Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Security Technical Implementation Guide

Unrestricted traffic may contain malicious traffic which poses a threat to an enclave or to other connected networks. Additionally, unrestricted traffic may transit a network, which uses bandwidth and other resources. VPN traffic received from another enclave with different security policy or level of trust must not bypass be inspected by the firewall before being forwarded to the private network.

Display of the DOD-approved use notification before granting access to the network device ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Satisfies: SRG-NET-000041-VPN-000110, SRG-NET-000042-VPN-000120, SRG-NET-000043-VPN-000130

VPN gateway management includes the ability to control the number of users and user sessions that utilize a VPN gateway. Limiting the number of allowed users and sessions per user is helpful in limiting risks related to DoS attacks. This requirement addresses concurrent sessions for information system accounts and does not address concurrent sessions by single users via multiple system accounts. The maximum number of concurrent sessions should be defined based upon mission needs and the operational environment for each system. The intent of this policy is to ensure the number of concurrent sessions is deliberately set to a number based on the site's mission and not left unlimited.

To ensure accountability and prevent unauthenticated access, organizational users must be identified and authenticated to prevent potential misuse and compromise of the system. Organizational users include organizational employees or individuals the organization deems to have equivalent status of employees (e.g., contractors). Organizational users (and any processes acting on behalf of users) must be uniquely identified and authenticated for all accesses except the following. (i) Accesses explicitly identified and documented by the organization. Organizations document specific user actions that can be performed on the information system without identification or authentication; and (ii) Accesses that occur through authorized use of group authenticators without individual authentication. Organizations may require unique identification of individuals' in-group accounts (e.g., shared privilege accounts) or for detailed accountability of individual activity. This requirement only applies to components where this is specific to the function of the device or has the concept of an organizational user (e.g., VPN or proxy capability). This does not apply to authentication for the purpose of configuring the device itself (i.e., device management).

Without path validation, an informed trust decision by the relying party cannot be made when presented with any certificate not already explicitly trusted. To meet this requirement, the information system must create trusted channels between itself and remote trusted authorized IT product (e.g., syslog server) entities that protect the confidentiality and integrity of communications. The information system must create trusted paths between itself and remote administrators and users that protect the confidentiality and integrity of communications. A trust anchor is an authoritative entity represented via a public key and associated data. It is most often used in the context of public key infrastructures, X.509 digital certificates, and DNSSEC. However, applications that do not use a trusted path are not approved for nonlocal and remote management of DOD information systems. Use of SSHv2 to establish a trusted channel is approved. Use of FTP, TELNET, HTTP, and SNMPV1 is not approved since they violate the trusted channel rule set. Use of web management tools that are not validated by common criteria may also violate the trusted channel rule set. When there is a chain of trust, usually the top entity to be trusted becomes the trust anchor; it can be, for example, a Certification Authority (CA). A certification path starts with the subject certificate and proceeds through a number of intermediate certificates up to a trusted root certificate, typically issued by a trusted CA. This requirement verifies that a certification path to an accepted trust anchor is used for certificate validation and that the path includes status information. Path validation is necessary for a relying party to make an informed trust decision when presented with any certificate not already explicitly trusted. Status information for certification paths includes certificate revocation lists or online certificate status protocol responses. Validation of the certificate status information is out of scope for this requirement. Satisfies: SRG-NET-000164-VPN-000560, SRG-NET-000512-VPN-002230, SRG-NET-000580-VPN-002410

This SRG requirement is in response to the DoD OIG Audit of Maintaining Cybersecurity in the Coronavirus Disease-2019 Telework Environment. Best practice is to terminate inactive user sessions after a period; however, when setting timeouts to any VPN connection, the organization must take into consideration the risk to the mission and the purpose of the VPN. VPN connections that provide user access to the network are the prime candidates for VPN session termination and are the primary focus of this requirement. To determine if and when the VPN connections warrant termination, the organization must perform a risk assessment to identify the use case for the VPN and determine if periodic VPN session termination puts the mission at significant risk. The organization must document the results and the determination of the risk assessment in the VPN section of the SSP. The organization must also configure VPN session terminations in accordance with the risk assessment. This SRG requirement is in response to the DOD OIG Audit of Maintaining Cybersecurity in the Coronavirus Disease-2019 Telework Environment. Best practice is to terminate inactive user sessions after a period; however, when setting timeouts to any VPN connection, the organization must take into consideration the risk to the mission and the purpose of the VPN. VPN connections that provide user access to the network are the prime candidates for VPN session termination and are the primary focus of this requirement. To determine if and when the VPN connections warrant termination, the organization must perform a risk assessment to identify the use case for the VPN and determine if periodic VPN session termination puts the mission at significant risk. The organization must document the results and the determination of the risk assessment in the VPN section of the SSP. The organization must also configure VPN session terminations in accordance with the risk assessment. Terminating an idle session within a short time period reduces the window of opportunity for unauthorized personnel to take control of a management session enabled on the console or console port that has been left unattended. In addition, quickly terminating an idle session will also free up resources committed by the managed network element. Terminating network connections associated with communications sessions includes, for example, de-allocating associated TCP/IP address/port pairs at the operating system level, and de-allocating networking assignments at the application level if multiple application sessions are using a single, operating system level network connection. This requirement applies to any network element that tracks individual sessions (e.g., stateful inspection firewall, ALG, or VPN).

