Oracle Database 12c Security Technical Implementation Guide

Replication database accounts are used for database connections between databases. Replication requires the configuration of these accounts using the same username and password on all databases participating in the replication. Replication connections use fixed user database links. This means that access to the replication account on one server provides access to the other servers participating in the replication. Granting unauthorized access to the replication account provides unauthorized and privileged access to all databases participating in the replication group.

Service names may be discovered by unauthenticated users. If the service name includes version numbers or other database product information, a malicious user may use that information to develop a targeted attack.

Database links define connections that may be used by the local database to access remote Oracle databases. These links provide a means for a compromise to the local database to spread to remote databases in the distributed database environment. Limiting or eliminating use of database links where they are not required to support the operational system can help isolate compromises to the local or a limited number of databases.

The Oracle redo log files store the detailed information on changes made to the database. This information is critical to database recovery in case of a database failure.

An account permission to grant privileges within the database is an administrative function. Minimizing the number and privileges of administrative accounts reduces the chances of privileged account exploitation. Application user accounts must never require WITH GRANT OPTION privileges since, by definition, they require only privileges to execute procedures or view / edit data.

The configuration option SQL92_SECURITY specifies whether table-level SELECT privileges are required to execute an update or delete that references table column values. If this option is disabled (set to FALSE), the UPDATE privilege can be used to determine values that should require SELECT privileges. The SQL92_SECURITY setting of TRUE prevents the exploitation of user credentials with only DELETE or UPDATE privileges on a table from being able to derive column values in that table by performing a series of update/delete statements using a where clause, and rolling back the change. In the following example, with SQL92_SECURITY set to FALSE, a user with only delete privilege on the scott.emp table is able to derive that there is one employee with a salary greater than 3000. With SQL92_SECURITY set to TRUE, that user is prevented from attempting to derive a value. SQL92_SECURITY = FALSE SQL> delete from scott.emp where sal > 3000; 1 row deleted SQL> rollback; Rollback complete SQL92_SECURITY = TRUE SQL> delete from scott.emp where sal > 3000; delete from scott.emp where sal > 3000 * ERROR at line 1: ORA-01031: insufficient privileges

It is critically important to the security of your system that you protect your password file and the environment variables that identify the location of the password file. Any user with access to these could potentially compromise the security of the connection. The REMOTE_LOGIN_PASSWORDFILE setting of "NONE" disallows remote administration of the database. The REMOTE_LOGIN_PASSWORDFILE setting of "EXCLUSIVE" allows for auditing of individual DBA logons to the SYS account. If not set to "EXCLUSIVE", remote connections to the database as "internal" or "as SYSDBA" are not logged to an individual account.

The WITH ADMIN OPTION allows the grantee to grant a privilege to another database account. Best security practice restricts the privilege of assigning privileges to authorized personnel. Authorized personnel include DBAs, object owners, and, where designed and included in the application's functions, application administrators. Restricting privilege-granting functions to authorized accounts can help decrease mismanagement of privileges and wrongful assignments to unauthorized accounts.

System privileges can be granted to users and roles and to the user group PUBLIC. All privileges granted to PUBLIC are accessible to every user in the database. Many of these privileges convey considerable authority over the database and should be granted only to those persons responsible for administering the database. In general, these privileges should be granted to roles and then the appropriate roles should be granted to users. System privileges must never be granted to PUBLIC as this could allow users to compromise the database.

The WITH ADMIN OPTION allows the grantee to grant a role to another database account. Best security practice restricts the privilege of assigning privileges to authorized personnel. Authorized personnel include DBAs, object owners, and, where designed and included in the application's functions, application administrators. Restricting privilege-granting functions to authorized accounts can help decrease mismanagement of privileges and wrongful assignments to unauthorized accounts.

Permissions on objects may be granted to the user group PUBLIC. Because every database user is a member of the PUBLIC group, granting object permissions to PUBLIC gives all users in the database access to that object. In a secure environment, granting object permissions to PUBLIC must be restricted to those objects that all users are allowed to access. The policy does not require object permissions assigned to PUBLIC by the installation of Oracle Database server components be revoked.

Permissions granted to PUBLIC are granted to all users of the database. Custom roles must be used to assign application permissions to functional groups of application users. The installation of Oracle does not assign role permissions to PUBLIC.

Application administration roles, which are assigned system or elevated application object privileges, must be protected from default activation. Application administration roles are determined by system privilege assignment (create / alter / drop user) and application user role ADMIN OPTION privileges.

Multi-tier systems may be configured with the database and connecting middle-tier system located on an internal network, with the database located on an internal network behind a firewall and the middle-tier system located in a DMZ. In cases where either or both systems are located in the DMZ (or on networks external to DoD), network communications between the systems must be encrypted.

Unauthorized users may bypass security mechanisms by submitting jobs to job queues managed by the database to be run under a more privileged security context of the database or host system. These queues must be monitored regularly to detect any such unauthorized job submissions.

DBMS links provide a communication and data transfer path definition between two databases that may be used by malicious users to discover and obtain unauthorized access to remote systems. Database links between production and development DBMSs provide a means for developers to access production data not authorized for their access or to introduce untested or unauthorized applications to the production database. Only protected, controlled, and authorized downloads of any production data to use for development may be allowed. Only applications that have completed the configuration management process may be introduced by the application object owner account to the production system.

Data export from production databases may include sensitive data. Application developers do not have a need to know to sensitive data. Any access they may have to production data would be considered unauthorized access and subject the sensitive data to unlawful or unauthorized disclosure. See DODD 8500.1 for a definition of Sensitive Information.

The Oracle SYSTEM tablespace is used by the database to store all DBMS system objects. Other use of the system tablespace may compromise system availability and the effectiveness of host system access controls to the tablespace files.

Separation of tablespaces by application helps to protect the application from resource contention and unauthorized access that could result from storage space reuses or host system access controls. Application data must be stored separately from system and custom user-defined objects to facilitate administration and management of its data storage. The SYSTEM tablespace must never be used for application data storage in order to prevent resource contention and performance degradation.

The LOG_ARCHIVE_DEST parameter is used to specify the directory to which Oracle archive logs are written. Where the DBMS availability and recovery to a specific point in time is critical, the protection of archive log files is critical. Archive log files may also contain unencrypted sensitive data. If written to an inadequately protected or invalidated directory, the archive log files may be accessed by unauthorized persons or processes.

The _TRACE_FILES_PUBLIC parameter is used to make trace files used for debugging database applications and events available to all database users. Use of this capability precludes the discrete assignment of privileges based on job function. Additionally, its use may provide access to external files and data to unauthorized users.

Object ownership provides all database object permissions to the owned object. Access to the application object owner accounts requires special protection to prevent unauthorized access and use of the object ownership privileges. In addition to the high privileges to application objects assigned to this account, it is also an account that, by definition, is not accessed interactively except for application installation and maintenance. This reduced access to the account means that unauthorized access to the account could go undetected. To help protect the account, it must be enabled only when access is required.

Developer roles must not be assigned DBMS administrative privileges to production DBMS application and data directories. The separation of production DBA and developer roles helps protect the production system from unauthorized, malicious or unintentional interruption due to development activities.

The DBMS installation account may be used by any authorized user to perform DBMS installation or maintenance. Without logging, accountability for actions attributed to the account is lost.

