stratum-2 server.

The NTP servers should be configured to easily scale by creating a hierarchy of lower level (stratum-2 to stratum-15) servers to accommodate the workload. The width and depth of the hierarchy is dependent on the number of NTP clients as well as the amount of redundancy that is required.

If two NTP servers have not been deployed in the management network, this is a finding.

Fix

Deploy and implement at least two NTP servers in the management network.
V-18490 No Change
Findings ID: NET-IDPS-016 Rule ID: SV-20025r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001097

Discussion

The initial step in IDPS deployment is determining where sensors should be placed. Because attacks originate at the enclave perimeter and within the enclave boundary an IDPS implementation at the enclave perimeter only will not suffice. By placing IDPS technology throughout the Enterprise Regional enclaves and stand-alone enclaves, system administrators can track the spread of attacks and take corrective actions to prevent attacks reaching critical resources.

Checks

Review the DMZ topology and verify public servers are being monitored by an IDPS.

If an IDPS sensor is not deployed to monitor all DMZ segments housing public servers, this is a finding.

Fix

Place an IDPS sensor in the enclave to monitor public servers.
V-18492 No Change
Findings ID: NET-IDPS-018 Rule ID: SV-20027r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001097

Discussion

Attacks can originate within the enclave boundary. Hence, deploying an IDPS on the network segment hosting web, application, and database servers is imperative. The servers are critical resource and the network segment hosting them will receive the most traffic within the enclave. Deploying IDPS on this network is promotes defense-in-depth principles that will enable operations to detect attacks quickly and take corrective actions.

Checks

Review topology of the network segment hosting the web, application, and database servers.

If this segment is not being monitored by an IDPS sensor, this is a finding.

Fix

Implement an IDPS strategy to monitor the network segment hosting web, application, and database servers.
V-18493 No Change
Findings ID: NET-IDPS-019 Rule ID: SV-20028r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001097

Discussion

The initial step in IDPS deployment is determining where sensors should be placed. Because attacks originate at the enclave perimeter and within the enclave boundary an IDPS implementation at the enclave perimeter only will not suffice. By placing IDPS technology throughout the Enterprise Regional enclaves and stand-alone enclaves, system administrators can track the spread of attacks and take corrective actions to prevent attacks reaching critical resources.

Checks

Review the management network topology and verify network security management servers are being monitored by an IDPS.

If an IDPS sensor is not deployed to monitor all segments housing network security management servers, this is a finding.

Fix

Install an IDPS to monitor and protect the Management Network (management subnet or OOB network).
V-18496 No Change
Findings ID: NET-IDPS-024 Rule ID: SV-20031r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

User interface services must be physically or logically separated from data storage and management services. Data from IDS sensors must be protected by confidentiality controls; from being lost and altered.

Checks

Review the network topology diagram and interview the ISSO to determine how the IDS sensor data is transported between sites.

If it is not transported across an OOB network or an encrypted tunnel, this is a finding.

Fix

Design a communications path for OOB traffic or create an encrypted tunnel using a FIPS 140-2 validated encryption algorithm to protect data.
V-18497 No Change
Findings ID: NET-IDPS-025 Rule ID: SV-20032r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

All IDPS data collected by agents in the enclave at required locations must also be protected by logical separation when in transit from the agent to the management or database servers located on the Network Management subnet.

Checks

Review the network topology diagram and interview the ISSO to determine how the IDPS traffic between the sensor and the security management or sensor data collection servers is transported.

If the IDPS traffic does not traverse a dedicated VLAN logically separating IDPS traffic from all other enclave traffic, this is a finding.

Fix

Design a communications path for OOB traffic or create a VLAN for IDPS traffic to protect the data.
V-18504 No Change
Findings ID: NET-IDPS-027 Rule ID: SV-20039r2_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

Administrators should ensure that any products collecting baselines for anomaly-based detection have their baselines rebuilt periodically as needed to support accurate detection.

The ISSM is required to have the enclave prepared for readiness by raising INFOCON levels prior to an activity to ensure the network is as ready as possible when the operation or exercise begins. Because system and network administrators implement many of the INFOCON measures over a period of time in a pre-determined operational rhythm, commanders should raise INFOCON levels early enough to ensure completion of at least one cycle before the operational activity begins.

Recommendations for possible INFOCON changes should be written into Operation Plans (OPLAN) and Concept Plans (CONPLAN). Guidelines can be found in Strategic Command Directive (SD) 527-1.

Checks

Interview the IDPS administrator and determine if anomaly-based detection is deployed in the network. If implemented, ensure that any products collecting baselines for anomaly-based detection have their baselines rebuilt periodically to support accurate detection.

If the collection products do not have their baselines rebuilt periodically, this is a finding.

Fix

Establish procedures to update anomaly-based sensors.
V-18506 No Change
Findings ID: NET-IDPS-029 Rule ID: SV-20041r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

In a large scale IDPS deployment, it is common to have an automated update process implemented. This is accomplished by having the updates downloaded on a dedicated SFTP server within the management network. The SFTP server should be configured to allow read-only access to the files within the directory on which the signature packs are placed, and then only from the account that the sensors will use. The sensors can then be configured to automatically check the SFTP server periodically to look for the new signature packs and to update themselves once they have been tested.

Checks

If the signatures are located on a server, verify that the directories on which the signature packs are placed are protected by read-only access.

If the directories are not set for read-only access, this is a finding.

Fix

Modify the access restrictions to prevent the signatures from being updated.
V-18507 No Change
Findings ID: NET-IDPS-030 Rule ID: SV-20042r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

In a large scale IDPS deployment, it is common to have an automated update process implemented. This is accomplished by having the updates downloaded on a dedicated secure file server within the management network. The file server should be configured to allow read-only access to the files within the directory on which the signature packs are placed, and then only from the account that the sensors will use. The sensors can then be configured to automatically check the secure file server periodically to look for the new signature packs and to update themselves.

Checks

Review the file server accounts and determine if the accounts with read access to the IDPS signatures are provided only to the IDPS sensors.

If there are accounts other than those allocated for the IDPS sensors providing access to the signatures, this is a finding.

