Juniper SRX SG NDM Security Technical Implementation Guide

Upon gaining access to a network device, an attacker will often first attempt to create a persistent method of reestablishing access. One way to accomplish this is to create a new account. Notification of account creation helps to mitigate this risk. Auditing account creation provides the necessary reconciliation that account management procedures are being followed. Without this audit trail, personnel without the proper authorization may gain access to critical network nodes. An AAA server is required for account management in accordance with CCI-000370. Only a single account of last resort is permitted on the local device. However, since it is still possible for administrators to create local accounts either maliciously or to support mission needs, the SRX must be configured to log account management events. To log local account management events, ensure at least one external syslog server is configured to log facility any or facility change-log, and severity info or severity any.

Upon gaining access to a network device, an attacker will often first attempt to modify existing accounts to increase/decrease privileges. Notification of account modification events help to mitigate this risk. Auditing account modification events provides the necessary reconciliation that account management procedures are being followed. Without this audit trail, personnel without the proper authorization may gain access to critical network nodes. An AAA server is required for account management in accordance with CCI-000370. Only a single account of last resort is permitted on the local device. However, since it is still possible for administrators to create local accounts either maliciously or to support mission needs, the SRX must be configured to log account management events. To log local account management events, ensure at least one external syslog server is configured to log facility any or facility change-log, and severity info or severity any.

When device management accounts are disabled, user or service accessibility may be affected. Auditing also ensures authorized, active accounts remain enabled and available for use when required. Without this audit trail, personnel without the proper authorization may gain access to critical network nodes. An AAA server is required for account management in accordance with CCI-000370. Only a single account of last resort is permitted on the local device. However, since it is still possible for administrators to create local accounts either maliciously or to support mission needs, the SRX must be configured to log account management events. To log local account management events, ensure at least one external syslog server is configured to log facility any or facility change-log, and severity info or severity any.

Auditing account removal actions will support account management procedures. When device management accounts are terminated, user or service accessibility may be affected. Auditing also ensures authorized active accounts remain enabled and available for use when required. Without this audit trail, personnel without the proper authorization may gain access to critical network nodes. An AAA server is required for account management in accordance with CCI-000370. Only a single account of last resort is permitted on the local device. However, since it is still possible for administrators to create local accounts either maliciously or to support mission needs, the SRX must be configured to log account management events. To log local account management events, ensure at least one external syslog server is configured to log facility any or facility change-log, and severity info or severity any.

Once an attacker establishes initial access to a system, the attacker often attempts to create a persistent method of reestablishing access. One way to accomplish this is for the attacker to simply enable a new or disabled account. Notification of account enabling is one method for mitigating this risk. A comprehensive account management process will ensure an audit trail which documents the creation of application user accounts and notifies administrators and Information System Security Officers (ISSO). Such a process greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be surreptitiously created and provides logging that can be used for forensic purposes. Accounts can be disabled by configuring the account with the build-in login class "unauthorized". When the command is reissued with a different login class, the account is enabled.

To mitigate the risk of unauthorized privileged access to the device, administrators must be assigned only the privileges needed to perform the tasked assigned to their roles. Although use of an AAA server is required for non-local access for device management, the SRX must also be configured to implement the corresponding privileges upon user login. Each externally authenticated user is assigned a template that maps to a configured login class. AAA servers are usually configured to send a Vendor Specific Attribute (VSA) to the Juniper SRX. The device uses this information to determine the login class to assign to the authenticated user. Unless a VSA is returned from the AAA server, externally-authenticated users are mapped to the “remote” user by default. Remote user is a special default account in Junos OS. If this default account, or another designated remote user account, is not configured, then only externally-authenticated users with a returned VSA of a local template account are permitted login. If the remote user is configured, all externally-authenticated users without a returned VSA default to the remote user account's configured login class. All externally-authenticated users with a returned VSA inherit the login class configured for each respective template account. Junos OS provides four built-in login classes: super-user (all permissions), operator (limited permissions), read-only (no change permissions), and unauthorized (prohibits login). Because these classes are not configurable by the system administrator, they should not be used except for the unauthorized class which may be used for the remote user to deterministically prohibit logins from externally-authenticated users without a returned VSA. Therefore, all template user accounts, and the local account of last resort, should use custom, user-defined, login classes. Externally-authenticated users maintain two account names in Junos OS: the user and login names. The user name is the local template account name and the login name is the authenticated user’s external account name. Junos OS links the names to determine permissions, based upon login class, but uses the external account name for logging. Doing so permits multiple, individually-authenticated users, to be mapped to the same template account, and therefore enforce uniform permissions for each group of administrators, while also attributing any logged changes to the appropriate individual user. Template accounts are differentiated from local accounts by the presence of an authentication stanza; only the local account of last resort should have an authentication stanza.