Protection of DBMS data, transaction and audit data files stored by the host operating system is dependent on OS controls. When different applications share the same database, resource contention and security controls are required to isolate and protect an application's data from other applications. In addition, it is an Oracle best practice to separate data, transaction logs, and audit logs into separate physical directories according to Oracle’s OFA (Optimal Flexible Architecture). And finally, DBMS software libraries and configuration files also require differing access control lists.

The AUDIT_FILE_DEST parameter specifies the directory where the database audit trail file is stored (when AUDIT_TRAIL parameter is set to ‘OS’, ‘xml’ or ‘xml, extended’ where supported by the DBMS). Unauthorized access or loss of integrity of the audit trail could result in loss of accountability or the ability to detect suspicious activity. This directory also contains the audit trail of the SYS and SYSTEM accounts that captures privileged database events when the database is not running (when AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS parameter is set to TRUE).

The DBMS software libraries contain the executables used by the DBMS to operate. Unauthorized access to the libraries can result in malicious alteration or planting of operational executables. This may in turn jeopardize data stored in the DBMS and/or operation of the host system.

Replication accounts may be used to access databases defined for the replication architecture. An exploit of a replication on one database could lead to the compromise of any database participating in the replication that uses the same account name and credentials. If the replication account is compromised and it has DBA privileges, the database is at additional risk to unauthorized or malicious action.

Restricting remote access to specific, trusted systems helps prevent access by unauthorized and potentially malicious users.

When standard auditing is in use, the AUDIT_SYS_OPERATIONS parameter is used to enable auditing of actions taken by the user SYS. The SYS user account is a shared account by definition and holds all privileges in the Oracle database. It is the account accessed by users connecting to the database with SYSDBA or SYSOPER privileges.

Some DBMS systems provide the feature to assign security labels to data elements. If labeling is required, implementation options include the Oracle Label Security package, or a third-party product, or custom-developed functionality. The confidentiality and integrity of the data depends upon the security label assignment where this feature is in use. Changes to security label assignment may indicate suspicious activity.

The Oracle GLOBAL_NAMES parameter is used to set the requirement for database link names to be the same name as the remote database whose connection they define. By using the same name for both, ambiguity is avoided and unauthorized or unintended connections to remote databases are less likely.

/diag indicates the directory where trace, alert, core and incident directories and files are located. The files may contain sensitive data or information that could prove useful to potential attackers.

Remote administration provides a potential opportunity for malicious users to make unauthorized changes to the Connection Manager configuration or interrupt its service.

Unsupported Oracle network client installations may introduce vulnerabilities to the database. Restriction to use of supported versions helps to protect the database and helps to enforce newer, more robust security controls.

Application management includes the ability to control the number of users and user sessions utilizing an application. Limiting the number of allowed users, and sessions per user, is helpful in limiting risks related to Denial of Service attacks. This requirement addresses concurrent session control for a single information system account and does not address concurrent sessions by a single user via multiple system accounts. Unlimited concurrent connections to the DBMS could allow a successful Denial of Service (DoS) attack by exhausting connection resources. The organization will need to define the maximum number of concurrent sessions by account type, by account, or a combination thereof. In deciding on the appropriate number, it is important to take into account the work requirements of the various types of user. For example, 2 might be an acceptable limit for general users accessing the database via an application; but 10 might be too few for a database administrator using a database management GUI tool, where each query tab and navigation pane may count as a separate session.

Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system. (e.g., network interface, hard disk, modem, etc.). From an application perspective, certain specific application functionalities may be audited as well. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated. This set of events is typically a subset of the list of all events for which the system is capable of generating audit records (i.e., auditable events, timestamps, source and destination addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, file names involved, and access control or flow control rules invoked). Organizations define which application components shall provide auditable events. The DBMS must provide auditing for the list of events defined by the organization or risk negatively impacting forensic investigations into malicious behavior in the information system. Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system, such as network interfaces, hard disks, modems, etc. From an application perspective, certain specific application functionalities may be audited, as well. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated. This set of events is typically a subset of the list of all events for which the system is capable of generating audit records (i.e., auditable events, timestamps, source and destination addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, file names involved, and access control or flow control rules invoked). Organizations may define the organizational personnel accountable for determining which application components shall provide auditable events. Auditing provides accountability for changes made to the DBMS configuration or its objects and data. It provides a means to discover suspicious activity and unauthorized changes. Without auditing, a compromise may go undetected and without a means to determine accountability. The Department of Defense has established the following as the minimum set of auditable events. Most can be audited via Oracle settings; some - marked here with an asterisk - cannot, and may require OS settings. - Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access, modify, or delete privileges, security objects, security levels, or categories of information (e.g. classification levels). - Successful and unsuccessful logon attempts, privileged activities or other system level access - Starting and ending time for user access to the system, concurrent logons from different workstations. - Successful and unsuccessful accesses to objects. - All program initiations. - *All direct access to the information system. - All account creations, modifications, disabling, and terminations. - *All kernel module loads, unloads, and restarts.

The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated. This set of events is typically a subset of the list of all events for which the system is capable of generating audit records (i.e., auditable events, timestamps, source and destination addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, file names involved, and access control or flow control rules invoked). If the list of auditable events is not configurable, events that should be caught by auditing may be missed. This may allow malicious activity to be overlooked.

Audit records can be generated from various components within the information system, such as network interfaces, hard disks, modems, etc. From an application perspective, certain specific application functionalities may be audited, as well. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated. This set of events is typically a subset of the list of all events for which the system is capable of generating audit records (i.e., auditable events, timestamps, source and destination addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, file names involved, and access control or flow control rules invoked). Organizations may define the organizational personnel accountable for determining which application components shall provide auditable events. Auditing provides accountability for changes made to the DBMS configuration or its objects and data. It provides a means to discover suspicious activity and unauthorized changes. Without auditing, a compromise may go undetected and without a means to determine accountability. The Department of Defense has established the following as the minimum set of auditable events. Most can be audited via Oracle settings; some - marked here with an asterisk - cannot, and may require OS settings. - Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access, modify, or delete privileges, security objects, security levels, or categories of information (e.g. classification levels). - Successful and unsuccessful logon attempts, privileged activities or other system level access - Starting and ending time for user access to the system, concurrent logons from different workstations. - Successful and unsuccessful accesses to objects. - All program initiations. - *All direct access to the information system. - All account creations, modifications, disabling, and terminations. - *All kernel module loads, unloads, and restarts.

Information system auditing capability is critical for accurate forensic analysis. Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of this control includes: timestamps, source and destination addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, file names involved, and access control or flow control rules invoked. Database software is capable of a range of actions on data stored within the database. It is important, for accurate forensic analysis, to know exactly what actions were performed. This requires specific information regarding the event type an audit record is referring to. If event type information is not recorded and stored with the audit record, the record itself is of very limited use.

Information system auditing capability is critical for accurate forensic analysis. Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of this control includes: timestamps, source and destination addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, file names involved, and access control or flow control rules invoked. Database software is capable of a range of actions on data stored within the database. It's important, for accurate forensic analysis, to know exactly when specific actions were performed. This requires the date and time an audit record is referring to. If date and time information is not recorded and stored with the audit record, the record itself is of very limited use.