Fix

Secure the signatures from access to accounts for IDS updates.
V-18510 No Change
Findings ID: NET-IDPS-031 Rule ID: SV-20045r2_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

There are two types of IDPS updates: software updates and signature updates. Software updates fix bugs in the IDPS software or add new functionality, while signature updates add new detection capabilities or refine existing detection capabilities (e.g., reducing false positives). For many IDPSs, signature updates cause program code to be altered or replaced, so they are really a specialized form of software update. For other IDPSs, signatures are not written in code, so a signature update is a change to the configuration data for the IDPS.

Software updates can include any or all IDPS components, including sensors, agents, management servers, and consoles. Software updates for sensors and management servers, particularly appliance-based devices, are often applied by replacing an existing IDPS CD with a new one and rebooting the device. Many IDPSs run the software directly from the CD, so that no software installation is required. Other components, such as agents, require an administrator to install software or apply patches, either manually on each host or automatically through IDPS management software. Some vendors make software and signature updates available for download from their Web sites or other servers; often, the administrator interfaces for IDPSs have features for downloading and installing such updates.

Administrators should verify the integrity of updates before applying them, because updates could have been inadvertently or intentionally altered or replaced. The recommended verification method depends on the update’s format, as follows:

Files downloaded from a Web site or FTP site. Administrators should compare file checksums provided by the vendor with checksums that they compute for the downloaded files.

Update downloaded automatically through the IDPS user interface. If an update is downloaded as a single file or a set of files, either checksums provided by the vendor should be compared to checksums generated by the administrator, or the IDPS user interface itself should perform some sort of integrity check. In some cases, updates might be downloaded and installed as one action, precluding checksum verification; the IDPS user interface should check each update’s integrity as part of this.

Removable media (e.g., CD, DVD). Vendors may not provide a specific method for customers to verify the legitimacy of removable media apparently sent by the vendors. If media verification is a concern, administrators should contact their vendors to determine how the media can be verified, such as comparing vendor-provided checksums to checksums computed for files on the media, or verifying digital signatures on the media’s contents to ensure they are valid. Administrators should also consider scanning the media for malware, with the caveat that false positives might be triggered by IDPS signatures for malware on the media.

Checks

Interview the SA to determine the IDPS maintenance procedures as well as have SA display the backup files saved on the file server.

If the IDPS configuration is not backed up prior to applying software or signature updates, or when making changes to the configuration, this is a finding.

Fix

Establish backup procedures and define directories to store the configuration settings and operating system versions.
V-18511 No Change
Findings ID: NET-IDPS-032 Rule ID: SV-20046r2_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

There are two types of IDPS updates: software updates and signature updates. Software updates fix bugs in the IDPS software or add new functionality, while signature updates add new detection capabilities or refine existing detection capabilities (e.g., reducing false positives). For many IDPSs, signature updates cause program code to be altered or replaced, so they are really a specialized form of software update. For other IDPSs, signatures are not written in code, so a signature update is a change to the configuration data for the IDPS.

Software updates can include any or all IDPS components, including sensors, agents, management servers, and consoles. Software updates for sensors and management servers, particularly appliance-based devices, are often applied by replacing an existing IDPS CD with a new one and rebooting the device. Many IDPSs run the software directly from the CD, so that no software installation is required. Other components, such as agents, require an administrator to install software or apply patches, either manually on each host or automatically through IDPS management software. Some vendors make software and signature updates available for download from their Web sites or other servers; often, the administrator interfaces for IDPSs have features for downloading and installing such updates.

Administrators should verify the integrity of updates before applying them, because updates could have been inadvertently or intentionally altered or replaced. The recommended verification method depends on the update’s format, as follows:

Files downloaded from a Web site or FTP site. Administrators should compare file checksums provided by the vendor with checksums that they compute for the downloaded files.

Update downloaded automatically through the IDPS user interface. If an update is downloaded as a single file or a set of files, either checksums provided by the vendor should be compared to checksums generated by the administrator, or the IDPS user interface itself should perform some sort of integrity check. In some cases, updates might be downloaded and installed as one action, precluding checksum verification; the IDPS user interface should check each update’s integrity as part of this.

Removable media (e.g., CD, DVD). Vendors may not provide a specific method for customers to verify the legitimacy of removable media apparently sent by the vendors. If media verification is a concern, administrators should contact their vendors to determine how the media can be verified, such as comparing vendor-provided checksums to checksums computed for files on the media, or verifying digital signatures on the media’s contents to ensure they are valid. Administrators should also consider scanning the media for malware, with the caveat that false positives might be triggered by IDPS signatures for malware on the media.

Checks

Interview the SA and determine the process of software and signature validation.

If file checksums provided by the vendor are not compared and verified with checksums computed from CD or downloaded files, this is a finding.

Fix

Establish change control procedures that include file validation and integrity.
V-18596 Updated
Findings ID: NET-WIDS-001 Rule ID: SV-20145r34_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001673

Discussion

DoD networks are at risk and DoD data could be compromised if wireless scanning is not conducted to identify unauthorized WLAN clients and access points connected to or attempting to connect to the network.

Checks

Detailed Policy Requirements:

DoD components will ensure that a Wireless Intrusion detection System (WIDS) is implemented that allows for monitoring of WLAN activity and the detection of WLAN-related policy violations on all unclassified and classified DoD wired and wireless LANs.
The WIDS must be implemented regardless of whether or not an authorized WLAN has been deployed.

The WIDS shall be capable of monitoring IEEE 802.11 transmissions within all DoD LAN environments and detect nearby unauthorized WLAN devices. WIDS shall not be required to monitor non-IEEE 802.11 transmissions.

WIDS Implementation Criteria. The WIDS shall continuously scan for and detect authorized and unauthorized WLAN activities 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

Note: Exceptions to WIDS implementation criteria may be made by the AO for DoD wired and wireless LAN operating environments. This exception allows the AO to implement periodic scanning conducted by designated personnel using handheld scanners during walk-through assessments. Periodic scanning may be conducted as the alternative to the continuous scanning only in special circumstances, where it has been determined on a case-by-case basis that continuous scanning is either infeasible or unwarranted. The AO exception must be documented.