In order to ensure network devices have a sufficient storage capacity in which to write the logs, they need to be able to allocate audit record storage capacity. The task of allocating audit record storage capacity is usually performed during initial device setup if it is modifiable. The amount allocated for the organization-defined audit record storage requirement will depend on the amount of storage available on the network device, the anticipated volume of logs, and how long the logs are kept on the device. Since the Syslog is the primary audit log, the local log is not essential to keep archived for lengthy periods, thus the allocated space on the device should be low.

It is critical for the appropriate personnel to be aware if a system is at risk of failing to process logs as required. Without an immediate alert for critical system issues, security personnel may be unaware of an impending failure of the audit capability and system operation may be adversely affected. Alerts provide organizations with urgent messages. Real-time alerts provide these messages at information technology speed (i.e., the time from event detection to alert occurs in seconds or less). Automated alerts can be conveyed in a variety of ways, including, for example, telephonically, via electronic mail, via text message, or via websites. Alerts must be sent immediately to the designated individuals (e.g., via Syslog configuration, SNMP trap, manned console message, or other events monitoring system). Log processing failures include software/hardware errors, failures in the log capturing mechanisms, and log storage capacity being reached or exceeded. While this requirement also applies to the configuration of the event monitoring system (e.g., Syslog, Security Information and Event Management [SIEM], or SNMP servers), the Juniper SRX can also be configured to generate a message to the administrator console or send via email for immediate messages. Syslog and SNMP trap events with a facility of "daemon" pertaining to errors encountered by system processes.

If time stamps are not consistently applied and there is no common time reference, it is difficult to perform forensic analysis. UTC is normally used in DoD; however, Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) may be used if needed for mission requirements.

Allowing anyone to install software, without explicit privileges, creates the risk that untested or potentially malicious software will be installed on the system. This requirement applies to code changes and upgrades for all network devices. For example audit admins and the account of last resort are not allowed to perform this task.

The loopback interface is a logical interface and has no physical port. Since the interface and addresses ranges are well-known, this port must be filtered to protect the Juniper SRX from attacks.

The loss of connectivity to a particular authoritative time source will result in the loss of time synchronization (free-run mode) and increasingly inaccurate time stamps on log events and other functions. Multiple time sources provide redundancy by including a secondary source. Time synchronization is usually a hierarchy; clients synchronize time to a local source while that source synchronizes its time to a more accurate source. The network device must utilize an authoritative time server and/or be configured to use redundant authoritative time sources.

Centralized management of authentication settings increases the security of remote and nonlocal access methods. This control is a particularly important protection against the insider threat. Audit records for administrator accounts access to the organization's network devices can be more readily analyzed for trends and anomalies. The alternative method of defining administrator accounts on each device exposes the device configuration to remote access authentication attacks and system administrators with multiple authenticators for each network device. The Juniper SRX supports three methods of user authentication: local password authentication, Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS), and Terminal Access Controller Access Control System Plus (TACACS+). RADIUS and TACACS+ are remote access methods used for management of the Juniper SRX. The local password method will be configured for use only for the account of last resort. To completely set up AAA authentication, create a user template account (the default name is remote) and specify a system authentication server and an authentication order. See CCI-000213 for more details. The remote user template is not a logon account. Once the AAA server option is configured, any remote or nonlocal access attempts are redirected to the AAA server. Since individual user accounts are not defined on the SRX, the authentication server must be used to manage individual account settings.

