Network Infrastructure Policy Security Technical Implementation Guide

U_Network_Infrastructure_Policy_STIG_V9R7_Manual-xccdf.xml

Version/Release Published Filters Downloads Update
V9R7 2018-09-27      
Update existing CKLs to this version of the STIG
This Security Technical Implementation Guide is published as a tool to improve the security of Department of Defense (DoD) information systems. The requirements are derived from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-53 and related documents. Comments or proposed revisions to this document should be sent via e-mail to the following address: [email protected]
Vuln Rule Version CCI Severity Title Description
SV-8532r3_rule NET0090 CCI-001098 MEDIUM Network topology diagrams for the enclave must be maintained and up to date at all times. To assist in the management, auditing, and security of the network infrastructure facility drawings and topology maps are a necessity. Topology maps are important because they show the overall layout of the network infrastructure and where devices are physically located. They also show the relationship and interconnectivity between devices and where possible intrusive attacks could take place. Having up to date network topology diagrams will also help show what the security, traffic, and physical impact of adding a new user(s) will be on the network.
SV-8533r3_rule NET0130 CCI-001121 MEDIUM All external connections must be validated and approved by the Authorizing Official (AO) and the Connection Approval Office (CAO) and meeting Connection Approval Process (CAP) requirements. Every site must have a security policy to address filtering of the traffic to and from those connections. This documentation along with diagrams of the network topology is required to be submitted to the Connection Approval Process (CAP) for approval to connect to the NIPRNet or SIPRNet. SIPRNet connections must also comply with the documentation required by the Classified Connection Approval Office (CCAO) to receive the SIPRNet Interim Approval to Connect (IATC) or final Approval to Connect (ATC). Also any additional requirements must be met as outlined in the Interim Authority to Operate (IATO) or Authority to Operate (ATO) forms signed by the Authorizing Official (AO).
SV-8534r4_rule NET0135 CCI-001121 MEDIUM External connections to the network must be reviewed and the documentation updated semi-annually. A network is only as secure as its weakest link. It is imperative that all external connections be reviewed and kept to a minimum needed for operations. All external connections should be treated as untrusted networks. Reviewing who or what the network is connected to empowers the security manager to make sound judgements and security recommendations. Minimizing backdoor circuits and connections reduces the risk for unauthorized access to network resources.
SV-8535r3_rule NET0140 CCI-001121 LOW The connection between the Channel Service Unit/Data Service Unit (CSU/DSU) and the Local Exchange Carriers (LEC) data service jack (i.e., demarc) as well as any service provider premise equipment must be located in a secure environment. DOD leased lines carry an aggregate of sensitive and non-sensitive data; therefore unauthorized access must be restricted. Inadequate cable protection can lead to damage and denial of service attacks against the site and the LAN infrastructure.
SV-8537r4_rule NET0160 CCI-001101 HIGH Written mission justification approval must be obtained from the Office of the DoD CIO prior to establishing a direct connection to the Internet via commercial service provider outside DoD CIO approved Internet access points (e.g. DISA IAP, Cloud Access Point, NIPRnet Federated Gateway, DREN IAP, etc.). Analysis of DoD reported incidents reveal current protective measures at the NIPRNet boundary points are insufficient. Documented ISPs and validated architectures for DMZs are necessary to protect internal network resources from cyber attacks originating from external Internet sources by protective environments.System Administrator
SV-8538r4_rule NET0170 CCI-001102 MEDIUM External network connections must not bypass the enclaves perimeter security. Without taking the proper safeguards, external networks connected to the organization will impose security risks unless properly routed through the perimeter security devices. Since external networks to the organization are considered to be untrusted, this could prove detrimental since there is no way to verify traffic inbound or outbound on this backdoor connection. An attacker could carry out attacks or steal data from the organization without any notification. An external connection is considered to be any link from the organization's perimeter to the NIPRNet, SIPRNet, Commercial ISP, or other untrusted network outside the organization's defined security policy. The DREN and SREN are DoD's Research & Engineering Network. A DoD Network that is the official DoD long-haul network for computational scientific research, engineering, and testing in support of DoD's S&T and T&E communities. It has also been designated as a DoD IPv6 pilot network by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks & Information Integration)/DoD Chief Information Officer ASD (NII)/DoD CIO. A DISN enclave should not have connectivity to the DREN unless approved by the AO and the requirements have been met for all external connections described in NET0130.
SV-8540r3_rule NET0210 CCI-000921 MEDIUM All network infrastructure devices must be located in a secure room with limited access. If all communications devices are not installed within controlled access areas, risk of unauthorized access and equipment failure exists, which could result in denial of service or security compromise. It is not sufficient to limit access to only the outside world or non-site personnel. Not everyone within the site has the need-to-know or the need-for-access to communication devices.
SV-8546r2_rule NET1025 CCI-001575 LOW A centralized syslog server must be deployed in the management network. Maintaining an audit trail of system activity logs can help identify configuration errors, understand past intrusions, troubleshoot service disruptions, and react to probes and scans of the network.
SV-8547r2_rule NET1040 CCI-001785 LOW Current and previous network element configurations must be stored in a secured location. If the network element's non-volatile memory is lost without a recent configuration stored in an offline location, it may take time to recover that segment of the network. Users connected directly to the switch or router will be without service for a longer than acceptable time.
SV-8552r3_rule NET0351 CCI-000262 MEDIUM When protecting the boundaries of a network, the firewall must be placed between the private network and the perimeter router and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The only way to mediate the flow of traffic between the inside network, the outside connection, and the DMZ is to place the firewall into the architecture in a manner that allows the firewall the ability to screen content for all three destinations.