Information system auditing capability is critical for accurate forensic analysis. Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of this control includes: timestamps, source and destination addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, file names involved, and access control or flow control rules invoked. Without sufficient information establishing where the audit events occurred, investigation into the cause of events is severely hindered.

Information system auditing capability is critical for accurate forensic analysis. Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of this control, includes, but is not limited to: timestamps, source and destination IP addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, application specific events, success/fail indications, file names involved, access control or flow control rules invoked. Without information establishing the source of activity, the value of audit records from a forensics perspective is questionable.

Information system auditing capability is critical for accurate forensic analysis. Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of this control includes, but is not limited to: timestamps, source and destination IP addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, application specific events, success/fail indications, file names involved, access control, or flow control rules invoked. Success and failure indicators ascertain the outcome of a particular event. As such, they also provide a means to measure the impact of an event and help authorized personnel to determine the appropriate response. Without knowing the outcome of audit events, it is very difficult to accurately recreate the series of events during forensic analysis.

Information system auditing capability is critical for accurate forensic analysis. Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of this control includes: timestamps, source and destination addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, file names involved, and access control or flow control rules invoked. Database software is capable of a range of actions on data stored within the database. It is important, for accurate forensic analysis, to know exactly who performed a given action. If user identification information is not recorded and stored with the audit record, the record itself is of very limited use.

Information system auditing capability is critical for accurate forensic analysis. Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of this control includes: timestamps, source and destination addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, file names involved, and access control or flow control rules invoked. In addition, the application must have the capability to include organization-defined additional, more detailed information in the audit records for audit events. These events may be identified by type, location, or subject. An example of detailed information the organization may require in audit records is full-text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities of shared account users. Some organizations may determine that more detailed information is required for specific database event types. If this information is not available, it could negatively impact forensic investigations into user actions or other malicious events.

If audit data were to become compromised, then competent forensic analysis and discovery of the true source of potentially malicious system activity is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In addition, access to audit records provides information an attacker could potentially use to his or her advantage. To ensure the veracity of audit data, the information system and/or the application must protect audit information from any and all unauthorized access. This includes read, write, copy, etc. This requirement can be achieved through multiple methods which will depend upon system architecture and design. Some commonly employed methods include ensuring log files enjoy the proper file system permissions utilizing file system protections and limiting log data location. Additionally, applications with user interfaces to audit records must not allow for the unfettered manipulation of or access to those records via the application. If the application provides access to the audit data, the application becomes accountable for ensuring that audit information is protected from unauthorized access. Audit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity.

If audit data were to become compromised, then competent forensic analysis and discovery of the true source of potentially malicious system activity is impossible to achieve. To ensure the veracity of audit data, the information system and/or the application must protect audit information from unauthorized modification. This requirement can be achieved through multiple methods which will depend upon system architecture and design. Some commonly employed methods include ensuring log files enjoy the proper file system permissions and limiting log data locations. Applications providing a user interface to audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the data and the corresponding rights that the user enjoys in order to make access decisions regarding the modification of audit data. Audit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity. Modification of database audit data could mask the theft of, or the unauthorized modification of, sensitive data stored in the database.

If audit data were to become compromised, then competent forensic analysis and discovery of the true source of potentially malicious system activity is impossible to achieve. To ensure the veracity of audit data the information system and/or the application must protect audit information from unauthorized deletion. This requirement can be achieved through multiple methods which will depend upon system architecture and design. Some commonly employed methods include: ensuring log files enjoy the proper file system permissions utilizing file system protections; restricting access; and backing up log data to ensure log data is retained. Applications providing a user interface to audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the data and the corresponding rights the user enjoys in order make access decisions regarding the deletion of audit data. Audit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity. Deletion of database audit data could mask the theft of, or the unauthorized modification of, sensitive data stored in the database.

Protecting audit data also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Depending upon the log format and application, system and application log tools may provide the only means to manipulate and manage application and system log data. It is, therefore, imperative that access to audit tools be controlled and protected from unauthorized access. Applications providing tools to interface with audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools and the corresponding rights the user enjoys in order make access decisions regarding the access to audit tools. Audit tools include, but are not limited to, OS-provided audit tools, vendor-provided audit tools, and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. If an attacker were to gain access to audit tools, he could analyze audit logs for system weaknesses or weaknesses in the auditing itself. An attacker could also manipulate logs to hide evidence of malicious activity.

Protecting audit data also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Depending upon the log format and application, system and application log tools may provide the only means to manipulate and manage application and system log data. If the tools are compromised it could provide attackers with the capability to manipulate log data. It is, therefore, imperative that audit tools be controlled and protected from unauthorized modification. Audit tools include, but are not limited to, OS provided audit tools, vendor provided audit tools, and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. If an attacker were to gain access to audit tools he could analyze audit logs for system weaknesses or weaknesses in the auditing itself. An attacker could also manipulate logs to hide evidence of malicious activity.

Protecting audit data also includes identifying and protecting the tools used to view and manipulate log data. Depending upon the log format and application, system and application log tools may provide the only means to manipulate and manage application and system log data. It is, therefore, imperative that access to audit tools be controlled and protected from unauthorized access. Applications providing tools to interface with audit data will leverage user permissions and roles identifying the user accessing the tools and the corresponding rights the user enjoys in order make access decisions regarding the access to audit tools. Audit tools include, but are not limited to, OS-provided audit tools, vendor-provided audit tools, and open source audit tools needed to successfully view and manipulate audit information system activity and records. If an attacker were to gain access to audit tools, he could analyze audit logs for system weaknesses or weaknesses in the auditing itself. An attacker could also manipulate logs to hide evidence of malicious activity.

Within the database, object ownership implies full privileges to the owned object including the privilege to assign access to the owned objects to other subjects. Unmanaged or uncontrolled ownership of objects can lead to unauthorized object grants and alterations, and unauthorized modifications to data. If critical tables or other objects rely on unauthorized owner accounts, these objects can be lost when an account is removed. It may be the case that there are accounts that are authorized to own synonyms, but no other objects. If this is so, it should be documented.

Information systems are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). It is detrimental for applications to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or mission objectives. Examples include, but are not limited to, installing advertising software, demonstrations, or browser plugins not related to requirements or providing a wide array of functionality not required for the mission. Applications must adhere to the principles of least functionality by providing only essential capabilities. Demonstration and sample database objects and applications present publicly known attack points for malicious users. These demonstration and sample objects are meant to provide simple examples of coding specific functions and are not developed to prevent vulnerabilities from being introduced to the DBMS and host system.

Information systems are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). It is detrimental for applications to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or mission objectives. Examples include, but are not limited to, installing advertising software, demonstrations, or browser plug-ins not related to requirements or providing a wide array of functionality not required for the mission. Applications must adhere to the principles of least functionality by providing only essential capabilities. Demonstration and sample database objects and applications present publicly known attack points for malicious users. These demonstration and sample objects are meant to provide simple examples of coding specific functions and are not developed to prevent vulnerabilities from being introduced to the DBMS and host system. Unused and unnecessary DBMS components increase the attack vector for the DBMS by introducing additional targets for attack. By minimizing the services and applications installed on the system, the number of potential vulnerabilities is reduced.