To mitigate the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive information by entities that have been issued certificates by DoD-approved PKIs. The SRX generates a key-pair and a CSR. The CSR is sent to the approved CA, who signs it and returns it as a certificate. That certificate is then installed. The process to obtain a device PKI certificate requires the generation of a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), submission of the CSR to a CA, approval of the request by an RA, and retrieval of the issued certificate from the CA.

In order to prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or unauthorized tunneling (i.e., embedding of data types within data types), organizations must disable unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols on information systems. The control plane is responsible for operating most of the system services on the SRX. The control plane is responsible not only for acting as the interface for the administrator operating the device, but also for controlling the operation of the chassis, pushing the configuration to the data plane, and operating the daemons that provide functionality to the system. The control plane operates the Junos OS, which is a FreeBSD variant. The Juniper SRX control plane services include, but are not limited to, the following: Management Daemon (MGD), Routing Protocol Daemon (RPD) (e.g., RIP, OSPF, IS-IS, BGP, PIM, IPv6 counterparts), User interfaces (SSH, J-Web, NetConf), File system interfaces (SCP), Syslogd (DNS, DHCP, NTP, ICMP, ARP/ND, SNMP), Chassisd, JSRPD (HA clustering).

If unsecured protocols (lacking cryptographic mechanisms) are used for sessions, the contents of those sessions will be susceptible to manipulation, potentially allowing alteration and hijacking of maintenance sessions. Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network. Tools used for nonlocal management and diagnostics with the Juniper SRX include SSH but may also include compatible enterprise maintenance and diagnostics servers. Regardless of the tool used, the Juniper SRX must permit only the use of protocols with the capability to be configured securely with integrity protections. Specifically, use SSH instead of Telnet, SCP instead of FTP, and SNMPv3 rather than other versions SNMP.

Without authenticating devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity. Bidirectional authentication provides stronger safeguards to validate the identity of other devices for connections that are of greater risk, such as remote connections. The Juniper SRX can only be configured to use MD5 authentication keys. This algorithm is not FIPS 140-2 validated; thus, a CAT 1 finding is allocated in CCI-000803. However, MD5 is preferred to no authentication at all. The trusted-key statement permits authenticating NTP servers. The Juniper SRX supports multiple keys, multiple NTP servers, and different keys for each server; add the “key ” parameter to the server statement to associate a key with a specific server.

Since the identity of the root account is well-known for systems based upon Linux or UNIX and this account does not have a setting to limit access attempts, there is risk of a brute force attack on the password. Root access would give superuser access to an attacker. Preventing attackers from remotely accessing management functions using root account mitigates the risk that unauthorized individuals or processes may gain superuser access to information or privileges. A separate account should be used for access and then the administrator can sudo to root when necessary.

Restricting the privilege to create a UNIX-level shell limits access to this powerful function. System administrators, regardless of their other permissions, will need to also know the root password for this access, thus limiting the possibility of malicious or accidental circumvention of security controls.

Use this configuration option to prevent a user from creating an SSH tunnel over a CLI session to the Juniper SRX via SSH. This type of tunnel could be used to forward TCP traffic, bypassing any firewall filters or ACLs, allowing unauthorized access.

Without centralized management, credentials for some network devices will be forgotten, leading to delays in administration, which itself leads to delays in remediating production problems and in addressing compromises in a timely fashion. Maintaining local administrator accounts for daily usage on each network device without centralized management is not scalable or feasible. Local accounts are configured using the local password authentication method which does not meet the multifactor authentication criteria. The account of last resort is a group authenticator which does not provide nonrepudiation, thus must be used only rare cases where the device must be accessed using the local console and an individual authenticator is not possible, including when network access is not available.