SV-8564r3_rule NET-IDPS-033 CCI-000366 MEDIUM The organization must establish weekly data backup procedures for the network Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) data. IDPS data needs to be backed up to ensure preservation in the case a loss of data due to hardware failure or malicious activity.
SV-8566r2_rule NET-IDPS-035 CCI-000366 LOW The Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) software and signatures must be updated when updates are provided by the vendor. Keeping the IDPS software updated with the latest engine and attack signatures will allow for the IDPS to detect all forms of known attacks. Not maintaining the IDPS properly could allow for attacks to go unnoticed.
SV-8567r3_rule NET-VLAN-001 CCI-000366 MEDIUM The organization must ensure all switches and associated cross-connect hardware are kept in a secure Intermediate Distribution Frame (IDF) or an enclosed cabinet that is kept locked. Since the IDF includes all hardware required to connect horizontal wiring to the backbone, it is imperative that all switches and associated cross-connect hardware are kept in a secured IDF or an enclosed cabinet that is kept locked. This will also prevent an attacker from gaining privilege mode access to the switch. Several switch products only require a reboot of the switch in order to reset or recover the password.
SV-8585r3_rule NET0198 CCI-001902 LOW Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) audit and event logs must record hostnames and MAC addresses to be stored online for thirty days and offline for one year. In order to identify and combat IP address spoofing, it is highly recommended that the DHCP server logs MAC addresses and hostnames on the DHCP server.
SV-8586r3_rule NET0199 CCI-001902 LOW Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) servers used within SIPRNet infrastructure must be configured with a minimum lease duration time of 30 days. In order to trace, audit, and investigate suspicious activity, DHCP servers within the SIPRNet infrastructure must have the minimum lease duration time configured to 30 or more days.
SV-8758r3_rule NET-IDPS-021 CCI-001097 MEDIUM An Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) must be deployed to monitor all unencrypted traffic entering and leaving the enclave. Per CJCSI 6510.01F, Enclosure A-5, Paragraph 8, “DOD ISs (e.g., enclaves, applications, outsourced IT-based process, and platform IT interconnections) shall be monitored to detect and react to incidents, intrusions, disruption of services, or other unauthorized activities (including insider threat) that threaten the security of DOD operations or IT resources, including internal misuse.” An Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) allows the sensor to monitor, alert, and actively attempt to drop/block malicious traffic. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) uses a passive method; receiving a copy of the packets to analyze and alert authorized persons about any malicious activity. While an IDS or an IPS in a passive role cannot stop the attack itself, it can typically notify and dynamically assign ACLs or other rules to a firewall or router for filtering. The preferred method of installation is to have the IDPS configured for inline mode. Only when there is a valid technical reason, should the IDPS be placed into a passive or IDS mode. For a full uninhibited view of the traffic, the IDPS must sit behind the enclave’s firewall. This will allow the IDPS to monitor all traffic unencrypted, entering or leaving the enclave.
SV-12294r5_rule NET0369 CCI-002080 HIGH A deny-by-default security posture must be implemented for traffic entering and leaving the enclave. To prevent malicious or accidental leakage of traffic, organizations must implement a deny-by-default security posture at the network perimeter. Such rulesets prevent many malicious exploits or accidental leakage by restricting the traffic to only known sources and only those ports, protocols, or services that are permitted and operationally necessary. Applications, protocols, TCP/UDP ports, and endpoints (specific hosts or networks) are identified and used to develop rulesets and access control lists to restrict traffic to and from an enclave.
SV-12625r6_rule WIR0035 CCI-002327 HIGH Unclassified wireless devices must not be allowed in a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) unless approved by the SCIF Cognizant Security Authority (CSA) in accordance with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 503, ICD 705, DIA SCIF policy requirements, the Authorizing Official (AO) and local Special Security officer (SSO). Emanations from computing devices in the secured area may be transmitted or picked up inadvertently by wireless devices.Other
SV-12654r2_rule NET1815 CCI-000366 MEDIUM All Releasable Local Area Network (REL LAN) environments must be documented in the System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA). The ISSM will ensure Releasable Local Area Network (REL LAN) environments are documented in the SSAA.Other
SV-12655r2_rule NET1816 CCI-000366 MEDIUM Annual reviews must be performed on all Releasable Local Area Network (REL LAN) environments. The ISSM will ensure Releasable Local Area Network (REL LAN) reviews are performed annually.
SV-12659r5_rule WIR0040 CCI-002327 MEDIUM Unclassified wireless devices must not be operated in Secure Spaces (as defined in DoDI 8420.01) unless required conditions are followed. The operation of electronic equipment and emanations must be controlled in and around areas where sensitive information is kept or processed. Sites should post signs and train users to this requirement to mitigate this vulnerability.System Administrator
SV-15259r4_rule NET0168 CCI-001101 MEDIUM If the site has a non-DoD external connection (i.e. Approved Gateway), an Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) must be located between the sites Approved Gateway and the perimeter router. The incorrect placement of the external IDPS may allow unauthorized access to go undetected and limit the ability of security personnel to stop malicious or unauthorized use of the network. In order to ensure that an attempted or existing attack goes unnoticed, the data from the sensors must be monitored continuously.
SV-15263r4_rule NET0346 CCI-002395 MEDIUM All hosted NIPRNet-only applications must be located in a local enclave Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Without the protection of a DMZ, production networks will be prone to outside attacks as they are allowing externally accessible services to be accessed on the internal LAN. This can cause many undesired consequences such as access to the entire network, Denial of Service attacks, or theft of sensitive information.