The "infeasible" criteria includes the following use case examples:
- It's not my building - this scenario means that for contractual, or other similar reasons, the DoD component is not allowed to install a WIDS.
- There's no power or space is limited - this scenarios means that for space weight and power (SWAP) reasons, the addition of continuous scanning capabilities cannot be accomplished because it would exceeds SWAP availability. Another reason power would affect your decision to waive continuous scanning requirements is if the entire LAN is only in operation periodically (e.g. the wired/wireless LAN is enabled on a vehicle that is only operating when the vehicle is being used for a specific operation).
- The exception for "Minimal Impact WLAN Systems" that: Do not provide connectivity to WLAN-enabled PEDs (e.g., backhaul systems); have no available FIPS 140 validated 802.1X EAP-TLS supplicant; support a very small number of users for a specific mission (e.g., 10 or less users); are standalone networks; or are highly specialized WLAN systems that are isolated from the DoDIN (e.g., handheld personal digital assistants [PDAs] used as radio-frequency identification [RFID] readers, a network of WLAN-enabled Voice over Internet Protocol [VoIP] phones) allows the AO to waive any of the security requirements in the Instruction. This includes using non-standard/proprietary FIPS validated encryption, using an alternative FIPS validated EAP type, and not having a continuous WIDS.
-The cost of the continuous WIDS capability is more expensive that the total cost of the LAN without a WIDS.

The AO must conduct a wireless threat risk assessment where it has been shown by analysis that the threat environment is extremely unlikely to non-existent to meet the "unwarranted" exception criteria.

Check Procedures:

Interview the site ISSO. Determine if the scanning by a WIDS is being conducted and if it is continuous or periodic.

If a continuous scanning WIDS is used, there is no finding.

If periodic scanning is used, verify the exception to policy is documented and signed by the AO. Verify the exception meets one of the required criteria.

If periodic scanning is being performed but requirements have not been met, this is a finding.

If no WIDS scanning is being performed at the site, this is a finding.

Fix

Perform required WIDS scanning
V-19900 No Change
Findings ID: WIR0115-02 Rule ID: SV-22070r3_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

Most known security breaches of cryptography result from improper implementation of the cryptography, not flaws in the cryptographic algorithms themselves. FIPS 140-2 validation provides assurance that cryptography is implemented correctly, and is required for Federal Government uses of cryptography in non-classified applications.System Administrator

Checks

Review the WLAN system product documentation. Verify the system is WPA2-Enterprise certified by the Wi-Fi Alliance.

If the WLAN product is not WPA2-Enterprise certified, this is a finding.

Fix

Procure WLAN equipment whose implementation of TLS has been FIPS 140-2 validated.
V-23735 No Change
Findings ID: NET1050 Rule ID: SV-28616r3_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-002345

Discussion

If a network device's non-volatile memory is lost without a recent configuration stored in an offline location, it may take time to recover that segment of the network. Users connected directly to the switch or router will be without service for a longer than acceptable time. Encrypting the configuration stored offline protects the data at rest and provides additional security to prevent tampering and potentially cause a network outage if the configuration were to be put into service.System Administrator

Checks

Inspect the network element configurations that have been stored offline.

If the configurations are not encrypted, this is a finding.

Fix

Encrypt all network device configurations stored offline.
V-25319 No Change
Findings ID: WIR0123 Rule ID: SV-31432r4_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

If the access point or its supporting authentication server is placed in front of the perimeter firewall, then it has no firewall protection against an attack. If the access point or its supporting authentication server is placed behind the perimeter firewall (on the internal network), then any breach of these devices could lead to attacks on other DoD information systems.System Administrator

Checks

Have the SA show how the guest WLAN is physically connected to the firewall or supporting switch and how it is logically connected through firewall or switch configuration settings. Verify the equipment is connected via a separate WLAN or logical segmentation of the host WLAN (e.g., separate service set identifier (SSID) and virtual LAN).

If a guest WLAN is set up as a separate WLAN from the DoD network or not set up as a logical segmentation from the DoD network or DoD WLAN, this is a finding.

Fix

Reconfigure physical and logical connections as needed so the Internet-only WLAN infrastructure resides in a dedicated subnet off the perimeter firewall.
V-30255 No Change
Findings ID: WIR0114 Rule ID: SV-39891r3_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

The Wi-Fi Alliance WPA2-Enterprise certification means the WLAN equipment can support DoD requirements, most notably EAP-TLS and AES-CCMP. If the equipment has not been WPA-Enterprise certified, then the equipment may not have the required security functionality to protect DoD networks and information.

Checks

Review the WLAN system product documentation. Verify the system is WPA2-Enterprise certified.

If the WLAN product is not WPA2-Enterprise certified, this is a finding.

Fix

Procure WPA2-Enterprise certified WLAN equipment.
V-31632 No Change
Findings ID: NET0180 Rule ID: SV-41919r3_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

If network address space is not properly configured, managed, and controlled, the network could be accessed by unauthorized personnel resulting in security compromise of site information and resources. Allowing subscribers onto the network whose IP addresses are not registered with the .Mil NIC may allow unauthorized users access into the network. These unauthorized users could then monitor the network, steal passwords, and access classified information.Network Security Officer

Checks

Validate global IP addresses in use on unclassified or classified networks registered through the DoD Network Information Center. For NIPRNet, go to the website https://www.nic.mil. For SIPRNet, go to the web portal at http://www.ssc.smil.mil. To verify Department of the Navy IP addresses, go to http://infosec.navy.mil.ipaddress.com.

If the site is using an address space that has not been registered and allocated to the site, this is a finding.

Fix

Submit any unregistered and/or unauthorized global IP addresses to the DoD Network Information Center (NIC) for registration.
V-31637 Updated
Findings ID: NET0185 Rule ID: SV-41924r67_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

As per CNSSI No. 1016, tThe DoD has an enterprise level security-focused configuration management (SecCM) requirement to support end-to-end monitoring of SIPRNet, as a National Security System (NSS). The use of NAT and private IP address space inhibits the view of specialized DISN enterprise tools in tracking client level enclave to enclave traffic, monitoring client use of enterprise level application services, and detecting anomalies and potential malicious attacks in SIPRNet client application traffic flows. Enclave nodes that communicate outside the organization’s enclave to other SIPRNet enclaves or enterprise services cannot use NATd private addresses via an enclave proxy without the permission of the SIPRNet DISN Authorizing Official, the DISA AO.

Checks

Review network diagrams, enterprise sensor reports, and network scans submitted to the Connection Approval Office. Determine that only global IP addresses assigned by the NIC are in use within the organization's SIPRNet enclave.