A replay attack may enable an unauthorized user to gain access to the application. Authentication sessions between the authenticator and the application validating the user credentials must not be vulnerable to a replay attack. An authentication process resists replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve a successful authentication by recording and replaying a previous authentication message. There are 2 approved methods for accessing the Juniper SRX which are, in order of preference, the SSH protocol and the console port.

Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. The shorter the password, the lower the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised. Use of more characters in a password helps to exponentially increase the time and/or resources required to compromise the password. Compliance with this requirement also prevents the system from being configured with default or no passwords.

Use of a complex passwords helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. The password change-type command specifies whether a minimum number of character-sets or a minimum number of character-set transitions are enforced. The DoD requires this setting be set to character-sets.

Use of a complex passwords helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determine how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password is, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.

Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determine how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.

Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determine how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.

Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password complexity is one factor of several that determine how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.

Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. The password format command is an optional command that specifies the hash algorithm used for authenticating passwords. The options are MD5, SHA1, or DES. SHA1 is recommended because it is a FIPS-approved algorithm and provides stronger security.

To protect the integrity of nonlocal maintenance sessions, SSHv2 with MAC algorithms for integrity checking must be configured. Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network. The SSHv2 protocol suite includes Layer 7 protocols such as SCP and SFTP which can be used for secure file transfers.

To protect the confidentiality of nonlocal maintenance sessions when using SSH communications, SSHv2, AES ciphers, and key-exchange commands are configured. Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network. The SSHv2 protocol suite includes Layer 7 protocols such as SCP and SFTP which can be used for secure file transfers. The key-exchange commands limit the key exchanges to FIPS and DoD-approved methods.

Add a firewall filter to protect the management interface. Note: The dedicated management interface (if present), and an interface placed in the functional zone management, will not participate in routing network traffic. It will only support device management traffic. The host-inbound-traffic feature of the SRX is an additional layer of security for system services. This function can be configured on either a per zone or a per interface basis within each individual security zone. By default, a security zone has all system services disabled, which means that it will not accept any inbound management or protocol requests on the control plane without explicitly enabling the service at either the interface or zone in the security zone stanzas.

This setting frees device resources and mitigates the risk of an unauthorized user gaining access to an open idle session. When sessions are terminated by a normal administrator log off, the Juniper SRX makes the current contents unreadable and no user activity can take place in the session. However, abnormal terminations or loss of communications do not signal a session termination, thus a keep-alive count and interval must be configured so the device will know when communication with the client is no longer available. The keep-alive value and the interval between keep-alive messages must be set to an organization-defined value based on mission requirements and network performance.

Terminating an idle session within a short time period reduces the window of opportunity for unauthorized personnel to take control of a management session. Quickly terminating an idle session also frees up resources. This requirement does not mean that the device terminates all sessions or network access; it only ends the inactive session. User accounts, including the account of last resort must be assigned to a login class. Configure all login classes with an idle timeout value. Pre-defined classes do not support configurations, therefore should not be used for DoD implementations. The root account cannot be assigned to a login-class which is why it is critical that this account be secured in accordance with DoD policy.

Configuring the keep-alive for management protocols mitigates the risk of an open connection being hijacked by an attacker. The keep-alive messages and the interval between each message are used to force the system to disconnect a user that has lost network connectivity to the device. This differs from inactivity timeouts because the device does not wait the 10 minutes to log the user out but, instead, immediately logs the user out if the number of keep-alive messages are exceeded. The interval between messages should also be configured. These values should be set to an organization-defined value based on mission requirements and network performance.

DoS is a condition when a resource is not available for legitimate users. When this occurs, the organization either cannot accomplish its mission or must operate at degraded capacity. Juniper SRX uses the system commands, system internet-options, and screens to mitigate the impact of DoS attacks on device availability.

The rate-limit command limits the number of SSH session attempts allowed per minute which helps limit an attacker's ability to perform DoS attacks. The rate limit should be as restrictive as operationally practical. Juniper Networks recommends a best practice of 4 for the rate limit, however the limit should be as restrictive as operationally practical. User connections that exceed the rate-limit will be closed immediately after the connection is initiated. They will not be in a waiting state.