SV-15265r4_rule NET0348 CCI-000366 MEDIUM All Internet-facing applications must be hosted in a DoD Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) Extension. Without the protection of a DMZ, production networks will be prone to outside attacks as they are allowing externally accessible services to be accessed on the internal LAN. This can cause many undesired consequences such as access to the entire network, Denial of Service attacks, or theft of sensitive information.
SV-15268r6_rule NET0365 CCI-001116 HIGH The organization must implement a deep packet inspection solution when protecting perimeter boundaries. Deep packet inspection (DPI) examines the packet beyond the Layer 4 header by examining the payload to identify the application or service. DPI searches for illegal statements, predefined criteria, malformed packets, and malicious code, thereby enabling the IA appliances to make a more informed decision on whether to allow or not allow the packet through. DPI engines can delve into application centric information to allow different applications to be protected in different ways from different threats. Examples of DPI appliances include next-generation firewalls, application layer gateways as well as specific gateways for web, email and SSL traffic.
SV-15442r2_rule NET1622 CCI-000366 MEDIUM An Out-of-Band (OOB) management network must be deployed for MAC I systems or 24x7 personnel must have console access for device management. From an architectural point of view, providing Out-Of-Band (OOB) management of network systems is the best first step in any management strategy. No production traffic resides on an out-of-band network. The biggest advantage to implementation of an OOB network is providing support and maintenance to the network that has become degraded or compromised. During an outage or degradation period the in band management link may not be available. The consequences of loss of availability of a MAC I system is unacceptable and could include the immediate and sustained loss of mission effectiveness. Mission Assurance Category I systems require the most stringent protection measures. Maintenance support for key IT assets must be available to respond 24x7 immediately upon failure.
SV-15473r2_rule NET0445 CCI-000765 MEDIUM Two-factor authentication must be implemented to restrict access to all network elements. Without secure management implemented with authenticated access controls, strong two-factor authentication, encryption of the management session and audit logs, unauthorized users may gain access to network managed devices compromised, large parts of the network could be incapacitated with only a few commands.
SV-15493r5_rule NET-TUNL-026 CCI-000028 HIGH Encapsulated and/or encrypted traffic received from another enclave must not bypass the network perimeter defense without being terminated and inspected before entering the enclaves private network. Allowing encapsulated traffic to bypass the enclave's network perimeter without being filtered and inspected leaves the enclave vulnerable to malicious traffic that could result in compromise and denial of service. The destination of these packets could be servers that provide mission critical services and data.
SV-15494r2_rule NET-TUNL-028 CCI-002396 MEDIUM Tunneling of classified traffic across an unclassified IP transport network or service provider backbone must be documented in the enclaves security authorization package and an Approval to Connect (ATC), or an Interim ATC must be issued by DISA prior to implementation. CJCSI 6211.02E instruction establishes policy and responsibilities for the connection of any information systems to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) provided transport. Enclosure E mandates that the CC/S/A document all IP tunnels transporting classified communication traffic in the enclave’s security authorization package prior to implementation. An ATC or IATC amending the current connection approval must be in place prior to implementation.
SV-15496r2_rule NET-TUNL-030 CCI-002396 HIGH DSAWG approval must be obtained before tunneling classified traffic outside the components local area network boundaries across a non-DISN or OCONUS DISN unclassified IP wide area network transport infrastructure. CJCSI 6211.02E instruction establishes policy and responsibilities for the connection of any information systems to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) provided transport. Enclosure E mandates that the CC/S/A obtain DSAWG approval before tunneling classified data outside component’s local area network boundaries across a non-DISN or OCONUS DISN unclassified IP-wide area transport infrastructure.
SV-15497r2_rule NET1826 CCI-000366 HIGH Enabling a connection that extends DISN IP network connectivity (e.g., NIPRNet and SIPRNet) to any DoD Vendor, Foreign, or Federal Mission Partner enclave or network without a signed DoD CIO approved sponsorship memo is prohibited. For classified connectivity it must be to a DSS approved contractor facility or DoD Component approved foreign government facility. Having a circuit provisioned that connects the SIPRNet enclave to a non-DoD, foreign, or contractor network puts the enclave and the entire SIPRNet at risk. If the termination point is not operated by the government, there is no control to ensure that the network element at the remote facility is not compromised or connected to another network.
SV-15498r2_rule NET1827 CCI-000366 MEDIUM Command and Control (C2) and non-C2 exceptions of SIPRNet must be documented in the enclaves accreditation package and an Authority to Connect (ATC) or Interim ATC amending the connection approval received prior to implementation. Any exception to use SIPRNet must be documented in an update to the enclave’s accreditation package and an Authority to Connect (ATC) or Interim ATC amending the connection approval received prior to implementation.
SV-15499r2_rule NET-TUNL-031 CCI-002396 MEDIUM Tunneling of classified traffic across an unclassified IP transport network must employ cryptographic algorithms in accordance with CNSS Policy No. 15. When transporting classified data over an unclassified IP network, it is imperative that traffic from the classified enclave or community of interest is encrypted prior reaching the point of presence or service delivery node of the unclassified network. Confidentiality and integrity of the classified traffic must be preserved by employing cryptographic algorithms in accordance with CNSS Policy No. 15 which requires the appropriate Suite B cryptographic algorithms listed in ANNEX B or a commensurate suite of NSA-approved cryptographic algorithms.
SV-15501r2_rule NET1832 CCI-000366 MEDIUM VPN gateways used to create IP tunnels to transport classified traffic across an unclassified IP network must comply with appropriate physical security protection standards for processing classified information. When transporting classified data over an unclassified IP network, it is imperative that the network elements deployed to provision the encrypted tunnels are located in a facility authorized to process the data at the proper classification level.