Information systems are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). It is detrimental for applications to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or mission objectives. Examples include, but are not limited to, installing advertising software, demonstrations, or browser plug-ins not related to requirements or providing a wide array of functionality not required for the mission. Applications must adhere to the principles of least functionality by providing only essential capabilities. Unused, unnecessary DBMS components increase the attack vector for the DBMS by introducing additional targets for attack. By minimizing the services and applications installed on the system, the number of potential vulnerabilities is reduced. Components of the system that are unused and cannot be uninstalled must be disabled.

Information systems are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). It is detrimental for applications to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or mission objectives. Examples include, but are not limited to, installing advertising software, demonstrations, or browser plugins not related to requirements or providing a wide array of functionality not required for the mission. Applications must adhere to the principles of least functionality by providing only essential capabilities. DBMSs may spawn additional external processes to execute procedures that are defined in the DBMS, but stored in external host files (external procedures). The spawned process used to execute the external procedure may operate within a different OS security context than the DBMS and provide unauthorized access to the host system.

The Oracle external procedure capability provides use of the Oracle process account outside the operation of the DBMS process. You can use it to submit and execute applications stored externally from the database under operating system controls. The external procedure process is the subject of frequent and successful attacks as it allows unauthenticated use of the Oracle process account on the operating system. As of Oracle version 11.1, the external procedure agent may be run directly from the database and not require use of the Oracle listener. This reduces the risk of unauthorized access to the procedure from outside of the database process.

Information systems are capable of providing a wide variety of functions and services. Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). Additionally, it is sometimes convenient to provide multiple services from a single component of an information system (e.g., email and web services), but doing so increases risk by constraining the ability to restrict the use of functions, ports, protocols, and/or services. To support the requirements and principles of least functionality, the application must support the organizational requirements providing only essential capabilities and limiting the use of ports, protocols, and/or services to only those required, authorized, and approved to conduct official business or to address authorized quality of life issues. Database Management Systems using ports, protocols, and services deemed unsafe are open to attack through those ports, protocols, and services. This can allow unauthorized access to the database and through the database to other components of the information system.

A trust anchor is an authoritative entity represented via a public key and associated data. It is used in the context of public key infrastructures, X.509 digital certificates, and DNSSEC. When there is a chain of trust, usually the top entity to be trusted becomes the trust anchor; it can be for example a Certification Authority (CA). A certification path starts with the Subject certificate and proceeds through a number of intermediate certificates up to a trusted root certificate, typically issued by a trusted CA. Path validation is necessary for a relying party to make an informed trust decision when presented with any certificate not already explicitly trusted. Status information for certification paths includes certificate revocation lists or online certificate status protocol responses. Database Management Systems that do not validate certificates to a trust anchor are in danger of accepting certificates that are invalid and/or counterfeit. This could allow unauthorized access to the database. Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the successor protocol to Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). Although the Oracle configuration parameters have names including 'SSL', such as SSL_VERSION and SSL_CIPHER_SUITES, they refer to TLS.

Just as individual users must be authenticated, and just as they must use PKI-based authentication, so must any processes that connect to the DBMS. The DoD standard for authentication of a process or device communicating with another process or device is the presentation of a valid, current, DoD-issued Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificate that has previously been verified as Trusted by an administrator of the other process or device. This applies both to processes that run on the same server as the DBMS and to processes running on other computers. The Oracle-supplied accounts, SYS, SYSBACKUP, SYSDG, and SYSKM, are exceptions. These cannot currently use certificate-based authentication. For this reason among others, use of these accounts should be restricted to where it is truly needed.

This requirement focuses on communications protection at the application session, versus network packet, level. Session IDs are tokens generated by web applications to uniquely identify an application user's session. Applications will make application decisions and execute business logic based on the session ID. Unique session identifiers or IDs are the opposite of sequentially generated session IDs, which can be easily guessed by an attacker. Unique session IDs help to reduce predictability of said identifiers. Unique session IDs address man-in-the-middle attacks, including session hijacking or insertion of false information into a session. If the attackers are unable to identify or guess the session information related to pending application traffic, they will have more difficulty in hijacking the session or otherwise manipulating valid sessions. When a user logs out, or when any other session termination event occurs, the application must terminate the user session to minimize the potential for an attacker to hijack that particular user session. Database sessions must be terminated when no longer in use in order to prevent session hijacking.

Failure in a known state can address safety or security in accordance with the mission/business needs of the organization. Failure in a known secure state helps prevent a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability in the event of a failure of the information system or a component of the system. Preserving information system state information helps to facilitate system restart and return to the operational mode of the organization with less disruption of mission/business processes.

Security functions are defined as "the hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information system responsible for enforcing the system security policy and supporting the isolation of code and data on which the protection is based". Developers and implementers can increase the assurance in security functions by employing well-defined security policy models, structured, disciplined, and rigorous hardware and software development techniques, and sound system/security engineering principles. Database Management Systems typically separate security functionality from non-security functionality via separate databases or schemas. Database objects or code implementing security functionality must not be commingled with objects or code implementing application logic. When security and non-security functionality is commingled, users who have access to non-security functionality may be able to access security functionality.

The purpose of this control is to prevent information, including encrypted representations of information, produced by the actions of a prior user/role (or the actions of a process acting on behalf of a prior user/role) from being available to any current user/role (or current process) that obtains access to a shared system resource (e.g., registers, main memory, secondary storage) after the resource has been released back to the information system. Control of information in shared resources is also referred to as object reuse. Data used for the development and testing of applications often involves copying data from production. It is important that specific procedures exist for this process, so copies of sensitive data are not misplaced or left in a temporary location without the proper controls.

Invalid user input occurs when a user inserts data or characters into an application's data entry fields and the application is unprepared to process that data. This results in unanticipated application behavior, potentially leading to an application or information system compromise. Invalid user input is one of the primary methods employed when attempting to compromise an application. All applications need to validate the data users attempt to input to the application for processing. Rules for checking the valid syntax and semantics of information system inputs (e.g., character set, length, numerical range, acceptable values) are in place to verify inputs match specified definitions for format and content. Inputs passed to interpreters are prescreened to prevent the content from being unintentionally interpreted as commands. This calls for inspection of application source code, which will require collaboration with the application developers. It is recognized that in many cases, the database administrator (DBA) is organizationally separate from the application developers and may have limited, if any, access to source code. Nevertheless, protections of this type are so important to the secure operation of databases that they must not be ignored. At a minimum, the DBA must attempt to obtain assurances from the development organization that this issue has been addressed and must document what has been discovered.

Any application providing too much information in error logs and in administrative messages to the screen risks compromising the data and security of the application and system. The structure and content of error messages needs to be carefully considered by the organization and development team. The extent to which the application is able to identify and handle error conditions is guided by organizational policy and operational requirements. Sensitive information includes account numbers, social security numbers, and credit card numbers. Databases can inadvertently provide a wealth of information to an attacker through improperly handled error messages. In addition to sensitive business or personal information, database errors can provide host names, IP addresses, user names, and other system information not required for troubleshooting but very useful to someone targeting the system. This calls for inspection of application source code, which will require collaboration with the application developers. It is recognized that in many cases, the database administrator (DBA) is organizationally separate from the application developers and may have limited, if any, access to source code. Nevertheless, protections of this type are so important to the secure operation of databases that they must not be ignored. At a minimum, the DBA must attempt to obtain assurances from the development organization that this issue has been addressed and must document what has been discovered.