Earlier versions of Junos may have reached the end of life cycle support by the vendor. Junos 12.1X46 is not a UC APL certified version, while 12.1X46 is UC APL Certified. The SRX with Junos 12.1X46 has been NIAP certified as a firewall and VPN. Junos 12.1X46 contains a number of enhancements, particularly related to IPv6, that are relevant to the STIG.

Automatic session termination addresses the termination of administrator-initiated logical sessions in contrast to the termination of network connections that are associated with communications sessions (i.e., network disconnect). Conditions or trigger events requiring automatic session termination can include, for example, organization-defined periods of user inactivity, targeted responses to certain types of incidents, and time-of-day restrictions on information system use. These conditions will vary across environments and network device types. The Juniper SRX can be configured to limit login times or to logout users after a certain time period if desired by the organization. These setting are configured as options on the login class to which they apply.

An authorized insider or individual who maliciously creates a local account could gain immediate access from a remote location to privileged information on a critical security device. Sending an alert to the administrators and ISSO when this action occurs greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be surreptitiously created. Automated mechanisms can be used to send automatic alerts or notifications. Such automatic alerts or notifications can be conveyed in a variety of ways (e.g., telephonically, via electronic mail, via text message, or via websites). The ALG must either send the alert to a management console that is actively monitored by authorized personnel or use a messaging capability to send the alert directly to designated personnel. Alerts must be sent immediately to designated individuals. Alerts may be sent via NMS, SIEM, Syslog configuration, SNMP trap or notice, or manned console message. Although, based on policy, administrator accounts must be created on the AAA server, thus this requirement addresses the creation of unauthorized accounts on the Juniper SRX itself. This does not negate the need to address this requirement on the AAA server and the event monitoring server (e.g., Syslog, Security Information and Event Management [SIEM], or SNMP servers).

An authorized insider or individual who maliciously modifies a local account could gain immediate access from a remote location to privileged information on a critical security device. Sending an alert to the administrators and ISSO when this action occurs greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be surreptitiously modified. Automated mechanisms can be used to send automatic alerts or notifications. Such automatic alerts or notifications can be conveyed in a variety of ways (e.g., telephonically, via electronic mail, via text message, or via websites). The ALG must either send the alert to a management console that is actively monitored by authorized personnel or use a messaging capability to send the alert directly to designated personnel. Alerts must be sent immediately to designated individuals. Alerts may be sent via NMS, SIEM, Syslog configuration, SNMP trap or notice, or manned console message. Although, based on policy, administrator accounts must be modified on the AAA server, thus this requirement addresses the modification of unauthorized accounts on the Juniper SRX itself. This does not negate the need to address this requirement on the AAA server and the event monitoring server (e.g., Syslog, Security Information and Event Management [SIEM], or SNMP servers).

An authorized insider or individual who maliciously disables a local account could gain immediate access from a remote location to privileged information on a critical security device. Sending an alert to the administrators and ISSO when this action occurs greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be surreptitiously disabled. Automated mechanisms can be used to send automatic alerts or notifications. Such automatic alerts or notifications can be conveyed in a variety of ways (e.g., telephonically, via electronic mail, via text message, or via websites). The ALG must either send the alert to a management console that is actively monitored by authorized personnel or use a messaging capability to send the alert directly to designated personnel. Alerts must be sent immediately to designated individuals. Alerts may be sent via NMS, SIEM, Syslog configuration, SNMP trap or notice, or manned console message. Although, based on policy, administrator accounts must be disabled on the AAA server, this requirement addresses the disabling of unauthorized accounts on the Juniper SRX itself. This does not negate the need to address this requirement on the AAA server and the event monitoring server (e.g., Syslog, Security Information and Event Management [SIEM], or SNMP servers).