Determine whether NAT and unauthorized IP address space is in use in the organization's SIPRNet enclave.

Exceptions to this requirement are listed below:
1. Closed classified networks logically transiting SIPRNet for enclave-to-enclave VPN transport only.
2. Out-of-Band management networks, where the NATd nodes do not access SIPRNet base enterprise services.
3. Thin client deployments where the hosting thin client server serves as the SIPRNet access point for its thin clients and that the organization maintains detailed thin client service usage audit logs.
4. Valid operational mission need or implementation constraints.

All exceptions must have approval by the SIPRNet DISN accreditation official, DISA AO.

If NAT and unauthorized IP address space is in use on the organization's SIPRNet infrastructure, this is a finding.

Fix

Remove the NAT configurations and private address space from the organization's SIPRNet enclave. Configure the SIPRNet enclave with SSC authorized .smil.mil or .sgov.gov addresses. If NAT or private address space is required, as per one of the stated exceptions or for valid mission requirements, then submit a detailed approval request to use of private addressing through the DSAWG Secretariat to the DISN accreditation official, DISA AO.
V-33831 No Change
Findings ID: NET0928 Rule ID: SV-44284r2_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

A Bogon route or Martian address is a type of packet that should never be routed inbound through the perimeter device. Bogon routes and Martian addresses are commonly found as the source addresses of DDoS attacks. By not having a policy implemented to keep these addresses up to date, the enclave will run the risk of allowing illegitimate traffic into the enclave or even blocking legitimate traffic. Also, if there are rulesets with "any" as the source address then Bogons/Martians must be applied.

Bogons and Martian addresses can be kept up to date routinely checking the IANA website or creating an account with Team Cymru to retrieve these lists in one of many ways.

http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-space/ipv4-address-space.xml
http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/Bogons/System AdministratorNetwork Security Officer

Checks

Review the Bogon/Martian maintenance policy to validate plans and procedures are in place to protect the enclave from illegitimate network traffic with up to date Bogon/Martian rulesets.

If the site does not have a policy to keep Bogon/Martian rulesets up to date, this is a finding.

Fix

Implement a Bogon/Martian maintenance policy to protect the enclave from illegitimate network traffic.
V-66349 No Change
Findings ID: NET0131 Rule ID: SV-80839r1_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001121

Discussion

Prior to establishing a connection with another activity, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) must be established between the two sites prior to connecting with each other.

Checks

Review the network topology and interview the ISSO to verify that each external connection to the site’s network has been validated and approved by the AO and CAO and that CAP requirements have been met.

If there are any external connections that have not been validated and approved, this is a finding.

Fix

All external connections will be validated and approved prior to connection. Interview the ISSM to verify that all connections have a mission requirement and that the AO is aware of the requirement.
V-66351 No Change
Findings ID: NET1026 Rule ID: SV-80841r1_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-000167

Discussion

Logging is a critical part of router security. Maintaining an audit trail of system activity logs (syslog) can help identify configuration errors, understand past intrusions, troubleshoot service disruptions, and react to probes and scans of the network.

Checks

Examine the syslog server to verify that it is configured to store messages for at least 30 days. Have the administrator show you the syslog files stored offline for one year.

If the syslog messages are not kept online for thirty days and offline for one year, this is a finding.

Fix

Configure the syslog server to store messages for at least 30 days on-line. The administrator must establish a strategy for storing the logs off-line for minimum of 1 year.
V-66353 No Change
Findings ID: NET2000 Rule ID: SV-80843r1_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000803

Discussion

Spoofed TCP segments could be introduced into the connection streams for LDP sessions used to build LSPs. By configuring strict authentication between LSR peers, LDP TCP sessions can be restricted and the integrity of LSPs can be guarded using the TCP MD5 Signature Option. The LSR ignores LDP Hellos from any LSR for which a password has not been configured. This ensures that the LSR establishes LDP TCP connections only with LSRs for which the shared secret has been configured. RSVP messages are used to control resource reservations for MPLS TE tunnels inside the MPLS core. The RSVP message authentication permits neighbors to use a secure hash to digitally sign all RSVP signaling messages, thus allowing the receiver of an RSVP message to verify the sender. By protecting against corruption and spoofing of RSVP messages, the integrity of the LSPs for bandwidth provisioning, path setup, and path teardown is maintained.

Checks

Review the router configuration to determine if LDP and RSVP messages are being authenticated as shown in the examples below.

If authentication is not being used for these protocols using a secured hashing algorithm for message authentication, this is a finding.

An LDP session is secured by configuring a password for each LDP peer as shown in the example below:

mpls ip
mpls label protocol ldp
mpls ldp neighbor 10.1.1.1 password xzxxxxxxxxxxx
mpls ldp neighbor 10.3.3.3 password xxxxxzzzzxxxz

The IP address 10.1.1.1 and 10.3.3.3 in this example are the router IDs of the neighbors for which this router has an LDP session requiring MD5 authentication. To specify that the router ID 10.1.1.1 is to be found in VPN routing/forwarding instance (VRF) named VPN1 instead of the global route table, the "vrf" keyword is used in the command as shown in the following example:

mpls ldp neighbor vrf VPN1 10.1.1.1 password xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

A group of peers using the same MD5 password can be configured as shown in the example below:

mpls ldp password for 10 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
mpls ldp password required for 10
!
access-list 10 permit 10.1.1.1
access-list 10 permit 10.3.3.3
access-list 10 permit 10.4.4.4

The access list specifies a password is mandatory for LDP sessions with neighbors whose LDP router IDs are permitted by the access list.

To configure MD5 or SHA-1 authentication for RSVP, both ip rsvp authentication key and ip rsvp authentication commands must be configured as shown in the example below. The latter command simply enables authentication.

interface Ethernet0/0
ip address 192.168.101.2 255.255.255.0
ip rsvp bandwidth 7500 7500
ip rsvp authentication type sha-1
ip rsvp authentication key xxxxxxxx ip rsvp authentication

Note: If SHA-1 is not specified using the ip rsvp authentication type command, MD5 will be utilized.