If the application provides too much information in error logs and administrative messages to the screen, this could lead to compromise. The structure and content of error messages need to be carefully considered by the organization and development team. The extent to which the information system is able to identify and handle error conditions is guided by organizational policy and operational requirements. Some default DBMS error messages can contain information that could aid an attacker in, among others things, identifying the database type, host address, or state of the database. Custom errors may contain sensitive customer information. It is important that error messages are displayed only to those who are authorized to view them. This calls for inspection of application source code, which will require collaboration with the application developers. It is recognized that in many cases, the database administrator (DBA) is organizationally separate from the application developers and may have limited, if any, access to source code. Nevertheless, protections of this type are so important to the secure operation of databases that they must not be ignored. At a minimum, the DBA must attempt to obtain assurances from the development organization that this issue has been addressed and must document what has been discovered.

In order to ensure sufficient storage capacity for the audit logs, the DBMS must be able to allocate audit record storage capacity. Although another requirement (SRG-APP-000515-DB-000318) mandates audit data be off-loaded to a centralized log management system, it remains necessary to provide space on the database server to serve as a buffer against outages and capacity limits of the off-loading mechanism. The task of allocating audit record storage capacity is usually performed during initial installation of the DBMS and is closely associated with the DBA and system administrator roles. The DBA or system administrator will usually coordinate the allocation of physical drive space with the application owner/installer and the application will prompt the installer to provide the capacity information, the physical location of the disk, or both. In determining the capacity requirements, consider such factors as: total number of users; expected number of concurrent users during busy periods; number and type of events being monitored; types and amounts of data being captured; the frequency/speed with which audit records are off-loaded to the central log management system; and any limitations that exist on the DBMS's ability to reuse the space formerly occupied by off-loaded records.

Any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of the information system and/or application can potentially have significant effects on the overall security of the system. If the system were to allow any user to make changes to software libraries, then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the appropriate testing and approvals that are part of a robust change management process. Accordingly, only qualified and authorized individuals shall be allowed to obtain access to information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. Unmanaged changes that occur to the database software libraries or configuration can lead to unauthorized or compromised installations.

Any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of the information system and/or application can potentially have significant effects on the overall security of the system. This includes the logic modules implemented within the database, such as packages, procedures, functions and triggers. If the DBMS were to allow any user to make changes to these, then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the appropriate testing and approvals that are part of a robust change management process. Accordingly, only qualified and authorized individuals shall be allowed to obtain access to information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. Unmanaged changes that occur to the database logic modules can lead to unauthorized or compromised installations.

When dealing with change control issues, it should be noted, any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of the information system and/or application can potentially have significant effects on the overall security of the system. Multiple applications can provide a cumulative negative effect. A vulnerability and subsequent exploit to one application can lead to an exploit of other applications sharing the same security context. For example, an exploit to a web server process that leads to unauthorized administrative access to host system directories can most likely lead to a compromise of all applications hosted by the same system. Database software not installed using dedicated directories both threatens and is threatened by other hosted applications. Access controls defined for one application may by default provide access to the other application's database objects or directories. Any method that provides any level of separation of security context assists in the protection between applications.

To assure accountability and prevent unauthorized access, organizational users shall be identified and authenticated. Organizational users include organizational employees or individuals the organization deems to have equivalent status of employees (e.g., contractors, guest researchers, individuals from allied nations). Users (and any processes acting on behalf of users) are uniquely identified and authenticated for all accesses other than those accesses explicitly identified and documented by the organization which outlines specific user actions that can be performed on the information system without identification or authentication.

Non-organizational users include all information system users other than organizational users which include organizational employees or individuals the organization deems to have equivalent status of employees (e.g., contractors, guest researchers, individuals from allied nations). Non-organizational users shall be uniquely identified and authenticated for all accesses other than those accesses explicitly identified and documented by the organization when related to the use of anonymous access, such as accessing a web server. Accordingly, a risk assessment is used in determining the authentication needs of the organization. Scalability, practicality, and security are simultaneously considered in balancing the need to ensure ease of use for access to federal information and information systems with the need to protect and adequately mitigate risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

Information system management functionality includes functions necessary to administer databases, network components, workstations, or servers, and typically requires privileged user access. The separation of user functionality from information system management functionality is either physical or logical and is accomplished by using different computers, different central processing units, different instances of the operating system, different network addresses, combinations of these methods, or other methods, as appropriate. An example of this type of separation is observed in web administrative interfaces that use separate authentication methods for users of any other information system resources. This may include isolating the administrative interface on a different domain and with additional access controls. If administrative functionality or information regarding DBMS management is presented on an interface available for users, information on DBMS settings may be inadvertently made available to the user.

This requirement is related to remote access, but more specifically to the networking protocols allowing systems to communicate. Remote access is any access to an organizational information system by a user (or an information system) communicating through an external, non-organization controlled network (e.g., the internet). Examples of remote access methods include dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Some networking protocols allowing remote access may not meet security requirements to protect data and components. Bluetooth and peer-to-peer networking are examples of less than secure networking protocols. The DoD Ports, Protocols, and Services Management (PPSM) program provides implementation guidance on the use of IP protocols and application and data services traversing the DoD Networks in a manner supporting net-centric operations. Applications implementing or utilizing remote access network protocols need to ensure the application is developed and implemented in accordance with the PPSM requirements. In situations where it has been determined that specific operational requirements outweigh the risks of enabling an insecure network protocol, the organization may pursue a risk acceptance. Using protocols deemed nonsecure would compromise the ability of the DBMS to operate in a secure fashion. The database must be able to disable network protocols deemed nonsecure.

Temporary application accounts could be used in the event of a vendor support visit where a support representative requires a temporary unique account in order to perform diagnostic testing or conduct some other support-related activity. When these types of accounts are created, there is a risk that the temporary account may remain in place and active after the support representative has left. To address this, in the event temporary application accounts are required, the application must ensure accounts designated as temporary in nature shall automatically terminate these accounts after an organization-defined time period. Such a process and capability greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be misused, hijacked, or data compromised. Note that user authentication and account management should be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP. This requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle. Temporary database accounts must be identified in order for the system to recognize and terminate them after a given time period. The DBMS and any administrators must have a means to recognize any temporary accounts for special handling.

Temporary application accounts could ostensibly be used in the event of a vendor support visit where a support representative requires a temporary unique account in order to perform diagnostic testing or conduct some other support related activity. When these types of accounts are created, there is a risk that the temporary account may remain in place and active after the support representative has left. To address this, in the event temporary application accounts are required, the application must ensure accounts designated as temporary in nature shall automatically terminate these accounts after a period of 72 hours. Such a process and capability greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be misused, hijacked, or data compromised. Note that user authentication and account management should be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP. This requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle. Temporary database accounts must be automatically terminated after a 72 hour time period in order to mitigate the risk of the account being used beyond its original purpose or timeframe.