An authorized insider or individual who maliciously delete a local account could gain immediate access from a remote location to privileged information on a critical security device. Sending an alert to the administrators and ISSO when this action occurs greatly reduces the risk that accounts will be surreptitiously deleted. Automated mechanisms can be used to send automatic alerts or notifications. Such automatic alerts or notifications can be conveyed in a variety of ways (e.g., telephonically, via electronic mail, via text message, or via websites). The ALG must either send the alert to a management console that is actively monitored by authorized personnel or use a messaging capability to send the alert directly to designated personnel. Alerts must be sent immediately to designated individuals. Alerts may be sent via NMS, SIEM, Syslog configuration, SNMP trap or notice, or manned console message. Although, based on policy, administrator accounts must be deleted on the AAA server, this requirement addresses the deletion of unauthorized accounts on the Juniper SRX itself. This does not negate the need to address this requirement on the AAA server and the event monitoring server (e.g., Syslog, Security Information and Event Management [SIEM], or SNMP servers). Accounts can be disabled by configuring the account with the built-in login class "unauthorized". When the command is reissued with a different login class, the account is enabled.

In order to detect and respond to events that affect network administrator accessibility and device processing, network devices must audit account enabling actions and, as required, notify the appropriate individuals so they can investigate the event. Alerts must be sent immediately to the designated individuals (e.g., via Syslog configuration, SNMP trap, manned console message, or other events monitoring system). Accounts can be disabled by configuring the account with the built-in login class "unauthorized". When the command is reissued with a different login class, the account is enabled.

It is critical that when the network device is at risk of failing to process logs as required, it take action to mitigate the failure. Log processing failures include: software/hardware errors; failures in the log capturing mechanisms; and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. Responses to log failure depend upon the nature of the failure mode. Since availability is an overriding concern given the role of the Juniper SRX in the enterprise, the system must not be configured to shut down in the event of a log processing failure. The system will be configured to log events to local files, which will provide a log backup. If communication with the Syslog server is lost or the server fails, the network device must continue to queue log records locally. Upon restoration of the connection to the centralized collection server, action should be taken to synchronize the local log data with the collection server. A best practice is to add log-prefixes to the log file names to help in researching the events and filters to prevent log overload. Another best practice is to add a match condition to limit the recorded events to those containing the regular expression (REGEX). Thus, the Juniper SRX will inherently and continuously capture events to local files to guard against the loss of connectivity to the primary and secondary events server.

Centralized application (e.g., TACACS+, RADIUS) of authentication settings increases the security of remote and nonlocal access methods. This control is a particularly important protection against the insider threat. Audit records for administrator accounts access to the organization's network devices can be more readily analyzed for trends and anomalies. The alternative method of defining administrator accounts on each device exposes the device configuration to remote access authentication attacks and system administrators with multiple authenticators for each network device. This requirement references identification and authentication and does not prevent the configuration of privileges using the remote template account (CCI-000213).

Component (e.g., chassis, file storage, file corruption) failure may cause the system to become unavailable, which could result in mission failure since the network would be operating without a critical security traffic inspection or access function. Alerts provide organizations with urgent messages. Real-time alerts provide these messages at information technology speed (i.e., the time from event detection to alert occurs in seconds or less). Automated alerts can be conveyed in a variety of ways, including, for example, telephonically, via electronic mail, via text message, or via websites. While this requirement also applies to the event monitoring system (e.g., Syslog, Security Information and Event Management [SIEM], or SNMP servers), the Juniper SRX must also be configured to generate a message to the administrator console. Syslog and SNMP trap events with a facility of "daemon" pertain to errors encountered by system processes.

Only authorized personnel should be aware of errors and the details of the errors. Error messages are an indicator of an organization's operational state. Additionally, sensitive account information must not be revealed through error messages to unauthorized personnel or their designated representatives. Although, based on policy, administrator accounts must be created on the AAA server, thus this requirement addresses the creation of unauthorized accounts on the Juniper SRX itself. This does not negate the need to address this requirement on the AAA server and the event monitoring server (e.g., Syslog, Security Information and Event Management [SIEM], or SNMP servers).