Fix

Implement neighbor authentication using a secured hashing algorithm for all signaling protocols deployed to build LSP tunnels.
V-66355 No Change
Findings ID: NET2001 Rule ID: SV-80845r1_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001097

Discussion

MPLS label exchange via Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) or Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) with any external neighbor creates the risk of label spoofing that could disrupt optimum routing, or even drop packets that are encapsulated with a label that is not in the MPLS forwarding table.

Checks

Review the DISN-facing interfaces of the enclave perimeter routers to verify that LDP or RSVP is not enabled.

If any of these interfaces are LDP or RSVP enabled, this is a finding.

Fix

Disable LDP and RSVP on DISN-facing interfaces on all perimeter routers.
V-66357 No Change
Findings ID: NET2002 Rule ID: SV-80847r1_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001549

Discussion

Packet loss can occur when an IGP adjacency is established and the router begins forwarding packets using the new adjacency before the LDP label exchange completes between the peers on that link. Packet loss can also occur if an LDP session closes and the router continues to forward traffic using the link associated with the LDP peer rather than an alternate pathway with a fully synchronized LDP session. The MPLS LDP-IGP Synchronization feature provides a means to synchronize LDP with OSPF or IS-IS to minimize MPLS packet loss. When an IGP adjacency is established on a link but LDP-IGP synchronization is not yet achieved or is lost, the IGP will advertise the max-metric on that link.

Checks

Review the router configuration and verify that the "mpls ldp sync" command is configured on the IS-IS or OSPF configuration as shown in the following example:

mpls ip
mpls label protocol ldp
!
interface POS0/3
ip router isis
mpls ip
...
...
...
router isis
mpls ldp sync

If not all MPLS routers synchronize IGP and LDP, this is a finding.

Note: If the LDP peer is reachable, the IGP waits indefinitely (by default) for synchronization to be achieved. To limit the length of time the IGP session must wait, enter the "mpls ldp igp sync holddown" command. If the LDP peer is not reachable, the IGP establishes the adjacency to enable the LDP session to be established.

Fix

Configure the MPLS router to synchronize IGP and LDP, minimizing packet loss when an IGP adjacency is established prior to LDP peers completing label exchange.
V-66359 No Change
Findings ID: NET2003 Rule ID: SV-80849r1_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-000803

Discussion

VLAN Trunk Protocol (VTP) provides central management of VLAN domains, thus reducing administration in a switched network. When configuring a new VLAN on a VTP server, the VLAN is distributed through all switches in the domain. This reduces the need to configure the same VLAN everywhere. VTP pruning preserves bandwidth by preventing VLAN traffic (unknown MAC, broadcast, multicast) from being sent down trunk links when not needed, that is, there are no access switch ports in neighboring switches belonging to such VLANs. An attack can force a digest change for the VTP domain enabling a rogue device to become the VTP server, which could allow unauthorized access to previously blocked VLANs or allow the addition of unauthorized switches into the domain. Authenticating VTP messages with a cryptographic hash function can reduce the risk of the VTP domain's being compromised.

Checks

Review the switch configuration to verify that VTP clients and servers are authenticating messages as shown in the following configuration example:

vtp mode server
vtp version 2
vtp domain ICAN1
vtp password xxxxxxxx

If any switches within the ICAN infrastructure have implemented VTP and are not authenticating VTP messages with a hash function using the most secured cryptographic algorithm available, this is a finding.

Fix

Configure the switch to authenticate all VLAN Trunk Protocol (VTP) messages with a hash function using the most secured cryptographic algorithm available.
V-66361 No Change
Findings ID: NET2004 Rule ID: SV-80851r1_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) is implemented on bridges and switches to prevent Layer 2 loops when a broadcast domain spans multiple bridges and switches and when redundant links are provisioned to provide high availability in case of link failures. Convergence time can be significantly reduced using Rapid STP (802.1w) instead of STP (802.1d), resulting in improved availability. Rapid STP should be deployed by implementing either Rapid Per-VLAN-Spanning-Tree (Rapid-PVST) or Multiple Spanning-Tree Protocol (MSTP), the later scales much better when there are many VLANs.

Checks

In cases where VLANs do not span multiple switches it is a best practice to not implement STP. Avoiding the use of STP will provide the most deterministic and highly available network topology. If STP is required, then review the switch configuration to verify that RSTP or MSTP has been implemented. Following are example configurations:

RSTP

spanning-tree mode rapid-pvst

MST

spanning-tree mode mst
spanning-tree mst configuration
name Region1
revision 1
instance 1 vlan 10, 11, 12
instance 2 vlan 13, 14

If RSTP or MSTP has not been implemented where STP is required, this is a finding.

Note: Note: Cisco has implemented RSTP as part of MSTP and Rapid-PVST+.

Fix

Configure Rapid STP be implemented at the access and distribution layers where VLANs span multiple switches.
V-66363 No Change
Findings ID: NET2005 Rule ID: SV-80853r1_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001095

Discussion

Different applications have unique requirements and toleration levels for delay, jitter, packet loss, and availability. To manage the multitude of applications and services, a network requires a Quality of Service (QoS) framework to differentiate traffic and provide a method to manage network congestion. The Differentiated Services Model (DiffServ) is based on per-hop behavior by categorizing traffic into different classes and enabling each node to enforce a forwarding treatment to each packet as dictated by a service policy. Packet markings such as IP Precedence and its successor, Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCP), were defined along with specific per-hop behaviors for key traffic types to enable a scalable QoS solution. DiffServ QoS categorizes network traffic, prioritizes it according to its relative importance, and provides priority treatment based on the classification. It is imperative that end-to-end QoS is implemented to guarantee the required bandwidth for control plane traffic and C2 real-time services during periods of congestion within the JIE WAN IP network.

Checks

Review each router and verify that a QoS policy has been configured to provide preferred treatment for control plane traffic and C2 real-time services.