SV-18981r2_rule NET0998 CCI-000366 MEDIUM A dedicated management network must be implemented. To deploy a management network for the purpose of controlling, monitoring, and restricting management traffic, a separate management subnet must be implemented. Define a large enough address block that will enable the management network to scale in proportion to the managed network.
SV-19152r2_rule NET0810 CCI-000366 LOW Two Network Time Protocol (NTP) servers must be deployed in the management network. NTP provides an efficient and scalable method for managed network elements to actively synchronize to an accurate time source. Insuring that there are always NTP servers available to provide time is critical. It is imperative that all single points of failure for the NTP infrastructure are eliminated. Knowing the correct time is not only crucial for proper network functioning but also for security. Compromising an NTP server opens the door to more sophisticated attacks that include NTP poisoning, replay attacks, and denial of service. Where possible, deploy multiple gateways with diverse paths to the NTP servers. An alternative design is to have one server connected to a reference clock and the other server reference an external stratum-1 server. With this scenario, the NTP clients should be configured to prefer the stratum-1 server over the stratum-2 server. The NTP servers should be configured to easily scale by creating a hierarchy of lower level (stratum-2 to stratum-15) servers to accommodate the workload. The width and depth of the hierarchy is dependent on the number of NTP clients as well as the amount of redundancy that is required.
SV-20025r2_rule NET-IDPS-016 CCI-001097 MEDIUM An Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) sensor must be deployed to monitor all Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) segments housing public servers. The initial step in IDPS deployment is determining where sensors should be placed. Because attacks originate at the enclave perimeter and within the enclave boundary an IDPS implementation at the enclave perimeter only will not suffice. By placing IDPS technology throughout the Enterprise Regional enclaves and stand-alone enclaves, system administrators can track the spread of attacks and take corrective actions to prevent attacks reaching critical resources.
SV-20027r2_rule NET-IDPS-018 CCI-001097 MEDIUM An Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) sensor must be deployed to monitor the network segment hosting web, application, and database servers. Attacks can originate within the enclave boundary. Hence, deploying an IDPS on the network segment hosting web, application, and database servers is imperative. The servers are critical resource and the network segment hosting them will receive the most traffic within the enclave. Deploying IDPS on this network is promotes defense-in-depth principles that will enable operations to detect attacks quickly and take corrective actions.
SV-20028r2_rule NET-IDPS-019 CCI-001097 MEDIUM An Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) sensor must be deployed to monitor network segments that house network security management servers. The initial step in IDPS deployment is determining where sensors should be placed. Because attacks originate at the enclave perimeter and within the enclave boundary an IDPS implementation at the enclave perimeter only will not suffice. By placing IDPS technology throughout the Enterprise Regional enclaves and stand-alone enclaves, system administrators can track the spread of attacks and take corrective actions to prevent attacks reaching critical resources.
SV-20031r2_rule NET-IDPS-024 CCI-000366 MEDIUM Sensor traffic in transit must be protected at all times via an Out-of-Band (OOB) network or an encrypted tunnel between site locations. User interface services must be physically or logically separated from data storage and management services. Data from IDS sensors must be protected by confidentiality controls; from being lost and altered.
SV-20032r2_rule NET-IDPS-025 CCI-000366 MEDIUM Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) traffic between the sensor and the security management or sensor data collection servers must traverse a dedicated Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) logically separating IDPS traffic from all other enclave traffic. All IDPS data collected by agents in the enclave at required locations must also be protected by logical separation when in transit from the agent to the management or database servers located on the Network Management subnet.
SV-20039r2_rule NET-IDPS-027 CCI-000366 LOW Products collecting baselines for anomaly-based detection must have their baselines rebuilt based on changes to mission requirements such as Information Operations Conditions (INFOCON) levels and when the traffic patterns are expected to change significantly. Administrators should ensure that any products collecting baselines for anomaly-based detection have their baselines rebuilt periodically as needed to support accurate detection. The ISSM is required to have the enclave prepared for readiness by raising INFOCON levels prior to an activity to ensure the network is as ready as possible when the operation or exercise begins. Because system and network administrators implement many of the INFOCON measures over a period of time in a pre-determined operational rhythm, commanders should raise INFOCON levels early enough to ensure completion of at least one cycle before the operational activity begins. Recommendations for possible INFOCON changes should be written into Operation Plans (OPLAN) and Concept Plans (CONPLAN). Guidelines can be found in Strategic Command Directive (SD) 527-1.
SV-20041r2_rule NET-IDPS-029 CCI-000366 MEDIUM If a Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) server is used to provide updates to the sensors, the server must be configured to allow read-only access to the files within the directory on which the signature packs are placed. In a large scale IDPS deployment, it is common to have an automated update process implemented. This is accomplished by having the updates downloaded on a dedicated SFTP server within the management network. The SFTP server should be configured to allow read-only access to the files within the directory on which the signature packs are placed, and then only from the account that the sensors will use. The sensors can then be configured to automatically check the SFTP server periodically to look for the new signature packs and to update themselves once they have been tested.
SV-20042r2_rule NET-IDPS-030 CCI-000366 MEDIUM If an automated scheduler is used to provide updates to the sensors, an account on the file server must be defined that will provide access to the signatures only to the sensors. In a large scale IDPS deployment, it is common to have an automated update process implemented. This is accomplished by having the updates downloaded on a dedicated secure file server within the management network. The file server should be configured to allow read-only access to the files within the directory on which the signature packs are placed, and then only from the account that the sensors will use. The sensors can then be configured to automatically check the secure file server periodically to look for the new signature packs and to update themselves.