Access control policies (e.g., identity-based policies, role-based policies, attribute-based policies) and access enforcement mechanisms (e.g., access control lists, access control matrices, cryptography) are employed by organizations to control access between users (or processes acting on behalf of users) and objects (e.g., devices, files, records, processes, programs, domains). DAC is a type of access control methodology serving as a means of restricting access to objects and data based on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. It is discretionary in the sense that application users with the appropriate permissions to access an application resource or data have the discretion to pass that permission on to another user either directly or indirectly. Data protection requirements may result in a DAC policy being specified as part of the application design. Discretionary access controls would be employed at the application level to restrict and control access to application objects and data thereby providing increased information security for the organization. When DAC controls are employed, those controls must limit sharing to named application users, groups of users, or both. The application DAC controls must also limit the propagation of access rights and have the ability to exclude access to data down to the granularity of a single user. Databases using DAC must have the ability for the owner of an object or information to assign or revoke rights to view or modify the object or information. If the owner of an object or information does not have rights to exclude access to an object or information at a user level, users may gain access to objects and information they are not authorized to view/modify.

Applications employ the concept of least privilege for specific duties and information systems (including specific functions, ports, protocols, and services). The concept of least privilege is also applied to information system processes, ensuring that the processes operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary to accomplish required organizational missions and/or functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional processes, roles, and information system accounts as necessary to achieve least privilege. Organizations also apply least privilege concepts to the design, development, implementation, and operations of information systems. Many sites distribute a single client database connection configuration file to all site database users that contains network access information for all databases on the site. Such a file provides information to access databases not required by all users that may assist in unauthorized access attempts.

Applications employ the concept of least privilege for specific duties and information systems (including specific functions, ports, protocols, and services). The concept of least privilege is also applied to information system processes, ensuring that the processes operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary to accomplish required organizational missions and/or functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional processes, roles, and information system accounts as necessary to achieve least privilege. Organizations also apply least privilege concepts to the design, development, implementation, and operations of information systems. Developers granted elevated database and/or operating system privileges on production databases can affect the operation and/or security of the database system. Operating system and database privileges assigned to developers on production systems must not be allowed.

Applications employ the concept of least privilege for specific duties and information systems (including specific functions, ports, protocols, and services). The concept of least privilege is also applied to information system processes, ensuring that the processes operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary to accomplish required organizational missions and/or functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional processes, roles, and information system accounts as necessary to achieve least privilege. Organizations also apply least privilege concepts to the design, development, implementation, and operations of information systems. Developers granted elevated database and/or operating system privileges on systems that support both development and production databases can affect the operation and/or security of the production database system. Operating system and database privileges assigned to developers on shared development and production systems must be restricted.

Applications employ the concept of least privilege for specific duties and information systems (including specific functions, ports, protocols, and services). The concept of least privilege is also applied to information system processes, ensuring that the processes operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary to accomplish required organizational missions and/or functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional processes, roles, and information system accounts as necessary to achieve least privilege. Organizations also apply least privilege concepts to the design, development, implementation, and operations of information systems. Administrative data includes DBMS metadata and other configuration and management data. Unauthorized access to this data could result in unauthorized changes to database objects, access controls, or DBMS configuration.

Applications employ the concept of least privilege for specific duties and information systems (including specific functions, ports, protocols, and services). The concept of least privilege is also applied to information system processes, ensuring that the processes operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary to accomplish required organizational missions and/or functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional processes, roles, and information system accounts as necessary to achieve least privilege. Organizations also apply least privilege concepts to the design, development, implementation, and operations of information systems. Privileges granted outside the context of the application user job function are more likely to go unmanaged or without oversight for authorization. Maintenance of privileges using roles defined for discrete job functions offers improved oversight of application user privilege assignments and helps to protect against unauthorized privilege assignment.

This requirement is intended to limit exposure due to operating from within a privileged account or role. The inclusion of role is intended to address those situations where an access control policy, such as Role Based Access Control (RBAC), is being implemented and where a change of role provides the same degree of assurance in the change of access authorizations for both the user and all processes acting on behalf of the user as would be provided by a change between a privileged and non-privileged account. To limit exposure when operating from within a privileged account or role, the application must support organizational requirements that users of information system accounts, or roles, with access to organization-defined lists of security functions or security-relevant information, use non-privileged accounts, or roles, when accessing other (non-security) system functions. When privileged activities are not separated from non-privileged activities, the database can be subject to unauthorized changes to settings and data that a standard user would not normally have access to, outside of an authorized maintenance session.

This requirement is intended to limit exposure due to operating from within a privileged account or role. The inclusion of role is intended to address those situations where an access control policy, such as Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is being implemented and where a change of role provides the same degree of assurance in the change of access authorizations for both the user and all processes acting on behalf of the user as would be provided by a change between a privileged and non-privileged account. To limit exposure when operating from within a privileged account or role, the application must support organizational requirements that users of information system accounts, or roles, with access to organization-defined lists of security functions or security-relevant information, use non-privileged accounts, or roles, when accessing other (non-security) system functions. Use of privileged accounts for non-administrative purposes puts data at risk of unintended or unauthorized loss, modification, or exposure. In particular, DBA accounts if used for non-administration application development or application maintenance can lead to miss-assignment of privileges where privileges are inherited by object owners. It may also lead to loss or compromise of application data where the elevated privileges bypass controls designed in and provided by applications. External applications called or spawned by the DBMS process may be executed under OS accounts with unnecessary privileges. This can lead to unauthorized access to OS resources and compromise of the OS, the DBMS or any other services provided by the host platform.

Anytime an authentication method is exposed, to allow for the utilization of an application, there is a risk that attempts will be made to obtain unauthorized access. To defeat these attempts, organizations define the number of times a user account may consecutively fail a logon attempt. The organization also defines the period of time in which these consecutive failed attempts may occur. By limiting the number of failed logon attempts, the risk of unauthorized system access via user password guessing, otherwise known as brute forcing, is reduced. Limits are imposed by locking the account. Note that user authentication and account management must be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP. This requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle.

Anytime an authentication method is exposed, to allow for the utilization of an application, there is a risk that attempts will be made to obtain unauthorized access. To defeat these attempts, organizations define the number of times a user account may consecutively fail a logon attempt. The organization also defines the period of time in which these consecutive failed attempts may occur. By limiting the number of failed logon attempts, the risk of unauthorized system access via user password guessing, otherwise known as brute forcing, is reduced. Limits are imposed by locking the account. More recent brute force attacks make attempts over long periods of time to circumvent intrusion detection systems and system account lockouts based entirely on the number of failed logons that are typically reset after a successful logon. Note that user authentication and account management must be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP. This requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle. Note also that a policy that places no limit on the length of the timeframe (for counting consecutive invalid attempts) does satisfy this requirement.

Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is based on the premise that individual users are "owners" of objects and therefore have discretion over who should be authorized to access the object and in which mode (e.g., read or write). Ownership is usually acquired as a consequence of creating the object or via specified ownership assignment. DAC allows the owner to determine who will have access to objects they control. An example of DAC includes user-controlled file permissions. DAC models have the potential for the access controls to propagate without limit, resulting in unauthorized access to said objects. When applications provide a discretionary access control mechanism, the application must be able to limit the propagation of those access rights. The DBMS must ensure the recipient of permissions possesses only the access intended. The database must enforce the ability to limit rights propagation if that is the intent of the grantor. If the propagation of access rights is not limited, users with rights to objects they do not own can continue to grant rights to those objects to other users without limit. This is default behavior for Oracle.