Step 1: Verify that the class-maps are configured to match on DSCP values that have been set at the edges as shown in the configuration example below:

class-map match-all CONTROL_PLANE
match ip dscp 48
class-map match-all C2_VOICE
match ip dscp 47
class-map match-all VOICE
match ip dscp ef
class-map match-all VIDEO
match ip dscp af4
class-map match-all PREFERRED_DATA
match ip dscp af3

Step 2: Verify that the policy map applied to the core-layer-facing interface reserves the bandwidth for each traffic type as shown in the following example:

policy-map QOS_POLICY
class CONTROL_PLANE
priority percent 10
class C2_VOICE
priority percent 10
class VOICE
priority percent 15
class VIDEO
bandwidth percent 25
class PREFERRED_DATA
bandwidth percent 25
class class-default
bandwidth percent 15

Step 3: Verify that an output service policy is bound to the core-layer-facing interface as shown in the configuration example below:

interface GigabitEthernet1/1
ip address 10.2.0.2 255.255.255.252
service-policy output QOS_POLICY

If a QoS policy has not been implemented within the JIE WAN infrastructure to provide assured services for control plane traffic and C2 real-time services, this is a finding.

Fix

Configure a QoS policy on each router to provide assured services for control plane traffic and C2 real-time services.
V-66365 No Change
Findings ID: NET2006 Rule ID: SV-80855r1_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001414

Discussion

PIM is a routing protocol that is used by the IP core for forwarding multicast traffic. PIM operates independent of any particular IP routing protocol but makes use of the IP unicast routing table--PIM does not keep a separate multicast routing table. The multicast tree is built by first allowing a flood of traffic from the source to every dense mode router in the network. For a brief time, unnecessary traffic is allowed. As each router receives traffic for the group, it will decide whether it has active recipients wanting to receive the multicast data. If so, the router will let the flow continue. If no hosts have registered for the multicast group, the router sends a prune message to its neighbor toward the source. That branch of the tree is then pruned off so that the unnecessary traffic does not continue. Dense mode is viewed as a "flood and prune" implementation. With PIM Sparse Mode (PIM-SM), the multicast tree is not extended to a router unless a local host has already joined the group. The multicast tree is built by beginning with group members at the end leaf nodes and extending back toward a central root point--the tree is built from the bottom up. In either case, if an interface is not going to be supporting any of the multicast traffic--that is, join a multicast tree, PIM should be disabled.

Checks

By default, multicast is disabled globally as well as on all interfaces. Multicast routing is enabled on a router with the global command ip multicast-routing. PIM is enabled on an interface with either of the following commands: ip pim sparse-mode, ip pim dense-mode, ip pim sparse-dense-mode. If the global command ip multicast-routing is defined, review all interface configurations and verify that only the required interfaces are enabled for PIM. The following is a sample configuration with multicast routing enabled and PIM enabled on an interface.

ip multicast-routing
!
interface FastEthernet0/0
ip pim sparse-mode

If PIM is not disabled on interfaces that are not supporting multicast, this is a finding.

Fix

The router administrator will disable PIM on all router interfaces that are not required to support multicast routing.
V-66367 No Change
Findings ID: NET2007 Rule ID: SV-80857r1_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001414

Discussion

Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) is a routing protocol that is used by the IP core for forwarding multicast traffic. PIM traffic must be limited to only known PIM neighbors by configuring and binding a PIM neighbor filter to those interfaces that have PIM enabled.

Checks

Step 1: Verify that an ACL is configured that will specify the allowable PIM neighbors similar to the following example.

ip access-list standard pim-neighbors permit 192.0.2.1
permit 192.0.2.3

Step 2: Verify that a pim neighbor-filter command is configured on all PIM enabled interfaces that is referencing the PIM neighbor ACL similar to the following example:

interface GigabitEthernet0/3
ip address 192.0.2.2 255.255.255.0
pim neighbor-filter pim-neighbors

If PIM neighbor filter is not bound to interfaces that have PIM enabled, this is a finding.

Fix

The router administrator configures and binds a PIM neighbor filter to those interfaces that have PIM enabled.
V-66369 No Change
Findings ID: NET2008 Rule ID: SV-80859r1_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001414

Discussion

A multicast boundary must be established to ensure that administratively-scoped multicast traffic does not flow into or out of the IP core. The multicast boundary can be created by ensuring that COI-facing interfaces on all PIM routers are configured to block inbound and outbound administratively-scoped multicast traffic.

Checks

The administratively-scoped IPv4 multicast address space is 239.0.0.0 through 239.255.255.255. Packets addressed to administratively-scoped multicast addresses must not cross administrative boundaries. This can be accomplished by applying a multicast boundary statement to all COI-facing interfaces as shown in the following example:

ip multicast-routing
!
interface FastEthernet0/0
ip address 199.36.92.1 255.255.255.252
ip pim sparse-mode
ip multicast boundary 1
!
access-list 1 deny 239.0.0.0 0.255.255.255
access-list 1 permit any

If inbound and outbound administratively-scoped multicast traffic is not blocked, this is a finding.

Fix

Configure a multicast boundary statement at all COI-facing interfaces that has PIM enabled to block inbound and outbound administratively-scoped multicast traffic.
V-66371 No Change
Findings ID: NET2009 Rule ID: SV-80861r1_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001414

Discussion

With static RP, the RP address for any multicast group must be consistent across all routers in a multicast domain. A static configuration is simple and convenient. However, if the statically defined RP router becomes unreachable, there is no automatic failover to another RP router. Auto-RP distributes information to routers as to which RP address must be used for various multicast groups. Auto-RP eliminates inconsistencies and enables scalability and automatic failover. All PIM-enabled routers join the RP discovery group (224.0.1.40), which allows them to receive all group-to-RP mapping information. This information is distributed by an entity called RP mapping agent. Mapping agents themselves join the RP announce group (224.0.1.39). All candidate RPs advertise themselves periodically using the RP announce group address. The mapping agent listens to all RP candidate announcements and determines which routers will be used for each multicast group. It then advertises the RP and its associate multicast groups to all PIM routers in the network using an RP discovery message. Auto-RP announcement and discovery messages provide information (i.e., IP addresses of the RP candidates, multicast groups, etc.) vital to the multicast domain and should not be leaked out of the multicast domain. Using this information, a malicious user could disrupt multicast services by attacking the RP or flooding bogus traffic destined to the learned multicast groups.

Checks

To prevent Auto-RP messages from entering or leaving the PIM domain, the ip multicast boundary command must be configured on a COI-facing PIM-enabled interface. Verify that the referenced ACL denies multicast addresses 224.0.1.39 and 224.0.1.40, as shown in the example below:

ip multicast-routing
!
interface FastEthernet0/0
ip address 199.36.92.1 255.255.255.252
ip pim sparse-mode
ip multicast boundary 1
!
access-list 1 deny 224.0.1.39
access-list 1 deny 224.0.1.40

If COI-facing interfaces do not block inbound and outbound Auto-RP discovery and announcement messages, this is a finding.