SV-20045r2_rule NET-IDPS-031 CCI-000366 LOW The Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) configuration must be backed up before applying software or signature updates, or when making changes to the configuration. There are two types of IDPS updates: software updates and signature updates. Software updates fix bugs in the IDPS software or add new functionality, while signature updates add new detection capabilities or refine existing detection capabilities (e.g., reducing false positives). For many IDPSs, signature updates cause program code to be altered or replaced, so they are really a specialized form of software update. For other IDPSs, signatures are not written in code, so a signature update is a change to the configuration data for the IDPS. Software updates can include any or all IDPS components, including sensors, agents, management servers, and consoles. Software updates for sensors and management servers, particularly appliance-based devices, are often applied by replacing an existing IDPS CD with a new one and rebooting the device. Many IDPSs run the software directly from the CD, so that no software installation is required. Other components, such as agents, require an administrator to install software or apply patches, either manually on each host or automatically through IDPS management software. Some vendors make software and signature updates available for download from their Web sites or other servers; often, the administrator interfaces for IDPSs have features for downloading and installing such updates. Administrators should verify the integrity of updates before applying them, because updates could have been inadvertently or intentionally altered or replaced. The recommended verification method depends on the update’s format, as follows: Files downloaded from a Web site or FTP site. Administrators should compare file checksums provided by the vendor with checksums that they compute for the downloaded files. Update downloaded automatically through the IDPS user interface. If an update is downloaded as a single file or a set of files, either checksums provided by the vendor should be compared to checksums generated by the administrator, or the IDPS user interface itself should perform some sort of integrity check. In some cases, updates might be downloaded and installed as one action, precluding checksum verification; the IDPS user interface should check each update’s integrity as part of this. Removable media (e.g., CD, DVD). Vendors may not provide a specific method for customers to verify the legitimacy of removable media apparently sent by the vendors. If media verification is a concern, administrators should contact their vendors to determine how the media can be verified, such as comparing vendor-provided checksums to checksums computed for files on the media, or verifying digital signatures on the media’s contents to ensure they are valid. Administrators should also consider scanning the media for malware, with the caveat that false positives might be triggered by IDPS signatures for malware on the media.
SV-20046r2_rule NET-IDPS-032 CCI-000366 LOW The Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDPS) file checksums provided by the vendor must be compared and verified with checksums computed from CD or downloaded files. There are two types of IDPS updates: software updates and signature updates. Software updates fix bugs in the IDPS software or add new functionality, while signature updates add new detection capabilities or refine existing detection capabilities (e.g., reducing false positives). For many IDPSs, signature updates cause program code to be altered or replaced, so they are really a specialized form of software update. For other IDPSs, signatures are not written in code, so a signature update is a change to the configuration data for the IDPS. Software updates can include any or all IDPS components, including sensors, agents, management servers, and consoles. Software updates for sensors and management servers, particularly appliance-based devices, are often applied by replacing an existing IDPS CD with a new one and rebooting the device. Many IDPSs run the software directly from the CD, so that no software installation is required. Other components, such as agents, require an administrator to install software or apply patches, either manually on each host or automatically through IDPS management software. Some vendors make software and signature updates available for download from their Web sites or other servers; often, the administrator interfaces for IDPSs have features for downloading and installing such updates. Administrators should verify the integrity of updates before applying them, because updates could have been inadvertently or intentionally altered or replaced. The recommended verification method depends on the update’s format, as follows: Files downloaded from a Web site or FTP site. Administrators should compare file checksums provided by the vendor with checksums that they compute for the downloaded files. Update downloaded automatically through the IDPS user interface. If an update is downloaded as a single file or a set of files, either checksums provided by the vendor should be compared to checksums generated by the administrator, or the IDPS user interface itself should perform some sort of integrity check. In some cases, updates might be downloaded and installed as one action, precluding checksum verification; the IDPS user interface should check each update’s integrity as part of this. Removable media (e.g., CD, DVD). Vendors may not provide a specific method for customers to verify the legitimacy of removable media apparently sent by the vendors. If media verification is a concern, administrators should contact their vendors to determine how the media can be verified, such as comparing vendor-provided checksums to checksums computed for files on the media, or verifying digital signatures on the media’s contents to ensure they are valid. Administrators should also consider scanning the media for malware, with the caveat that false positives might be triggered by IDPS signatures for malware on the media.
SV-20145r4_rule NET-WIDS-001 CCI-001673 MEDIUM The site must conduct continuous wireless Intrusion Detection System (IDS) scanning. DoD networks are at risk and DoD data could be compromised if wireless scanning is not conducted to identify unauthorized WLAN clients and access points connected to or attempting to connect to the network.