DAC is based on the notion that individual users are "owners" of objects and therefore have discretion over who should be authorized to access the object and in which mode (e.g., read or write). Ownership is usually acquired as a consequence of creating the object or via specified ownership assignment. DAC allows the owner to determine who will have access to objects they control. An example of DAC includes user-controlled file permissions. Including or excluding access to the granularity of a single user means providing the capability to either allow or deny access to objects (e.g., files, folders) on a per single user basis. Databases using DAC must have the ability for the owner of an object or information to assign or revoke rights to view or modify the object or information. If the owner of an object or information does not have rights to exclude access to an object or information at a user level, users may gain access to objects and information they are not authorized to view/modify.

It is critical for the appropriate personnel to be aware if a system is at risk of failing to process audit logs as required. Audit processing failures include: software/hardware errors, failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. If audit log capacity were to be exceeded, then events subsequently occurring would not be recorded. Organizations shall define a maximum allowable percentage of storage capacity serving as an alarming threshold (e.g., application has exceeded 80% of log storage capacity allocated) at which time the application or the logging mechanism the application utilizes will provide a warning to the appropriate personnel. A failure of database auditing will result in either the database continuing to function without auditing or in a complete halt to database operations. When audit processing fails, appropriate personnel must be alerted immediately to avoid further downtime or unaudited transactions. This can be an alert provided by the database, a log repository, or the OS when a designated log directory is nearing capacity.

It is critical for the appropriate personnel to be aware if a system is at risk of failing to process audit logs as required. Audit processing failures include: software/hardware errors, failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. If audit log capacity were to be exceeded, then events subsequently occurring would not be recorded. Organizations shall define a maximum allowable percentage of storage capacity serving as an alarming threshold (e.g., application has exceeded 80% of log storage capacity allocated) at which time the application or the logging mechanism the application utilizes will provide a warning to the appropriate personnel. A failure of database auditing will result in either the database continuing to function without auditing or in a complete halt to database operations. When audit processing fails, appropriate personnel must be alerted immediately to avoid further downtime or unaudited transactions. This can be an alert provided by the database, a log repository, or the OS when a designated log directory is nearing capacity. If Oracle Enterprise Manager is in use, the capability to issue such an alert is built in and configurable via the console so an alert can be sent to a designated administrator.

When dealing with access restrictions pertaining to change control, it should be noted any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of the information system and/or application can have significant effects on the overall security of the system. Accordingly, only qualified and authorized individuals must be allowed to obtain access to application components for the purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. Modifications to the DBMS settings, the database files, database configuration files, or the underlying database application files themselves could have catastrophic consequences to the database. Modification to DBMS settings could include turning off access controls to the database, the halting of archiving, the halting of auditing, and any number of other malicious actions.

Information system backup is a critical step in maintaining data assurance and availability. User-level information is data generated by information system and/or application users. In order to assure availability of this data in the event of a system failure, DoD organizations are required to ensure user-generated data is backed up at a defined frequency. This includes data stored on file systems, within databases or within any other storage media. Applications performing backups must be capable of backing up user-level information per the DoD-defined frequency. Database backups provide the required means to restore databases after compromise or loss. Backups help reduce the vulnerability to unauthorized access or hardware loss.

Information system backup is a critical step in maintaining data assurance and availability. User-level information is data generated by information system and/or application users. In order to assure availability of this data in the event of a system failure, DoD organizations are required to ensure user-generated data is backed up at a defined frequency. This includes data stored on file systems, within databases or within any other storage media. Applications performing backups must be capable of backing up user-level information per the DoD-defined frequency. Problems with backup procedures or backup media may not be discovered until after a recovery is needed. Testing and verification of procedures provides the opportunity to discover oversights, conflicts, or other issues in the backup procedures or use of media designed to be used.

Information system backup is a critical step in maintaining data assurance and availability. User-level information is data generated by information system and/or application users. In order to assure availability of this data in the event of a system failure, DoD organizations are required to ensure user-generated data is backed up at a defined frequency. This includes data stored on file systems, within databases or within any other storage media. Applications performing backups must be capable of backing up user-level information per the DoD-defined frequency. Lost or compromised DBMS backup and restoration files may lead to not only the loss of data, but also the unauthorized access to sensitive data. Backup files need the same protections against unauthorized access when stored on backup media as when online and actively in use by the database system. In addition, the backup media needs to be protected against physical loss. Most DBMS's maintain online copies of critical control files to provide transparent or easy recovery from hard disk loss or other interruptions to database operation.

To assure individual accountability and prevent unauthorized access, application users (and any processes acting on behalf of users) must be individually identified and authenticated. A shared authenticator is a generic account used by multiple individuals. Use of a shared authenticator alone does not uniquely identify individual users. An example of a shared authenticator is the UNIX OS 'root' user account, a Windows 'administrator' account, an 'SA' account, or a 'helpdesk' account. For example, the UNIX and Windows operating systems offer a 'switch user' capability allowing users to authenticate with their individual credentials and, when needed, 'switch' to the administrator role. This method provides for unique individual authentication prior to using a shared authenticator. Some applications may not have the need to provide a group authenticator; this is considered a matter of application design. In those instances where the application design includes the use of a shared authenticator, this requirement will apply. There may also be instances when specific user actions need to be performed on the information system without unique user identification or authentication. An example of this type of access is a web server which contains publicly releasable information. These types of accesses are allowed but must be explicitly identified and documented by the organization. When shared accounts are utilized without another means of identifying individual users, users may deny having performed a particular action.

Attackers that are able to exploit an inactive DBMS account can potentially obtain and maintain undetected access to the database. Owners of inactive DBMS accounts will not notice if unauthorized access to their user account has been obtained. All DBMS need to track periods of user inactivity and disable accounts after 35 days of inactivity. Such a process greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be hijacked, leading to a data compromise. To address access requirements, some database administrators choose to integrate their databases with enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms that meet or exceed access control policy requirements. Such integration allows the database administrator to off-load those access control functions and focus on core application features and functionality. This policy does not apply to either emergency accounts or infrequently used accounts. Infrequently used accounts are local logon administrator accounts used by system administrators when network or normal logon/access is not available. Emergency accounts are administrator accounts created in response to crisis situations. Note that user authentication and account management must be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP. This requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle.

Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. To meet password policy requirements, passwords need to be changed at specific policy-based intervals. If the information system or application allows the user to consecutively reuse their password when that password has exceeded its defined lifetime, the end result is a password that is not changed as per policy requirements. Weak passwords are a primary target for attack to gain unauthorized access to databases and other systems. Where username/password is used for identification and authentication to the database, requiring the use of strong passwords can help prevent simple and more sophisticated methods for guessing at passwords. Note that user authentication and account management must be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP. This requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle.

Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. To meet password policy requirements, passwords need to be changed at specific policy-based intervals. If the information system or application allows the user to consecutively reuse their password when that password has exceeded its defined lifetime, the end result is a password that is not changed as per policy requirements. Password reuse restrictions protect against bypass of password expiration requirements and help protect accounts from password guessing attempts. Note that user authentication and account management must be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP. This requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle.

Password complexity or strength is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determine how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password is, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Note that user authentication and account management must be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP This requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle.

Password complexity or strength is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determine how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password is, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Note that user authentication and account management must be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP. This requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle.

Password complexity or strength is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determine how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password is, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Note that user authentication and account management must be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP This requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle.