Fix

Block inbound and outbound Auto-RP discovery and announcement messages at external-facing PIM-enabled interfaces.
V-66373 No Change
Findings ID: NET2010 Rule ID: SV-80863r1_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001414

Discussion

Customer networks that do not maintain a multicast domain and only require the IP multicast service will be required to stand up a PIM-SM router that will be incorporated into the JIE shared tree structure by establishing a peering session with an RP router. Both of these implementations expose several risks that must be mitigated to provide a secured IP core network. All RP routers that are peering with customer PIM-SM routers must implement a PIM import policy to block multicast registration requests for reserved or any other undesirable multicast groups.

Checks

Verify that the RP router is configured to filter PIM register messages using the ip pim accept-register global command as shown in the example below. This command can reference either an ACL or a route-map to identify and prevent unauthorized sources or groups from registering with the RP.

ip pim accept-register list PIM_REGISTER_FILTER
!
ip access-list extended PIM_REGISTER_FILTER
deny ip any 224.0.0.0 0.0.0.255
deny ip 0.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
deny ip 1.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
deny ip 2.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
deny ip 5.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
deny ip 7.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
deny ip 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
deny ip 23.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
deny ip 27.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
...
...
...
deny ip 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255 any
deny ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 any
deny ip 197.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
deny ip 223.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
deny ip 224.0.0.0 224.255.255.255 any
permit ip any any

If the RP router peering with customer PIM-SM routers is not configured with a PIM import policy to block registration messages for reserved multicast groups, this is a finding.

Fix

Configure RP routers to filter PIM register messages received from a tenant multicast DR for any reserved or any other undesirable multicast groups.
V-66375 No Change
Findings ID: NET2011 Rule ID: SV-80865r1_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001414

Discussion

Customer networks that do not maintain a multicast domain and only require the IP multicast service will be required to stand up a PIM-SM router that will be incorporated into the JIE shared tree structure by establishing a peering session with an RP router. Both of these implementations expose several risks that must be mitigated to provide a secure IP core network. All RP routers that are peering with customer PIM-SM routers must implement a PIM import policy to block multicast join requests for reserved or any other undesirable multicast groups.

Checks

Verify that the RP router is configured to filter PIM join messages for any reserved multicast groups using the ip pim accept-rp global command as shown in the example below. The ip pim accept-rp global command causes the router to accept only (*, G) join messages destined for the specified RP address as allowed by the referenced access-list.

ip pim accept-rp 10.10.2.1 PIM_JOIN_FILTER
!
ip access-list standard PIM_JOIN_FILTER
deny 224.0.1.2
deny 224.0.1.3
deny 224.0.1.8
deny 224.0.1.22
deny 224.0.1.24
deny 224.0.1.25
...
...
...
deny 225.1.2.3
deny 229.55.150.208
deny 234.42.42.42 255.255.255.252
deny 239.0.0.0 0.255.255.255
permit any

Note: IOS 12.4T extends the ip multicast-routing command with a group-range or access-list argument that can be used to filter multicast control (PIM, IGMP) and data packets for unauthorized groups.

If the RP router peering with customer PIM-SM routers is not configured with a PIM import policy to block join messages for reserved and any undesirable multicast groups, this is a finding.

Fix

RP routers that are peering with customer PIM-SM routers must implement a PIM import policy to block join messages for reserved and any undesirable multicast groups.
V-66379 No Change
Findings ID: NET2012 Rule ID: SV-80869r1_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001095

Discussion

When a new source starts transmitting in a PIM Sparse Mode network, the DR will encapsulate the multicast packets into register messages and forward them to the Rendezvous Point (RP) using unicast. This process can be taxing on the CPU for both the DR and the RP if the source is running at a high data rate and there are many new sources starting at the same time. This scenario can potentially occur immediately after a network failover. The rate limit for the number of register messages should be set to a relatively low value based on the known number of multicast sources within the multicast domain.

Checks

Review the configuration of the DR to verify that it is rate limiting the number of multicast register messages.

If the DR is not limiting multicast register messages, this is a finding.

The following is a PIM sparse mode configuration example that limits the number of register messages for each (S, G) multicast entry to 10 per second.

ip multicast-routing
!
interface FastEthernet 0/0
description link to core
ip address 192.168.123.2 255.255.255.0
ip pim sparse-mode
!
interface FastEthernet 0/1
description User LAN
ip address 192.168.122.1 255.255.255.0
ip pim sparse-mode
!
ip pim rp-address 1.1.1.1
ip pim register-rate 10

Fix

Configure the Designated Router (DR) to rate limit the number of multicast register messages it will allow for each (S, G) entry.
V-66381 No Change
Findings ID: NET2013 Rule ID: SV-80871r1_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001414

Discussion

Real-time multicast traffic can entail multiple large flows of data. Large unicast flows tend to be fairly isolated (e.g., someone doing a file download here or there), whereas multicast can have broader impact on bandwidth consumption resulting in extreme network congestion. Hence, it is imperative that there is multicast admission control to restrict which multicast groups that hosts are allowed to join via IGMP (IPv4) or MLD (IPv6).

Checks

Review the configuration of the DR to verify that it is filtering IGMP or MLD report messages allowing hosts to only join those groups that have been approved by the organization.

If the DR is not filtering IGMP or MLD report messages, this is a finding.

The following is a PIM sparse mode configuration example filtering specific multicast groups as defined in access-list 11 on the LAN-facing interface.

ip multicast-routing
!
interface FastEthernet 0/0
description link to core
ip address 192.168.123.2 255.255.255.0
ip pim sparse-mode
!
interface FastEthernet 0/1
description User LAN
ip address 192.168.122.1 255.255.255.0
ip pim sparse-mode
ip igmp access-group 11
!
access-list 11 permit 224.10.10.0 0.0.0.255
access-list 11 permit 224.11.11.0 0.0.0.255
access-list 11 permit 224.20.20.0 0.0.0.255

Fix

Configure the Designated Router (DR) to filter the Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) report messages to allow tenant hosts to join only those multicast groups that have been approved by the organization.
V-66389 No Change
Findings ID: NET2014 Rule ID: SV-80879r1_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001095

Discussion

The current multicast paradigm can let any host join any multicast group at any time by sending an Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) or Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) membership report to the Designated Router (DR). In a PIM Sparse Mode network, the DR will send a PIM Join message for the group to the Rendezvous Point (RP). Without any form of admission control, this can pose a security risk to the entire multicast domain, specifically the multicast routers along the shared tree from the DR to the RP that must maintain the mroute state information for each group join request. Hence, it is imperative that the DR is configured to limit the number of mroute state information that must be maintained to mitigate the risk of IGMP (IPv4) or MLD (IPv6) flooding.