SV-22070r3_rule WIR0115-02 CCI-000366 MEDIUM The cryptography implemented by the Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) components must be FIPS 140-2 validated. Most known security breaches of cryptography result from improper implementation of the cryptography, not flaws in the cryptographic algorithms themselves. FIPS 140-2 validation provides assurance that cryptography is implemented correctly, and is required for Federal Government uses of cryptography in non-classified applications.System Administrator
SV-28616r3_rule NET1050 CCI-002345 MEDIUM The organization must encrypt all network device configurations while stored offline. If a network device's non-volatile memory is lost without a recent configuration stored in an offline location, it may take time to recover that segment of the network. Users connected directly to the switch or router will be without service for a longer than acceptable time. Encrypting the configuration stored offline protects the data at rest and provides additional security to prevent tampering and potentially cause a network outage if the configuration were to be put into service.System Administrator
SV-31432r4_rule WIR0123 CCI-000366 MEDIUM DoD Components providing Internet-only guest access must use separate WLAN or logical segmentation of the host WLAN (e.g., separate service set identifier (SSID) and virtual LAN) or DoD network. If the access point or its supporting authentication server is placed in front of the perimeter firewall, then it has no firewall protection against an attack. If the access point or its supporting authentication server is placed behind the perimeter firewall (on the internal network), then any breach of these devices could lead to attacks on other DoD information systems.System Administrator
SV-39891r3_rule WIR0114 CCI-000366 MEDIUM The Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) must be Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2)-Enterprise certified by the Wi-Fi Alliance. The Wi-Fi Alliance WPA2-Enterprise certification means the WLAN equipment can support DoD requirements, most notably EAP-TLS and AES-CCMP. If the equipment has not been WPA-Enterprise certified, then the equipment may not have the required security functionality to protect DoD networks and information.
SV-41919r3_rule NET0180 CCI-000366 MEDIUM All global address ranges used on unclassified and classified networks must be properly registered with the DoD Network Information Center (NIC). If network address space is not properly configured, managed, and controlled, the network could be accessed by unauthorized personnel resulting in security compromise of site information and resources. Allowing subscribers onto the network whose IP addresses are not registered with the .Mil NIC may allow unauthorized users access into the network. These unauthorized users could then monitor the network, steal passwords, and access classified information.Network Security Officer
SV-41924r7_rule NET0185 CCI-000366 MEDIUM Network Address Translation (NAT) and private IP address space must not be deployed within the SIPRNet enclave. The DoD has an enterprise level security-focused configuration management (SecCM) requirement to support end-to-end monitoring of SIPRNet, as a National Security System (NSS). The use of NAT and private IP address space inhibits the view of specialized DISN enterprise tools in tracking client level enclave to enclave traffic, monitoring client use of enterprise level application services, and detecting anomalies and potential malicious attacks in SIPRNet client application traffic flows. Enclave nodes that communicate outside the organization’s enclave to other SIPRNet enclaves or enterprise services cannot use NATd private addresses via an enclave proxy without the permission of the SIPRNet DISN Authorizing Official, the DISA AO.
SV-44284r2_rule NET0928 CCI-000366 MEDIUM A policy must be implemented to keep Bogon/Martian rulesets up to date. A Bogon route or Martian address is a type of packet that should never be routed inbound through the perimeter device. Bogon routes and Martian addresses are commonly found as the source addresses of DDoS attacks. By not having a policy implemented to keep these addresses up to date, the enclave will run the risk of allowing illegitimate traffic into the enclave or even blocking legitimate traffic. Also, if there are rulesets with "any" as the source address then Bogons/Martians must be applied. Bogons and Martian addresses can be kept up to date routinely checking the IANA website or creating an account with Team Cymru to retrieve these lists in one of many ways. http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-space/ipv4-address-space.xml http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/Bogons/System AdministratorNetwork Security Officer
SV-80839r1_rule NET0131 CCI-001121 MEDIUM Prior to having external connection provisioned between enclaves, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) must be established. Prior to establishing a connection with another activity, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) must be established between the two sites prior to connecting with each other.
SV-80841r1_rule NET1026 CCI-000167 LOW Syslog messages must be retained for a minimum of 30 days online and then stored offline for one year. Logging is a critical part of router security. Maintaining an audit trail of system activity logs (syslog) can help identify configuration errors, understand past intrusions, troubleshoot service disruptions, and react to probes and scans of the network.
SV-80843r1_rule NET2000 CCI-000803 MEDIUM Multi-Protocol Labeled Switching (MPLS) protocols deployed to build Label-Switch Path (LSP) tunnels must authenticate all messages with a hash function using the most secured cryptographic algorithm available. Spoofed TCP segments could be introduced into the connection streams for LDP sessions used to build LSPs. By configuring strict authentication between LSR peers, LDP TCP sessions can be restricted and the integrity of LSPs can be guarded using the TCP MD5 Signature Option. The LSR ignores LDP Hellos from any LSR for which a password has not been configured. This ensures that the LSR establishes LDP TCP connections only with LSRs for which the shared secret has been configured. RSVP messages are used to control resource reservations for MPLS TE tunnels inside the MPLS core. The RSVP message authentication permits neighbors to use a secure hash to digitally sign all RSVP signaling messages, thus allowing the receiver of an RSVP message to verify the sender. By protecting against corruption and spoofing of RSVP messages, the integrity of the LSPs for bandwidth provisioning, path setup, and path teardown is maintained.
SV-80845r1_rule NET2001 CCI-001097 MEDIUM Multi-Protocol Labeled Switching (MPLS) labels must not be exchanged between the enclaves edge routers and any external neighbor routers. MPLS label exchange via Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) or Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) with any external neighbor creates the risk of label spoofing that could disrupt optimum routing, or even drop packets that are encapsulated with a label that is not in the MPLS forwarding table.
SV-80847r1_rule NET2002 CCI-001549 LOW Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) must be synchronized with the Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) to minimize packet loss when an IGP adjacency is established prior to LDP peers completing label exchange. Packet loss can occur when an IGP adjacency is established and the router begins forwarding packets using the new adjacency before the LDP label exchange completes between the peers on that link. Packet loss can also occur if an LDP session closes and the router continues to forward traffic using the link associated with the LDP peer rather than an alternate pathway with a fully synchronized LDP session. The MPLS LDP-IGP Synchronization feature provides a means to synchronize LDP with OSPF or IS-IS to minimize MPLS packet loss. When an IGP adjacency is established on a link but LDP-IGP synchronization is not yet achieved or is lost, the IGP will advertise the max-metric on that link.