The aggregation of log data kept on a syslog server can be used to detect attacks and trigger an alert to the appropriate security personnel. The stored log data can used to detect weaknesses in security that enable the network IA team to find and address these weaknesses before breaches can occur. Reviewing these logs, whether before or after a security breach, are important in showing whether someone is an internal employee or an outside threat. This requirement applies only to components where this is specific to the function of the device (e.g., IDPS sensor logs, firewall logs). This does not apply to audit logs generated on behalf of the device itself (management).

It is critical for the appropriate personnel to be aware if a system is at risk of failing to process audit logs as required. Without a real-time alert, security personnel may be unaware of an impending failure of the audit capability and system operation may be adversely affected. Alerts provide organizations with urgent messages. Automated alerts can be conveyed in a variety of ways, including, for example, telephonically, via electronic mail, via text message, or via websites. Log processing failures include software/hardware errors, failures in the log capturing mechanisms, and log storage capacity being reached or exceeded. The VPN daemon facility and log facility are messages in the log, which capture actions performed or errors encountered by system processes.

Without authenticating devices, unidentified or unknown devices may be introduced, thereby facilitating malicious activity. For ICS, user authentication uses authentication servers, realms, roles, and sign-in policies. To the device, both machine and user authentication are treated as user logins and certificates (machine certs and CAC) are supported for authentication. Although both machine and human users are considered "users" to the device. The system supports separating admin from user/computer authentication by duplicating auth servers and only associating a single server to an admin realm or a user realm but not both. This supports the DOD best practice of authenticating admin authentication using a separate authentication server from user authentication.

Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of using encryption to protect data. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service's (NSA/CSS) CSfC Program enables commercial products to be used in layered solutions to protect classified National Security Systems (NSS) data. Currently, Suite B cryptographic algorithms are specified by NIST and are used by NSA's Information Assurance Directorate in solutions approved for protecting classified and unclassified NSS. However, quantum resistant algorithms will be required for future required Suite B implementations. Satisfies: SRG-NET-000352-VPN-001460, SRG-NET-000565-VPN-002400, SRG-NET-000565-VPN-002390

Split tunneling would in effect allow unauthorized external connections, making the system more vulnerable to attack and to exfiltration of organizational information. A VPN hardware or software client with split tunneling enabled provides an unsecured backdoor to the enclave from the internet. With split tunneling enabled, a remote client has access to the internet while at the same time has established a secured path to the enclave via an IPsec tunnel. A remote client connected to the internet that has been compromised by an attacker on the internet, provides an attack base to the enclave's private network via the IPsec tunnel. Hence, it is imperative that the VPN gateway enforces a no split-tunneling policy to all remote clients.

Without device-to-device authentication, communications with malicious devices may be established. Bidirectional authentication provides stronger safeguards to validate the identity of other devices for connections that are of greater risk. SNMPv3 supports authentication, authorization, access control, and privacy, while previous versions of the protocol contained well-known security weaknesses, which were easily exploited. SNMPv3 can be configured for identification and bidirectional, cryptographically based authentication. A typical SNMP implementation includes three components: managed device, SNMP agent, and NMS. The SNMP agent is the SNMP process that resides on the managed device and communicates with the network management system. The NMS is a combination of hardware and software that is used to monitor and administer a network. The SNMP data is stored in a highly structured, hierarchical format known as a management information base (MIB). The SNMP manager collects information about network connectivity, activity, and events by polling managed devices. SNMPv3 defines a user-based security model (USM), and a view-based access control model (VACM). SNMPv3 USM provides data integrity, data origin authentication, message replay protection, and protection against disclosure of the message payload. SNMPv3 VACM provides access control to determine whether a specific type of access (read or write) to the management information is allowed. Implement both VACM and USM for full protection. SNMPv3 server services must not be configured on products whose primary purpose is not to provide SNMP services. SNMP client services may be configured on the VPN gateway, application, or operating system to allow limited monitoring or querying of the device from by an SNMP server for management purposes. SNMP of any version will not be used to make configuration changes to the device. SNMPv3 must be disabled by default and enabled only if used. SNMP v3 provides security feature enhancements to SNMP, including encryption and message authentication. Currently, the AES cipher block algorithm can be used for both applying cryptographic protection (e.g., encryption) and removing or verifying the protection that was previously applied (e.g., decryption) in DOD. The use of FIPS-approved algorithms for both cryptographic mechanisms is required. If any version of SNMP is used for remote administration, default SNMP community strings such as "public" and "private" should be removed before real community strings are put into place. If the defaults are not removed, an attacker could retrieve real community strings from the device using the default string.