Password complexity or strength is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determine how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password is, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Note that user authentication and account management must be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP This requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle.

Passwords need to be changed at specific policy-based intervals. If the information system or application allows the user to consecutively reuse extensive portions of their password when they change their password, the end result is a password that has not had enough elements changed to meet the policy requirements. Changing passwords frequently can thwart password-guessing attempts or re-establish protection of a compromised DBMS account. Minor changes to passwords may not accomplish this since password guessing may be able to continue to build on previous guesses, or the new password may be easily guessed using the old password. Note that user authentication and account management must be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP This requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle.

Password maximum lifetime is the maximum period of time, (typically in days) a user's password may be in effect before the user is forced to change it. Passwords need to be changed at specific policy-based intervals as per policy. Any password, no matter how complex, can eventually be cracked. One method of minimizing this risk is to use complex passwords and periodically change them. If the application does not limit the lifetime of passwords and force users to change their passwords, there is the risk that the system and/or application passwords could be compromised. New accounts authenticated by passwords that are created without a password or with an easily guessed password are vulnerable to unauthorized access. Procedures for creating new accounts with passwords should include the required assignment of a temporary password to be modified by the user upon first use. Note that user authentication and account management must be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP With respect to Oracle, this requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle.

Password maximum lifetime is the maximum period of time, (typically in days) a user's password may be in effect before the user is forced to change it. Passwords need to be changed at specific policy-based intervals as per policy. Any password, no matter how complex, can eventually be cracked. One method of minimizing this risk is to use complex passwords and periodically change them. If the application does not limit the lifetime of passwords and force users to change their passwords, there is the risk that the system and/or application passwords could be compromised. The storage of passwords in application source or batch job code that is compiled, encoded, or encrypted prevents compliance with password expiration and other management requirements, as well as provides another means for potential discovery. This requirement applies equally to those accounts managed by Oracle and those managed and authenticated by the OS or an enterprise-wide mechanism. This requirement should not be construed as prohibiting or discouraging the encryption of source code, which remains an advisable precaution. Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the successor protocol to Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). Although the Oracle configuration parameters have names including 'SSL', such as SSL_VERSION and SSL_CIPHER_SUITES, they refer to TLS. This calls for inspection of application source code, which will require collaboration with the application developers. It is recognized that in many cases, the database administrator (DBA) is organizationally separate from the application developers and may have limited, if any, access to source code. Nevertheless, protections of this type are so important to the secure operation of databases that they must not be ignored. At a minimum, the DBA must attempt to obtain assurances from the development organization that this issue has been addressed and must document what has been discovered.

Password maximum lifetime is the maximum period of time, (typically in days) a user's password may be in effect before the user is forced to change it. Passwords need to be changed at specific policy-based intervals as per policy. Any password, no matter how complex, can eventually be cracked. One method of minimizing this risk is to use complex passwords and periodically change them. If the application does not limit the lifetime of passwords and force users to change their passwords, there is the risk that the system and/or application passwords could be compromised. The PASSWORD_LIFE_TIME parameter defines the number of days a password remains valid. This can must not be set to UNLIMITED. Further, the PASSWORD_GRACE_TIME parameter, if set to UNLIMITED, can nullify the PASSWORD_LIFE_TIME. PASSWORD_GRACE_TIME must be set to 0 days (or another small integer). Note: User authentication and account management must be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP. With respect to Oracle, this requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle.

Non-local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network. The act of managing systems and applications includes the ability to access sensitive application information, such as system configuration details, diagnostic information, user information, and potentially sensitive application data. When applications provide a remote management capability inherent to the application, the application needs to ensure all sessions and network connections are terminated when non-local maintenance is completed. When network connections are left open after the database session has closed, the network session is open to session hijacking. The Oracle Listener inherently meets most of this SRG requirement. When a user logs off, or times out, or encounters an unrecoverable network fault, the Oracle Listener terminates all sessions and network connections. The remaining aspect of the requirement, the timeout because of inactivity, is configurable.

Cryptography is only as strong as the encryption modules/algorithms employed to encrypt the data. Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data. Data files that are not encrypted are vulnerable to theft. When data files are not encrypted they can be copied and opened on a separate system. The data can be compromised without the information owner's knowledge that the theft has even taken place.

Emergency application accounts are typically created due to an unforeseen operational event or could ostensibly be used in the event of a vendor support visit where a support representative requires a temporary unique account in order to perform diagnostic testing or conduct some other support-related activity. When these types of accounts are created, there is a risk that the temporary account may remain in place and active after the support representative has left. In the event emergency application accounts are required, the application must ensure accounts that are designated as temporary in nature shall automatically terminate these accounts after an organization-defined time period. Such a process and capability greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be misused, hijacked, or application data compromised. Note that user authentication and account management must be done via an enterprise-wide mechanism whenever possible. Examples of enterprise-level authentication/access mechanisms include, but are not limited to, Active Directory and LDAP. This requirement applies to cases where it is necessary to have accounts directly managed by Oracle. If it is possible for any temporary emergency accounts to be created and managed by Oracle, then the DBMS or application must provide or utilize a mechanism to automatically terminate such accounts after an organization-defined time period. Emergency database accounts must be automatically terminated after an organization-defined time period in order to mitigate the risk of the account being misused.

A variety of technologies exist to limit, or in some cases, eliminate the effects of DoS attacks. For example, boundary protection devices can filter certain types of packets to protect devices on an organization's internal network from being directly affected by DoS attacks. Employing increased capacity and bandwidth combined with service redundancy may reduce the susceptibility to some DoS attacks. Some of the ways databases can limit their exposure to DoS attacks are through limiting the number of connections that can be opened by a single user and database clustering.

Organizations are required to employ integrity verification applications on information systems to look for evidence of information tampering, errors, and omissions. The organization is also required to employ good software engineering practices with regard to commercial off-the-shelf integrity mechanisms (e.g., parity checks, cyclical redundancy checks, and cryptographic hashes), and to use tools to automatically monitor the integrity of the information system and the applications it hosts. The DBMS opens data files and reads configuration files at system startup, system shutdown, and during abort recovery efforts. If the DBMS does not verify the trustworthiness of these files, it is vulnerable to malicious alterations of its configuration or unauthorized replacement of data.

When dealing with change control issues, it should be noted, any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of the information system and/or application can potentially have significant effects on the overall security of the system. If the application were to allow any user to make changes to software libraries, then those changes might be implemented without undergoing the appropriate testing and approvals that are part of a robust change management process. This requirement is contingent upon the language in which the application is programmed, as many application architectures in use today incorporate their software libraries into, and make them inseparable from, their compiled distributions, rendering them static and version-dependent. However, this requirement does apply to applications with software libraries accessible and configurable as in the case of interpreted languages. Accordingly, only qualified and authorized individuals shall be allowed to obtain access to information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. The DBMS software libraries contain the executables used by the DBMS to operate. Unauthorized access to the libraries can result in malicious alteration. This may in turn jeopardize data stored in the DBMS and/or operation of the host system.

Information stored in one location is vulnerable to accidental or incidental deletion or alteration. Off-loading is a common process in information systems with limited audit storage capacity. The DBMS may write audit records to database tables, files in the file system, other kinds of local repositories, or a centralized log management system. Whatever the method used, it must be compatible with off-loading the records to the centralized system.