SV-80849r1_rule NET2003 CCI-000803 MEDIUM VLAN Trunk Protocol (VTP) messages must be authenticated with a hash function using the most secured cryptographic algorithm available. VLAN Trunk Protocol (VTP) provides central management of VLAN domains, thus reducing administration in a switched network. When configuring a new VLAN on a VTP server, the VLAN is distributed through all switches in the domain. This reduces the need to configure the same VLAN everywhere. VTP pruning preserves bandwidth by preventing VLAN traffic (unknown MAC, broadcast, multicast) from being sent down trunk links when not needed, that is, there are no access switch ports in neighboring switches belonging to such VLANs. An attack can force a digest change for the VTP domain enabling a rogue device to become the VTP server, which could allow unauthorized access to previously blocked VLANs or allow the addition of unauthorized switches into the domain. Authenticating VTP messages with a cryptographic hash function can reduce the risk of the VTP domain's being compromised.
SV-80851r1_rule NET2004 CCI-000366 LOW Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) must be implemented at the access and distribution layers where Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) span multiple switches. Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) is implemented on bridges and switches to prevent Layer 2 loops when a broadcast domain spans multiple bridges and switches and when redundant links are provisioned to provide high availability in case of link failures. Convergence time can be significantly reduced using Rapid STP (802.1w) instead of STP (802.1d), resulting in improved availability. Rapid STP should be deployed by implementing either Rapid Per-VLAN-Spanning-Tree (Rapid-PVST) or Multiple Spanning-Tree Protocol (MSTP), the later scales much better when there are many VLANs.
SV-80853r1_rule NET2005 CCI-001095 LOW A Quality of Service (QoS) policy must be implemented to provide preferred treatment for Command and Control (C2) real-time services and control plane traffic. Different applications have unique requirements and toleration levels for delay, jitter, packet loss, and availability. To manage the multitude of applications and services, a network requires a Quality of Service (QoS) framework to differentiate traffic and provide a method to manage network congestion. The Differentiated Services Model (DiffServ) is based on per-hop behavior by categorizing traffic into different classes and enabling each node to enforce a forwarding treatment to each packet as dictated by a service policy. Packet markings such as IP Precedence and its successor, Differentiated Services Code Points (DSCP), were defined along with specific per-hop behaviors for key traffic types to enable a scalable QoS solution. DiffServ QoS categorizes network traffic, prioritizes it according to its relative importance, and provides priority treatment based on the classification. It is imperative that end-to-end QoS is implemented to guarantee the required bandwidth for control plane traffic and C2 real-time services during periods of congestion within the JIE WAN IP network.
SV-80855r1_rule NET2006 CCI-001414 MEDIUM Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) must be disabled on all router interfaces that are not required to support multicast routing. PIM is a routing protocol that is used by the IP core for forwarding multicast traffic. PIM operates independent of any particular IP routing protocol but makes use of the IP unicast routing table--PIM does not keep a separate multicast routing table. The multicast tree is built by first allowing a flood of traffic from the source to every dense mode router in the network. For a brief time, unnecessary traffic is allowed. As each router receives traffic for the group, it will decide whether it has active recipients wanting to receive the multicast data. If so, the router will let the flow continue. If no hosts have registered for the multicast group, the router sends a prune message to its neighbor toward the source. That branch of the tree is then pruned off so that the unnecessary traffic does not continue. Dense mode is viewed as a "flood and prune" implementation. With PIM Sparse Mode (PIM-SM), the multicast tree is not extended to a router unless a local host has already joined the group. The multicast tree is built by beginning with group members at the end leaf nodes and extending back toward a central root point--the tree is built from the bottom up. In either case, if an interface is not going to be supporting any of the multicast traffic--that is, join a multicast tree, PIM should be disabled.
SV-80857r1_rule NET2007 CCI-001414 LOW A Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) neighbor filter must be implemented to restrict and control multicast traffic. Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) is a routing protocol that is used by the IP core for forwarding multicast traffic. PIM traffic must be limited to only known PIM neighbors by configuring and binding a PIM neighbor filter to those interfaces that have PIM enabled.
SV-80859r1_rule NET2008 CCI-001414 LOW The multicast domain must block inbound and outbound administratively-scoped multicast traffic at the edge. A multicast boundary must be established to ensure that administratively-scoped multicast traffic does not flow into or out of the IP core. The multicast boundary can be created by ensuring that COI-facing interfaces on all PIM routers are configured to block inbound and outbound administratively-scoped multicast traffic.
SV-80861r1_rule NET2009 CCI-001414 LOW The multicast domain must block inbound and outbound Auto-RP discovery and announcement messages at the edge. With static RP, the RP address for any multicast group must be consistent across all routers in a multicast domain. A static configuration is simple and convenient. However, if the statically defined RP router becomes unreachable, there is no automatic failover to another RP router. Auto-RP distributes information to routers as to which RP address must be used for various multicast groups. Auto-RP eliminates inconsistencies and enables scalability and automatic failover. All PIM-enabled routers join the RP discovery group (224.0.1.40), which allows them to receive all group-to-RP mapping information. This information is distributed by an entity called RP mapping agent. Mapping agents themselves join the RP announce group (224.0.1.39). All candidate RPs advertise themselves periodically using the RP announce group address. The mapping agent listens to all RP candidate announcements and determines which routers will be used for each multicast group. It then advertises the RP and its associate multicast groups to all PIM routers in the network using an RP discovery message. Auto-RP announcement and discovery messages provide information (i.e., IP addresses of the RP candidates, multicast groups, etc.) vital to the multicast domain and should not be leaked out of the multicast domain. Using this information, a malicious user could disrupt multicast services by attacking the RP or flooding bogus traffic destined to the learned multicast groups.