Checks

Review the DR configuration to verify that it is limiting the number of mroute states via IGMP or MLD.

If the DR is not limiting multicast join requests via IGMP or MLD, this is a finding.

The following is a PIM sparse mode DR configuration example that limits the number of IGMP join requests on both a global and a per-interface basis

ip multicast-routing
ip igmp limit 80
!
interface FastEthernet 0/1
description User LAN121
ip address 192.168.122.1 255.255.255.0
ip pim sparse-mode
ip igmp limit 50
!
interface FastEthernet 0/2
description User LAN122
ip address 192.168.122.1 255.255.255.0
ip pim sparse-mode
ip igmp limit 50

Note: If both global and per interface state limiters are configured, the limits configured for per interface state limiters are still enforced but are constrained by the global limit.

Fix

Configure the Designated Router (DR) on a global or interface basis to limit the number of mroute states resulting from IGMP or MLD membership reports.
V-66391 No Change
Findings ID: NET2015 Rule ID: SV-80881r1_rule Severity: medium CCI: CCI-001095

Discussion

Any Source Multicast (ASM) can have many sources for the same groups (many-to-many). For many receivers, the path via the Rendezvous Point (RP) may not be ideal compared with the shortest path from the source to the receiver. By default, the last-hop router will initiate a switch from the shared tree to a source-specific shortest-path tree (SPT) to obtain lower latencies. This is accomplished by the last-hop router sending an (S, G) PIM Join towards S (the source). When the last-hop router begins to receive traffic for the group from the source via the SPT, it will send a PIM Prune message to the RP for the (S, G). The RP will then send a Prune message towards the source. The SPT switchover becomes a scaling issue for large multicast topologies that have many receivers and many sources for many groups because (S, G) entries require more memory than (*, G). Hence, it is imperative to minimize the amount of (S, G) state to be maintained by increasing the threshold that determines when the SPT switchover occurs.

Checks

Review the multicast last-hop router configuration to verify that the SPT switchover threshold is increased (default is 0) or set to infinity (never switch over). The following is a PIM sparse mode last-hop router configuration example that will disable the SPT switchover for all multicast groups:

ip multicast-routing
ip pim spt-threshold infinity

If any multicast router is not configured to increase the SPT threshold or set it to infinity to minimalize (S,G) state, this is a finding.

Fix

Configure the multicast router to increase the SPT threshold or set it to infinity to minimalize (S,G) state within the multicast topology where Any Source Multicast (ASM) is deployed.
V-66393 No Change
Findings ID: NET2016 Rule ID: SV-80883r1_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-001095

Discussion

The last-hop router sends the multicast packet out the interface towards the LAN containing interested receivers. The default behavior for a Layer 2 switch is to forward all multicast traffic out every access switch port that belongs to the VLAN. IGMP snooping is a mechanism used by "Layer 3 aware" switches to maintain a Layer 2 multicast table by examining all IGMP join and leave messages (destined to the all router's multicast address 224.0.0.2) sent between hosts and the multicast routers on the LAN. This will enable the switch to only forward multicast packets out the access switch ports that have connected hosts that have subscribed to the multicast group, thereby reducing the load on the switching backplane as well as eliminating unwanted traffic to uninterested hosts.

Checks

Review the access switches connected to multicast last-hop routers to determine if IGMP snooping is enabled. The following are switch configuration examples with IGMP snooping enabled globally and on a per-VLAN basis:

Enable IGMP Snooping globally: ip igmp snooping

Enable IGMP Snooping for VLAN: ip igmp snooping vlan 7

If any switches within the ICAN access layer do not have IGMP or MLD snooping enabled, this is a finding.

Fix

Configure the switch to implement IGMP or MLD snooping, ensuring multicast traffic for any given multicast group is forwarded to only those hosts that have joined the group.
V-66397 Updated
Findings ID: NET2017 Rule ID: SV-80887r12_rule Severity: low CCI: CCI-000366

Discussion

The Layer 2 connection between the nodes providing first-hop redundancy comes up quickly. If the preemption takes effect prior to the routing protocol converging, traffic is black holed. Traffic will go to the active router that does not have full routing information. It may take several seconds for the IGP to exchange all the routes, longer than the Hot Standby Router Protocol (HSRP), Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP), or Gateway Load Balancing Protocol (GLPB) transition. The recommended practice is to delay the preemption action until after the IGP has a chance to stabilize.

Checks

All routers or multilayer switches providing first-hop redundancy services must be configured to delay preemption to provide enough time for the IGP to stabilize. Review the router or multilayer switch providing first-hop redundancy services and verify that the preemption delay is configured.

If preemption delay is
not configured, this is a finding.

Following is an HSRP configuration example that delays the preemption by 30 seconds.

interface GigabitEthernet 0/0/0
ip address 10.11.0.2 255.255.255.0
standby 1 priority 110
standby 1 ip 10.21.0.1
standby 1 preempt
standby 1 preempt delay minimum 30

Following is a VRRP configuration example that delays the preemption by 30 seconds.

interface GigabitEthernet 0/0/0
ip address 10.11.0.2 255.255.255.0
vrrp 1 priority 110
vrrp 1 ip 10.21.0.1
vrrp 1 preempt delay minimum 30

For VRRP implementations, a preemptive scheme is enabled by default. If preemption is disabled using the no vrrp preempt command, the virtual router backup that is elected to become virtual router master remains the master until the original virtual router master recovers and becomes master again.

Fix

Configure each router and multilayer switch providing first-hop redundancy services to be configured to delay the preempt to provide enough time for the IGP to stabilize.

Note: The amount of delay will be based on the number of IGP routes.