SV-80863r1_rule NET2010 CCI-001414 LOW Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) register messages received from a downstream multicast Designated Routers (DR) must be filtered for any reserved or any other undesirable multicast groups. Customer networks that do not maintain a multicast domain and only require the IP multicast service will be required to stand up a PIM-SM router that will be incorporated into the JIE shared tree structure by establishing a peering session with an RP router. Both of these implementations expose several risks that must be mitigated to provide a secured IP core network. All RP routers that are peering with customer PIM-SM routers must implement a PIM import policy to block multicast registration requests for reserved or any other undesirable multicast groups.
SV-80865r1_rule NET2011 CCI-001414 LOW Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) join messages received from a downstream multicast Designated Routers (DR) must be filtered for any reserved or any other undesirable multicast groups. Customer networks that do not maintain a multicast domain and only require the IP multicast service will be required to stand up a PIM-SM router that will be incorporated into the JIE shared tree structure by establishing a peering session with an RP router. Both of these implementations expose several risks that must be mitigated to provide a secure IP core network. All RP routers that are peering with customer PIM-SM routers must implement a PIM import policy to block multicast join requests for reserved or any other undesirable multicast groups.
SV-80869r1_rule NET2012 CCI-001095 MEDIUM Multicast register messages must be rate limited per each source-group (S, G) entry. When a new source starts transmitting in a PIM Sparse Mode network, the DR will encapsulate the multicast packets into register messages and forward them to the Rendezvous Point (RP) using unicast. This process can be taxing on the CPU for both the DR and the RP if the source is running at a high data rate and there are many new sources starting at the same time. This scenario can potentially occur immediately after a network failover. The rate limit for the number of register messages should be set to a relatively low value based on the known number of multicast sources within the multicast domain.
SV-80871r1_rule NET2013 CCI-001414 LOW Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) report messages must be filtered to allow hosts to join only those multicast groups that have been approved by the organization. Real-time multicast traffic can entail multiple large flows of data. Large unicast flows tend to be fairly isolated (e.g., someone doing a file download here or there), whereas multicast can have broader impact on bandwidth consumption resulting in extreme network congestion. Hence, it is imperative that there is multicast admission control to restrict which multicast groups that hosts are allowed to join via IGMP (IPv4) or MLD (IPv6).
SV-80879r1_rule NET2014 CCI-001095 MEDIUM The number of mroute states resulting from Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) or Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) membership reports must be limited. The current multicast paradigm can let any host join any multicast group at any time by sending an Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) or Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) membership report to the Designated Router (DR). In a PIM Sparse Mode network, the DR will send a PIM Join message for the group to the Rendezvous Point (RP). Without any form of admission control, this can pose a security risk to the entire multicast domain, specifically the multicast routers along the shared tree from the DR to the RP that must maintain the mroute state information for each group join request. Hence, it is imperative that the DR is configured to limit the number of mroute state information that must be maintained to mitigate the risk of IGMP (IPv4) or MLD (IPv6) flooding.
SV-80881r1_rule NET2015 CCI-001095 MEDIUM The number of source-group (SG) states must be limited within the multicast topology where Any Source Multicast (ASM) is deployed. Any Source Multicast (ASM) can have many sources for the same groups (many-to-many). For many receivers, the path via the Rendezvous Point (RP) may not be ideal compared with the shortest path from the source to the receiver. By default, the last-hop router will initiate a switch from the shared tree to a source-specific shortest-path tree (SPT) to obtain lower latencies. This is accomplished by the last-hop router sending an (S, G) PIM Join towards S (the source). When the last-hop router begins to receive traffic for the group from the source via the SPT, it will send a PIM Prune message to the RP for the (S, G). The RP will then send a Prune message towards the source. The SPT switchover becomes a scaling issue for large multicast topologies that have many receivers and many sources for many groups because (S, G) entries require more memory than (*, G). Hence, it is imperative to minimize the amount of (S, G) state to be maintained by increasing the threshold that determines when the SPT switchover occurs.
SV-80883r1_rule NET2016 CCI-001095 LOW Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) or Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) snooping must be implemented within the network access layer. The last-hop router sends the multicast packet out the interface towards the LAN containing interested receivers. The default behavior for a Layer 2 switch is to forward all multicast traffic out every access switch port that belongs to the VLAN. IGMP snooping is a mechanism used by "Layer 3 aware" switches to maintain a Layer 2 multicast table by examining all IGMP join and leave messages (destined to the all router's multicast address 224.0.0.2) sent between hosts and the multicast routers on the LAN. This will enable the switch to only forward multicast packets out the access switch ports that have connected hosts that have subscribed to the multicast group, thereby reducing the load on the switching backplane as well as eliminating unwanted traffic to uninterested hosts.
SV-80887r2_rule NET2017 CCI-000366 LOW First-hop redundancy services must be configured to delay any preempt to provide enough time for the Internet Gateway Protocol (IGP) to stabilize. The Layer 2 connection between the nodes providing first-hop redundancy comes up quickly. If the preemption takes effect prior to the routing protocol converging, traffic is black holed. Traffic will go to the active router that does not have full routing information. It may take several seconds for the IGP to exchange all the routes, longer than the Hot Standby Router Protocol (HSRP), Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP), or Gateway Load Balancing Protocol (GLPB) transition. The recommended practice is to delay the preemption action until after the IGP has a chance to stabilize.